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ABSTRACT
A plethora of retailers have begun to embrace a dual-channel retailing strategy
wherein items are provided to consumers through both an online store and a physical
store. As a result of standards and competitive measures, many retailers provide buyers
who are unhappy with their purchases with the ability to achieve a full refund. In a dualchannel retailing system, full reimbursements can be done through what is called a crosschannel return, when a buyer purchases a product from an online store and returns it to a
physical store. They can also be done through what is called a same-channel return, when
a buyer purchases a product from a physical store and returns it back to the physical store,
or purchases a product from an online store and returns it back to the online store. No
existing research has examined all common types of customer returns in the context of a
dual-channel retailing system. Be notified that the practice of cross-returning an item
purchased from the physical store back to the online store is not common. Thus, it is not
considered in this dissertation.
We first study the optimal pricing policies for a centralized and decentralized
dual-channel retailer (DCR) with same- and cross-channel returns. We consider two
factors: the dual-channel retailer’s performance under centralization with unified and
differential pricing schemes, and the dual-channel retailer’s performance under
decentralization with the Stackelberg and Nash games. How dual-channel pricing
behaviour is impacted by customer preference and rates of customer returns is discussed.
In this study, a channel’s sales requests is a linear function of a channel’s own pricing
strategy and a cross-channel’s pricing strategy.
The second problem is an extension of the first problem. The optimal pricing
policies and online channel’s responsiveness level for a centralized and decentralized
dual-channel retailer with same- and cross-channel returns are studied. Indeed, the online
store is normally the distribution centre of the enterprise and is not limited to the
customers in its neighbourhood. Also, the online store experiences a much higher return
rate compared to the physical store. Thus, it has the capability and the need to optimize its
responsiveness to customer returns along with its pricing strategy. A channel’s sales
requests, in the second problem, is a linear function of a channel’s own price, a crosschannel’s price, and the online store’s responsiveness level.
The third problem studies the dilemma of whether or not to allow unsatisfactory
online purchases to be cross-returned to the physical store. If not properly considered,
those returns may create havoc to the system and a retailer might overestimate or
underestimate a channel’s order quantity. Therefore, we study and compare between four
v

different strategies, and propose models to determine optimal order quantities for each
strategy when a dual-channel retailer offers both same and cross-channel returns. Several
decision making insights on choosing between the different cross-channel return
strategies and some properties of the optimal solutions are presented.
From the retailer’s perspective of outsourcing the e-channel’s management to a
third party logistics and service provider, we finally study three different inventory
strategies, namely transaction-based fee, flat-based fee, and gain sharing. For each
strategy, we find both channels’ optimal inventory policies and expected profits. The
performances of the different strategies are compared and the managerial insights are
given using analytical and numerical analysis.
Methodologies, insights, comparative analysis, and computational results are
delivered in this dissertation for the above aforementioned problems.
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CHAPTER 1:
1.1

INTRODUCTION

Dual-Channel Retailing Strategy

The rapid development of the Internet, the growth of third-party logistics and
service providers (herein called providers), and the existence of several competitive
players have inspired enterprises to adopt a dual-channel retailing strategy. According to
Ryan et al. (2013), such a strategy offers products through both physical stores
(sometimes called retail, brick-mortar, traditional, conventional or offline stores) and
online stores (sometimes called e-tail, click or electronic stores). The dual-channel
retailing strategy was first introduced by Sears in 1925 when it initiated a physical store
beside a catalogue store (Zhang et al. 2010). About 42% of merchants in the different
industries implement the dual-channel retailing strategy (Dan et al. 2012). 80% of all US
retailers and almost every top US retailer use more than one channel to sell products and
services (Zhang et al. 2010). For example Wal-Mart, Toys“R”Us, Target, IBM, Hewlett–
Packard, Nike, Pioneer Electronics, Dell, Costco, Kmart, Barnes and Noble, Kohl’s, and
Cisco System are all dual-channel retailers. Those DCRs are, sometimes, referred to

as click-and-mortar companies. In the coming few years, it is expected that dualchannel retailing will be the dominant retailing strategy for all type of enterprises (Chen
et al. 2012).
Adopting a dual-channel retailing strategy offers retail businesses several
advantages and disadvantages. For example, retailers may use the strategy as a
mechanism to segment consumers. Shoppers who prefer to save time and transportation
costs purchase products online after viewing products’ descriptions. They are separated
from those who prefer to purchase products in person after touching and feeling the items
(Lu and Liu 2013). The use of a dual-channel retailing strategy, allows retailers to reach
wider segments of customers and increase revenue (Ryan et al. 2013). Since the Internet
is cost effective and has low entry barriers, the use of an online channel can reduce
operational retail costs (Chen et al. 2012; Hua et al. 2010; Zhang et al. 2010). Moreover,
using a dual-channel retailing strategy allows retailers to satisfy increasing customer
demands for multiple channels through which to shop. Thus, using a dual-channel
retailing strategy increases customer loyalty and satisfaction (Zhang et al. 2010).
Providing an online channel adds flexibility to each retailer’s supply chain (Chiang and
Monahan 2005). This flexibility allows customers to view a product’s description online
and purchase it at a physical store, order a product online and pick it up from a physical
1

store, or purchase a product online and return it to a physical store. Furthermore, having
an online channel facilitates stock-out substitutions for consumers, as retailers can
provide easy access to their inventory levels (Chian 2010). A dual-channel retailer can
use a differential pricing strategy to direct customer traffic depending on an enterprise’s
best interest (Zhang et al. 2010). For example, if revenue to weight ratio is low, then the
enterprise can set a higher price in the online channel to avoid high shipping and return
cost. Coordinated channels allow retailers to collect wide information about their
customers’ behaviour. Thus, marketing activities can be easily performed and uncertainty
can be efficiently reduced.
On the other hand, the dual-channel retailing strategy is normally associated with
sales substitution or cannibalization that may form competition between stores. If stores
are not coordinated, then this competition may lower a retailer’s total profitability (Ryan
et al. 2013). Moreover, selling through the online channel imposes operational difficulties
when it comes to receiving large packaged items and then repackages customer orders in
smaller cartoons (Zhang et al. 2010).

1.2

Customer Returns
In today’s market, many North American retailers implement a full refund policy.

The policy increases the number of customer purchase returns, as it allows customers to
return purchased products for numerous reasons. For example, a product can be returned
to a merchant because it is defective, a wrong order, or a wrong product, because the
customer did not like it, or because the purchase was impulsive. However, a full refund
policy allows retailers to increase customer loyalty, provide customer satisfaction, boost
sales, and/or comply with country legislations.
Additionally, customer returns have risen due to a growth in online selling
channels. Online customers do not see, touch, or feel products prior to purchasing them.
In these cases, a full refund policy “can be an indicator of product quality” (Akcay et al.
2013; Chen and Grewal 2013). Therefore, products purchased online are expected to have
higher return rates. For example, fashion products purchased in person through physical
stores can have return rates as high as 35%. In contradistinction, fashion products
purchased online can have return rates as high as 75% (Akcay et al. 2013; Mostard and
Teunter 2006; Vlachos and Dekker 2003). Furthermore, online returns may lead to an
annual reduction in revenue between $1.5 and $2.5 billion dollars (Li et al. 2013). In the
United States and Canada, yearly returns to merchants total between $100 and $10 billion
dollars of products, respectively (Akcay et al. 2013; Chen and Bell 2009; Su 2009).
2

According to the Center of Logistic at the University of Nevada, Wal-Mart, alone,
process returns worth of $6 billion dollars every year (Chen & Bell 2012). While a
significant amount of returned apparel is of good quality and can be resold several times
without a recovery process, electronic returns cannot be resold as new and must instead
be sold as open-box items (Akcay et al. 2013). In general, defective returns constitute
only 5% of all customer returns (Akcay et al. 2013; Su 2009).
Moreover, many retailers (for example, Wal-Mart or Toys“R”Us) allow samechannel returns, wherein an item purchased from one of their physical stores is returned
to one of their physical stores, or an item purchased from their online store is returned to
their online store. However, many also allow cross-channel returns, wherein a product
purchased from their online store may be returned to one of their physical stores.
Allowing cross-channel returns is vital for online stores as such a policy increases sales
and customer satisfaction and allow physical stores to create additional cross-selling
opportunities (Zhang et al. 2010; Cao and Li 2015). Notice that the process of purchasing
items from the physical stores and return them to the online stores is not common. Thus,
it is not considered in this work.

1.3

Research Objective

The objective of this dissertation is to analyze the problem of customer returns
under the dual-channel retailing system. The main goal is to investigate the different
cross-channel return polices, to study selected outsourcing options for the management of
the online store, and to develop proper methodologies of inventory control management,
price management and responsiveness level management.

1.4

Research Methodologies

We will now explain some of the tools and methodologies that have been used
throughout this dissertation.
Unconstrained

non-linear

programming:

the

unconstrained

non-linear

programming is the process of minimizing or maximizing a non-linear function without
considering any constraint. The problem might be unbounded or has several critical
points if the function is positive semi-definite, negative semi-definite or indefinite. In all
aforementioned cases the optimization process is impossible or difficult. Thus, to simplify
the prediction of systems’ behavior and grantee the existence of a sole optimal solution,
we normally condition parameters so that our functions are either positive definite (i.e.
there exist one global minima) or negative definite (i.e. there exist one global maxima).
3

We use the second derivative test to check the concavity or convexity of single variable,
two variables, or three variables functions as the following:
For single variable functions:
1. Assume that the second derivative of the function 𝑓 is continues on ℝ.
2. The function’s “Hessian” matrix is 𝐻 = 𝑓!! .
Let 𝐷 = 𝑓!! .
(a) If 𝐷 > 0, then the function 𝑓 posses a global minimum at 𝑎 ; where 𝑓! 𝑎 = 0.
(b) If 𝐷 < 0, then the function 𝑓 posses a global maximum at 𝑎 ; where 𝑓! 𝑎 = 0.
For two variables functions:
1. Assume that the second derivative of the function 𝑓 is continues on ℝ! .
2. The function’s “Hessian” matrix is 𝐻 =
Let 𝐷! = 𝑓!! and 𝐷! =

𝑓!!
𝑓!"

𝑓!!
𝑓!"

𝑓!"
.
𝑓!!

𝑓!"
.
𝑓!!

(a) If 𝐷! > 0 and 𝐷! > 0, then 𝑓 posses a global minimum at 𝑎, 𝑏 ; where 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏 = 0
and 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏 = 0.
(b) If 𝐷! < 0 and 𝐷! > 0, then 𝑓 posses a global maximum at 𝑎, 𝑏 ; where 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏 = 0
and 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏 = 0.
For three variables functions:
1. Assume that the second derivative of the function 𝑓 is continues on ℝ! .
𝑓!!
2. The function’s “Hessian” matrix is 𝐻 = 𝑓!"
𝑓!"

𝑓!"
𝑓!!
𝑓!"

𝑓!"
𝑓!" .
𝑓!!

𝑓!!
𝑓!"
and 𝐷! = 𝑓!"
𝑓!!
𝑓!"

𝑓!"
𝑓!!
𝑓!"

𝑓!"
𝑓!" .
𝑓!!

Let 𝐷! = 𝑓!!

𝑓!!
, 𝐷! =
𝑓!"

(a) If 𝐷! > 0, 𝐷! > 0 and 𝐷! > 0, then 𝑓 posses a global minimum at 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ; where
𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 = 0, 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 = 0 and 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 = 0.
(b) If 𝐷! < 0, 𝐷! > 0 and 𝐷! < 0, then 𝑓 posses a global maximum at 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ; where
𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 = 0, 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 = 0 and 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 = 0.
Nash games: the Nash game is a non-cooperative game that is widely used in supply
chain management. It is used in a static environment where active competitors
4

simultaneously choose their decisions in isolation. Let us consider two competitors where
players’ decisions affect each player’s payoff. Thus, if player-1’s decision is 𝑝! and
player-2’s decision is 𝑝! , then player-1’s utility is 𝑢! 𝑝! , 𝑝! and player-2’s utility is
𝑢! 𝑝! , 𝑝! . The objective of each player is to maximize his/her own utility. Assuming 𝑢!
and 𝑢! are differentiable, then the following conditions are necessary for the existence of
Nash equilibriums:
!!! !! ,!!
!!!
!!! !! ,!!
!!!

=0
=0

To find the equilibrium points, the above system of equations should be solved
simultaneously. Thus, for as long as the competitor adheres to Nash equilibrium, a player
will generate a lower payoff when deviating from the equilibrium point. If each utility
function is concave with respect to the player’s own strategy, i.e. 𝑢! 𝑝! , 𝑝! is concave in
𝑝! and 𝑢! 𝑝! , 𝑝! is concave in 𝑝! , then there exists at least one Nash equilibrium in the
game. To test for the Nash equilibrium uniqueness, we construct the hessian matrix as the
following:
! ! !!

! ! !!

!!!!
! ! !!

!!! !!!

!!! !!!

!!!!

𝐻=
If −1

!

! ! !!

.

𝐻 is positive, then a unique Nash equilibrium is guaranteed. 𝑛 in the previous

relationship is the number of strategies and it equals two in our example.
Stackelberg games: the Stackelberg game is another non-cooperative game that is
widely used in supply chain management where one competitor dominants the other. The
game is dynamic in nature and the events occur in two stages. The dominant competitor is
the leader and is allowed to initiate the game or choose his/her strategy first. Based on the
revealed strategy, the dominated competitor or the follower end the game or chooses
his/her strategy second. Knowing that both players are rational, the leader should use the
backward induction and choose his/her decision based on the follower’s best response
function or strategy. Again, let us consider two competitors where players’ decisions
affect each player’s payoff. If the leader’s decision is 𝑝! and follower’s decision is 𝑝! ,
then the leader’s utility is 𝑢! 𝑝! , 𝑝! and the follower utility is 𝑢! 𝑝! , 𝑝! . The objective
of each player is to maximize his/her own utility. Assuming 𝑢! and 𝑢! are differentiable,
then the following conditions are necessary for the existence of Stackelberg equilibriums:
5

!!! !! ,!!
!!!

!! !!!∗ !!

!!! !! ,!!∗ !!
!!!

=0
=0

!! !!!∗

If 𝑢! 𝑝! , 𝑝! is concave in 𝑝! , then there is a unique solution for the follower. However, if
𝑢! 𝑝! , 𝑝!∗ 𝑝!

is concave in 𝑝! , then there is a unique solution for the leader and we can

guarantee the existence of a unique Stackelberg equilibrium.
Stochastic programming: the purpose of stochastic programming is to seek optimal
decisions that best suit all applicable random parameters. Thus, with stochastic
programming one may minimize the system’s expected cost or maximize the system’s
expected profit.

1.5

Dissertation Organization

This dissertation is organized as follows: literature is reviewed in Chapter 2.
Pricing policies for a dual-channel retailer is discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 is an
extension of Chapter 3 and it discusses pricing and responsiveness level decisions under a
dual-channel retailing system. The optimal cross-channel return policy for a dual-channel
retailer is studied in Chapter 5. The optimal outsourcing strategy for managing the echannel is then discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, conclusion and future works are discussed
in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2:
2.1

LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature on Dual-Channel Systems
This chapter sheds the light upon two streams of literature. The first stream

addresses dual-channel systems under two settings: dual-channel supply chain setting and
dual-channel retailing setting. The second stream addresses customer returns under four
settings: single retailer setting, manufacturer-retailer setting, two competitive retailers
setting, and dual-channel retailing setting.
2.1.1 Dual-Channel Supply Chains
Considerable research works have analyzed systems that contain a manufacturer
(or supplier) that sells a single product to customers through both a manufacturer-owned
online store and an independent retail store(s) (Figure 2.1). Several different types of
competition take place between the two channels, including competition in price
(Balakrishnan et al. 2014; David and Adida 2015; Ryan et al. 2013), competition in
services (Lu and Liu 2013; Dan et al. 2012), and competition in product availability
(Takahashi et al. 2011; Chiang 2010; Chiang and Monahan 2005). Price competition may
take a horizontal form, between an online store and a physical store; take a vertical form,
between an upper echelon (i.e. manufacturer) and a lower echelon (i.e. retailer); or take
both forms (David and Adida 2015; Lu and Liu 2013; Ryan et al. 2013; Dan et al. 2012).
According to Chiang (2010), vertical competition enhances price double marginalization
inefficiency, while horizontal competition enhances cannibalization. Literature shows that
a great deal should be exerted to coordinate both channels in order to diminish, eliminate
or, even, reverse the negative effect of competition.

Figure 2.1: Dual-Channel Supply Chain (Chiang and Monahan 2005)

Existing literature shows that decentralized systems are a representation of a
situation wherein each channel seeks to maximize its own profit in the presence of
cannibalization. Thus, a manufacturer competes by selecting a wholesale price, an online
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price, a production quantity, a service level, and/or a delivery lead time. A retailer
competes by selecting retail price, an acquisition quantity, and/or a service level. This
competition is primarily modeled as a manufacturer-Stackelberg game (e.g. David and
Adida 2015; Lu and Liu 2013; Ryan et al. 2013; Dan et al. 2012; Huang et al. 2012; Chen
et al. 2012; Hua et al. 2010; Bin et al. 2010; Chiang 2010; Yao et al. 2009; Cai et al.
2009). However, it is sometimes modeled as a Nash game (e.g. Lu and Liu 2013; Ryan et
al. 2013; Chiang 2010; Cai et al. 2009). A few existing papers have also modeled this
competition as a retailer-Stackelberg game (e.g. Cai et al. 2009).
In a coordinated or centralized duopolistic system, each player maximizes its own
profit. However, it is done within the boundaries of a contract. David and Adida (2015)
examined the equilibrium quantities and prices of a supplier selling items through a selfowned online store and 𝑁 different retailers. They proposed a linear quantity discount
contract to coordinate the system wherein the amount of discount offered to a retailer
store is linearly related to the quantity ordered. Ryan et al. (2013) studied the performance
of a system under a modified revenue sharing contract in which a retailer shares part of its
revenue with a manufacturer. They also studied the performance of a system under a
gain/loss sharing contract in which a manufacturer shares part of its gain or loss with a
retailer. Moreover, a two-part tariff contract was studied by Chen et al. (2012). In such a
contract a retailer is charged a lump sum fee and a wholesale price equivalent to
production costs. Chen et al. (2012) also studied a profit-sharing agreement wherein
channels share their profits with competitors’ channels for better system performance.
Furthermore, an 𝑎, 𝑑 contract was examined by Bin et al. (2010). In such a contract, a
retailer pays a franchise fee of the value 𝑑 to a manufacturer. In turn the manufacturer
offers the retailer a portion, 𝑎, of its total revenue. Chiang (2010) implemented an
inventory and direct revenue sharing contract wherein a retailer shares part of its
inventory cost with a manufacturer. The manufacturer then shares part of its revenue with
the retailer. Finally, Cai et al. (2009) compared a system’s performance with and without
price discount contracts. They assumed prices were either consistent (i.e., channels’
prices were equal) or inconsistent (i.e., channels’ prices were not necessarily equal).
Some of the findings that are related to contracts implementation are stated next.
Ryan et al. (2013) claim that unless coordinated, loss of retailer’s profit and significant
increase in manufacturer’s profit can occur due to the introduction of online channel.
Similarly, Bin et al. (2010) argue that competition between channels enhances system’s
performance if contracts are used and a retailer will experience lower selling costs. They,
also, stated that higher information uncertainty in the retailer channel leads manufacturer
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to adopt a menu of contracts, while lower uncertainty leads to a single contract. Cai et al.
(2009) found that contract coordination and consistent pricing strategy reduce conflict
and increase profitability in a system where customers are considered to be either brand
loyal or retailer loyal. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2012) claim that coordination
through complementary contracts such as two-part tariff and profit sharing is not always
profitable to the system.
A fully coordinated or centralized monopolistic system uses a sole decision maker
to maximize the system’s total profit (e.g. Huang et al. 2012; Hua et al. 2010; Yao et al.
2009; Dumrongsiri et al. 2008). Bin et al. (2010) used both centralization and the
principle agent method to examine an asymmetry in information that occurs within the
dual-channel system when demand is stochastic. Chiang (2010) argued that a
monopolistic dual-channel supply chain outperforms both duopolistic and uncoordinated
dual-channel supply chains. Yao et al. (2009) optimized the inventory system of a dualchannel supply chain with a single period newsvendor model. They compared three
different management styles. In the first style, the inventory levels of both channels were
managed by one central manager. In the second style, each channel managed its own
inventory level. In the third style, the retailer managed its own inventory level while the
online store’s inventory level was managed by a third-party logistics provider.
Different than most papers in dual-channel supply chain literature, Chiang and
Monahan 2005, Takahashi et al. 2011, and Chiang 2010 study Markovian systems that
capture competition in product availability. Portion of a channel’s loyal customers will
cross fill when products are not available in their preferred channel (stuck out base
substitution). Chiang and Monahan (2005) claim that the increase of this portion might
harm profitability as it could increase total inventory related costs. They argue that
retailers and manufacturers are, almost, always better off in adopting dual-channel supply
chain. In there modeling, they capture holding and lost sale costs and apply one-for-one
inventory control policy. In contrast, Takahashi et al. (2011) have included production
and delivery setup costs and found that one-for-one inventory control policy is not an
appropriate policy for a dual-channel supply chain.
2.1.2 Dual-Channel Retailing Systems
Other papers in the literature have examined the situation wherein a dual-channel
retailer offers the same product in both self-owned online and physical stores (Figure
2.2). Yan et al. (2010), Yan (2010), and Yan (2008) all studied Nash, online-Stackelberg
and retailer-Stackelberg games to model the price competition that stems from operating a
dual-channel retailing system. Each of the studies stated that the Stackelberg games
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always outperform the Nash game. Yan et al. (2010) argue that by using profit sharing to
integrate the dual-channel retailing system, conflict is eliminated, coordination is
improved, and both channels generate more profit. Yan (2010) stated that higher brand
differentiation better handle conflict especially when consumers are less price sensitive
and market size is large. Additionally, Berger et al. (2006) examined the profit
enhancement induced by a dual-channel retailer that integrates the advertisement efforts
of both online and physical stores. They found that higher integration leads both channels
to generate higher profits.

Figure 2.2: Dual-Channel Retailing System

Using branch-and-bound algorithm, Mahar et al. (2009) examine the positive
impact that a real time information capability has on a dual-channel retailer. Such a
capability allows the dynamic assignment policy to replace the common static assignment
policy. Based solely on the proximity, the static policy pre-identifies the e-fulfilment
location responsible to serve a certain customer. On the other hand, based on both
proximity and real time inventory position, the dynamic policy identifies the e-fulfilment
location. It is found that such a policy might decrease total cost (holding, backorder and
shipping) for up to 8.2%.
One may note that each study presented above examined the possible coordination
strategies or policies between different competing channels in a dual-channel system.
None of the papers have considered customer returns and the impact that the returns have
had on dual-channel retailing systems. Papers that have considered customer returns are
reviewed next.

2.2

Literature on Customer Returns
Before we review the papers under the different settings, it is adequate to examine

the researchers findings in regard to the different refund policies. A large body of work on
customer returns has examined a refund policy that is exogenously determined as a full
refund or a Money Back Guarantee (MBG) (Reimann 2016; Chang and Yeh 2013; Chen
and Bell 2013; Choi et al. 2013; Akcay et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2010; You et al. 2010;
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Vlachos and Dekker 2003). Other papers have compared a system’s performance with no
refund policy to a system’s performance with a full refund policy (Chen and Grewal
2013; Choi et al. 2013; Chen and Bell 2012; Chen and Zhang 2011). Several papers that
conducted such a comparison also examined a partial refund policy (Chen and Grewal
2013; Li et al. 2013; Chen and Bell 2012; Chen and Zhang 2011; Su 2009; Yalabik et al.
2005). Hsiao and Chen (2012) found that the optimal refund policy may exceed the full
price of the item. Su (2009), Chen and Bell (2009), and Yalabik et al. (2005) all argued
that a full refund policy is not optimal as it overwhelms retailing systems. In contrast,
Chen and Zhang (2011) argued that a full refund policy may be optimal in the presence of
competition. However, Hu et al. (2014) and Su (2009) claimed that the optimal refund
policy depends upon the refunded product’s salvage value. According to Li et al. (2013),
retailers should offer either a lenient return policy with a low quality and a low price or a
strict return policy with a high quality and a high price. Their choice depends upon
customer sensitivity in regards to price, return policy, and quality. Moreover, Yu and Goh
(2012) stated that retailers should enforce a return policy that takes the nature of products
and their condition upon return into consideration. Akcay et al. (2013) encouraged
retailers to reduce the number of returns they receive by controlling selling prices and
enforcing a refund policy with restocking fees. However, Hu and Li (2012) argued that
offering a manufacturer buyback price equivalent to the retailer’s refund price is the
optimal coordinating mechanism.
2.2.1 Single Retailer Systems
Additionally, many papers have considered a retailer faces returns from
unsatisfied customers (Figure 2.3). Reimann (2016) considered a retailing system where
refurbished returns can be used to satisfy demand that exceeds the order quantity. Akcay
et al. (2013) studied a system wherein customers could differentiate between a new sell
and a resell but their product valuation was uncertain. Yu and Goh (2012) examined a
retailer facing eight different scenarios. The eight scenarios had several combinations that
consisted of whether or not returns occurred within a grace period, whether or not returns
were accompanied by a penalty, and whether or not returns were recoverable. While their
research did not consider a resell option for returns, it was considered that recoverable
items could be salvaged in a secondary market. Additionally, according to You et al.
(2010), a single selling period can be divided into 𝑁 countable sub-periods. Each subperiod is associated with a probability of return. Chen and Bell (2009) did not allow “as
good as new” returns to be sold in the same period in which they were sold, but did allow
them to be salvaged in a single-period setting or resold in the following period in a multi11

period setting. Wang et al. (2010) investigated a system wherein customer returns could
be resold several times. Inventory holding cost and deterioration over time is incorporated
in their model. Selling periods were divided into three sub-periods: a period in which
sales consumed both new and returned stocks, a period in which sales only consumed
returned stocks, and a period in which there were only returns, not sales. Li et al. (2013),
Hsiao and Chen (2012), and Mukhopadhyay and Setaputra (2007) discussed the
interrelationship between price, refund policy, and quality. Li et al. (2013) define quality
as product consistency with the online description, while Hsiao and Chen (2012) identify
product defects, misfit, and unconformity as quality risks that face customers. Choi et al.
(2013) and Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro (2005) examined a system in which demand is
linearly dependant on price, refund policy, and modularity level, while return is linearly
dependant on refund policy. They claim that with higher level of modularity, retailer
should charge higher price regardless of the refund policy applied. Vlachos and Dekker
(2003) studied six different systems according to whether or not returns could be resold in
the primary market, whether or not resalable returns needed a recovery process, and
whether or not the needed recovery process was associated with fixed or variable costs.
The objective of the paper is to maximize the profit by selecting the optimal ordering
quantity where resalable returns can be resold once a season. Mostard et al. (2005) and
Mostard and Teunter (2006) examined a system wherein a resalable return could be
resold an infinite number of times until it became non- resalable by not having demand to
consume it or by being returned after the end of the selling season. Mollenkopf et al.
(2007) studied the effect of customer return related services on the Internet shoppers’
perceived loyalty and the key drivers that positively impact the return experience. The
paper Yalabik et al. (2005) is an extension of the work done by Davis et al. (1998). They
classify customers into matched and mismatched with product valuation 𝑣1 and 𝑣2,
respectively. Post purchase the customer will consume a portion 𝛼 of the original value of
the product. Ultimately, customers will keep the product if the utility of keeping the
product is more than the utility of returning it. The previous papers considered single
retailer systems where customers can return unsatisfactory purchases to retailers. None of
those papers studied the effect of customer returns on dual-channel retailers.
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Figure 2.3: A Single Retailer System with Customer Returns

2.2.2 Manufacturer-Retailer Systems
Several other papers considered a system in which retailers and manufacturers
handled customer returns through the use of contractual agreements and information
sharing (Figure 2.4). Chang and Yeh (2013) studied returns from customer to retailer and
from retailer to manufacturer under centralized and decentralized settings. Returns could
not be resold in the same selling season during which they were returned due to seasonal
length constraints. Additionally, Chen and Bell (2013), Hu and Li (2012), Chen and Bell
(2011), and Chen (2011) examined the effect of sharing return information with a
manufacturer on the profitability of the system. Chen (2011) claims that not sharing
return information is a better strategy if the product is mature. Otherwise, and in
consistence with Chen and Bell (2011) work, not sharing information will negatively
impact both retailers and manufacturer. Hu and Li (2012), investigate a system under
Stackelberg game with demand and customer valuation uncertainty. Based on the
system’s acceptability of returns, four scenarios have been recognized. Moreover, Hu et
al. (2014) studied a consignment contract between a vendor and a retailer in which the
vendor owned the inventory placed in the retailer store. They examined both retailermanaged and vendor-managed consignment inventory systems. Finally, Su (2009) studied
four contracts that may be used to resolve conflicts that arise between retailers and
manufacturers due to customer returns: buy back, differential buy back, return to
manufacturer, and rebate contracts. The later is found to outperform all other contracts as
long as manufacturer can monitor sales. The previous papers considered returns from
customer to manufacturer, from customers to retailer and/or from retailer to manufacturer
under manufacturer-retailer settings. The effect of customer returns on dual-channel
retailers was not considered in any of the above papers.
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Figure 2.4: A Manufacturer-Retailer System with Customer Returns

2.2.3 Two Competitive Retailers Systems
Several other papers have considered customer returns when two retailers compete
in the same market (Figure 2.5). Chen and Bell (2012) examined a system with two
customer behaviours: return-sensitive customers willing to pay more and enjoy the
privilege of returning a product if it is a mismatch, and price-sensitive customers willing
to pay less and keep the product if it is a mismatch. Both a returnable channel and a nonreturnable channel are thus considered in Chen and Bell’s study. Furthermore, Chen and
Grewal (2013) studied Stackelberg and Nash competitions in situations wherein a new
channel competes with a well-established retailer that offers a full refund policy.
Additionally, Chen and Zhang (2011) studied Stackelberg and Nash competitions
between two retailers that both offered a full refund policy. Balakrishnan et al. (2014)
studied the browse and switch behaviour exerted by consumers on the brick and mortar
stores. The effect of such behaviour on system’s profits and prices are examined when
returns are allowed for online purchases only. None of the above works considered dualchannel retailers. Contrary to practice, they also assumed returns to be non-resalable.

Figure 2.5: Two Competing Retailers with Customer Returns
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2.2.4 Dual-channel Retailing Systems
Widodo et al. (2010) and Widodo et al. (2009) studied both Nash and Stackelberg
competitions between a retailer’s physical and online channels (Figure 2.6). Contrary to
practice, they studied returns that were only allowed for online purchases. Online
customers were allowed to return items to the online store (a same-channel return) or the
physical store (a cross-channel return). Also, the two studies assumed that returns could
be exchanged but not refunded. One may note that none of the above two papers has
collectively considered all common forms of customer returns a dual-channel retailer may
experience. There is thus a research gap in this area.

Figure 2.6: A Dual-Channel Retailer with Online Store’s Customer Returns
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CHAPTER 3:
3.1

PRICING POLICIES

Introduction and Motivation

Since coordination coincides with high costs and imposes operational difficulties,
most multi-channel retailers (i.e., Target, Nike, Kmart, Barnes and Noble, Jo-Ann Fabric
and Craft Stores, and Kohl’s) use decentralized teams to run their stores (Zhang et al.
2010; Yan et al. (2010); Neslin and Shankar 2009; Yan 2008; Berger et al. 2006; Webb
and Hogan 2002; Schoenbachler and Gordon 2002). Also, a variety of managerial skills
are needed for different channels; thus, some retailers outsource the management of
unfamiliar or newly opened channels to a third party. An example is Toys“R”Us, which
outsources the management of its online channel to Amazon (Berger et al. 2006).
Many often believe that decentralizing the dual-channels reduces market shares
due to cannibalization. This will in turn spark competition and trigger a price war that
may harm the parties involved. If decentralization is uncoordinated, its resulting
competition may lower supply chain profitability (Ryan et al. 2013; Yan et al. 2010;
Steinfield 2004; Schoenbachler and Gordon 2002; Webb and Hogan 2002). Furthermore,
as Webb and Hogan (2002) have stated, “goal incompatibility” (between physical stores
and online stores, for example) is an inevitable result of decentralization. Channels may
generate internal conflict due to scarce resources (for example, a tight budget or few
customers) or tight objectives (for example, a targeted revenue and profit). They define
competition as goal-centered behaviour and conflict as opponent-centered behaviour.
Webb and Hogan’s research supports this; they found that 66% of 50 interviewed retail
businesses viewed channel conflict as the most troublesome issue that is faced when they
run dual-retailing channels. The competition associated with such conflict may cause
channels to limit cooperation and inspire customers to change companies due to
confusion and agitation (Steinfield 2004). These limitations may be so intense that one
channel may sabotage another. For example, Levi Strauss and Best Buy had terminated
their online stores after a few years of their first operational trial due to internal
competition (Yan 2010; Falk et al. 2007). Consequently, companies such as Wal-Mart
Stores, Gap, and the Home Depot have successfully integrated their dual channels under a
sole decision maker to maximize their total profits (Yan 2008).
Several dual-channel retailers offer both same- and cross-channel returns, whether
their operating channels are integrated or not. Zhang et al. (2010) have stated that if crosschannel returned items are not offered at a physical store, then the items must be shipped
to the online store. Otherwise the ownership of such items is transferred to the physical
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store. This is done by conducting an inventory transfer that is subjected to the retailer’s
internal rules. The retailer’s policy and practice of having cross-channel returns can be
acquired through partial integration. As Cao and Li (2015) have stated, channels will only
have full integration when prices align to meet the retailer’s goals and objectives. That is
to say, cross-channel returns do not contradict the fact that channels may still undergo
price competition.
Many studies have considered competition and possible coordination strategies
between dual channels, which are owned by either the same retailer or different
enterprises. The customer returns topic has also been thoroughly studied in single retailer
or two retailers systems. However, few papers have studied customer returns under a
dual-channel retailing system. As stated before, there is no work that has collectively
considered all common forms of customer returns for both types of stores of a dualchannel retailer. Also, there is no published paper that has studied the impact of crosschannel returns on both stores of a DCR, especially when those returns are resalable. For
example, the effect of cross-channel returns on channels’ pricing policies and inventory
management has not being studied yet. Thus, Chapter 3 studies a dual-channel retailer
with both return mechanisms and investigates optimal pricing policies. Both
centralization with differential and unified pricing schemes and competition in regards to
theoretical game frameworks are addressed.
When determining prices in a Stackelberg game, the online store leads and the
physical store follows. However, in a Nash game, the physical store and the online store
determine optimal prices simultaneously. This study provides several contributions to
existing literature in three ways. First, it collectively considers all common forms of
customer returns for a dual-channel retailer. As stated previously, purchasing an item
from a physical store and returning it to an online store is not a common practice and,
thus, it is not considered in this work. Second, it addresses dual-channel competition
from a game theoretic perspective. Third, it compares dual-channel retailer’s total
performance under centralization with unified pricing scheme, and Stackelberg and Nash
games.

3.2

Model Formulation

This chapter considers merchants that run both a physical store and an online
store. It examines two coordination schemes: one in which channels are managed
collectively in a centralized setting and one in which channels are managed competitively
in a decentralized setting. Customers may receive a full refund for purchases returned
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within a merchant-specified time period. The probability that a product purchased from a
physical store is returned to a physical store is 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 1. The probability that a product
purchased from an online store is returned to an online store is 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1. The
probability that a product purchased from an online store is cross-returned to a physical
store is 0 ≤ 𝑣 ≤ 1 (Figure 3.1).

The assumption of ratios for returns has been

implemented in literature before, such as in works by Chen and Grewal (2013), Mostard
and Teunter (2006), Mostard et al. (2005), Vlachos and Dekker (2003), and many more.

Figure 3.1: A Dual-Channel Retailer with Same- and Cross-Channel Returns

Akcay et al. (2013) have stated that apparel is often returned “as good as new”;
thus, apparel can be resold several times during a single period. Therefore, for a returned
product to be resalable it must be returned in its original packaging and condition. We
assume that a returned product has a resalability rate of 𝑘! if the item was purchased from
and returned to a physical store, 𝑘! if the item was purchased from and returned to an
online store, and 𝑘!" if the item was purchased from an online store but cross-returned to
a physical store.
We assume that all same-channel resalable returns can be resold for 𝜀 times from
their original channels. Regardless of the number of times an item is sold in the online
store, all cross-channel resalable returns can be resold for 𝜀 times from the physical store.
According to Vlachos and Dekker (2003), if a resalable returned product takes a relatively
long time to be placed on a store’s shelf from the moment it is purchased, then one may
assume it can only be resold once during a selling season (i.e. 𝜀 = 1). In
contradistinction, if a resalable returned product takes a relatively short time to be placed
on a store’s shelf from the moment it is purchased (i.e., if it has a lead time of zero), then
one may assume it can be resold an infinite number of times (i.e. 𝜀 = ∞) during a selling
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season until it is permanently sold, cross-channel returned, or returned but not resalable
(Mostard and Teunter 2006; Mostard et al. 2005). Therefore, two cases are studied: a
general case where returns are assumed to be resold 𝜀 number of times; 𝜀 ∈ 1, ∞ , and a
more simplified special case where returns are assumed to be resold infinitely; 𝜀 = ∞.
Each returned item is associated with a return collection cost of the value 𝑑. If an
item is returned as not resalable or as resalable after the end of the selling season, then its
salvage value, 𝑠, is acquired by selling the item in a secondary market. The unit’s salvage
value must be less than or equal to the unit’s purchasing cost 𝑠 ≤ 𝑐; otherwise the profit
function would be unbounded above. Items that are purchased from or returned to the
online store will cost the store a per-unit shipping expense of 𝑡.
The parameter 𝛼 represents the base level of sales, or the sales level when items
are offered to customers free of charge (Chen et al. 2012; Huang et al. 2012). If
0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1 is the degree of customer preference for the physical store, then 𝛼! = 𝛼𝜃 is
the physical store’s base level of sales. Similarly, if 1 − 𝜃 is the degree of customer
preference for the online store, then 𝛼! = 𝛼 1 − 𝜃 is the online store’s base level of
sales.
Several papers have considered customer preference in their studies. For example,
Lu and Liu (2013) argue that customer preference for a certain channel induces
dominance and profitability to that channel and the degree of that preference greatly
affects the equilibrium prices. According to Hua et al. (2010), different products lead to
different degrees of customer preference for the physical store. For example, products that
are customized, require a high level of examination prior to being purchased (such as
used cars, clothes, shoes, or eyeglasses), or require after-sale services (such as
electronics) better-fit physical stores. In contradistinction, products that do not require a
high level of examination in regards to their quality level prior to being purchased,
standardized, or mature (such as books and CDs) better fit online stores. Hua et al. (2010)
also stated that customer preference for the online store is directly affected by lead-time
and product type. According to Ryan et al. (2013) the positive impact of coordination is
magnified when customers tend to stick to their preferable channel even in the existence
of price differentiation. Opposite to the general perception that customer preference for a
certain channel is the most important driver of demand in that channel, services provided
to customers (e.g. customer support, presale advice, in-store advertising and promotions,
technical and shopping assistance, and return services) will be the key factor in driving
demand up or down (Zhang et al. 2010). As customers are becoming more attached to
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dual-channel retailing, a new competing player in the market may increase customer base
for the incumbent, thus, increasing the channel’s profitability (Huang and Swaminathan
2009).
𝛽 is an ownership price sensitivity that measures the rate at which sales are
affected by a channel’s own price. 𝛾 is the cross-price sensitivity that reflects the degree
of cannibalization between two channels. A channel’s cross-price sensitivity has a lesser
effect on sales than a channel’s ownership-price sensitivity, which is 𝛾 ≤ 𝛽. 𝐷! and 𝐷!
denote total customer sales within the physical store and the online store, respectively.
Therefore, physical and online store sales functions are given, respectively, as:
𝐷! = 𝛼! − 𝛽𝑝! + 𝛾𝑝! and

(3.1)

𝐷! = 𝛼! − 𝛽𝑝! + 𝛾𝑝! .

(3.2)

Linear sales functions in a dual-channel system were utilized in Ryan et al. (2013), Huang
et al. (2012), Chen et al. (2012), Bin et al. (2010), and more.
𝑄!! and 𝑄!! are the order quantities placed at the physical store and the online store
at the beginning of the selling season, respectively. Since the studied retailing system
allows customer returns and a portion of those returns to be resold in the same selling
season, then it is intuitive to see that a channel’s order quantity is lower than its total
sales. Thus, if resalable returns can be resold 𝜀 number of times, then an online store will
sell its order quantity (𝑄!! ), all of its same-channel first time resalable returns (𝑤𝑘! 𝑄!! ),
all of its same-channel second time resalable returns (𝑤 ! 𝑘!! 𝑄!! ), and so on. Thus,
𝐷! = 𝑄!! 1 + 𝑤𝑘! + 𝑤𝑘!

!

+ ⋯ + 𝑤𝑘!

!

= 𝑄!!

!
!

𝑤𝑘!

!

(3.3)

The order quantity is as follows:
𝑄!! =

!
!

!!
!!! !

(3.4)

Due to the ratio 𝑣, a quantity of 𝑣𝐷! is cross-returned from the online store to the
physical store. A portion, 𝑘!" of this quantity, is resaleable and can be resold 𝜀 number of
times to satisfy part of the physical store’s total sales 𝐷! . Thus, the physical store will sell
its order quantity (𝑄!! ), all of its same-channel first time resalable returns of (𝑟𝑘! 𝑄!! ), all
of its same-channel second time resalable returns (𝑟 ! 𝑘!! 𝑄!! ), and so on. Similarly, it will
sell the quantity (𝑣𝑘!! 𝐷! ) and all of its same-channel first time resalable returns
(𝑟𝑘! 𝑣𝑘!" 𝐷! ), all of its same-channel second time resalable returns (𝑟 ! 𝑘!! 𝑣𝑘!" 𝐷! ), and so
on. Thus,
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𝐷! = 𝑄!! 1 + 𝑟𝑘! + ⋯ + 𝑟𝑘!
𝑄!!

!
!

𝑟𝑘!

!

+ 𝑣𝑘!" 𝐷!

!
!

!

𝑟𝑘!

+ 𝑣𝑘!" 𝐷! 1 + 𝑟𝑘! + ⋯ + 𝑟𝑘!
!!!

!!!

=
(3.5)

The order quantity is as follows:
𝑄!! =

!! !!!!" !! !! !!! !!!
!
!

(3.6)

!!! !

Notice that the term 𝑣𝑘!" 𝐷!

!
!

𝑟𝑘!

!!!

is conditioned to be less than or equal to

𝐷! (i.e. 𝑄!! ≥ 0); otherwise the physical store would be overwhelmed by cross-channel
returns that would allow the store to start its selling season without any quantity ordered
from the supplier. Such a case is unrealistic; thus, its analytical complications are omitted
from the calculations.
Assume that resalable returns can be resold several times in a selling season. If
return rate, resalability rate and sales requests are not staggeringly high, then 𝜀 is safely
assumed to be infinity (i.e. 𝜀 = ∞). The previous assumption will greatly simplify the
calculation of equilibrium points. Under such a case equations (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6)
are modified respectively as the following:
𝐷! =

!
!!!!

!!!!!

(3.7)

,

!
𝑄!!!
= 1 − 𝑤𝑘! 𝐷! ,

(3.8)

!
!!!!
!!!!" !!

(3.9)

𝐷! =

!!!!!

, and

!
𝑄!!!
= 1 − 𝑟𝑘! 𝐷! − 𝑣𝑘!" 𝐷! .

(3.10)

To comprehend, let us assume that the apparel industry is being studied. If the selling
season consists of four months and the unsatisfied customers posses sold items for two
weeks before reimbursing, then it is expected that 𝜀 = 8. Assume that 𝑤 = 0.5 and
𝑘! = 0.7, then using both equations (3.3) and (3.7) an ordered quantity of 5000 can
satisfy up to 7692. The answers are closely similar and thus the special case (i.e. 𝜀 = ∞)
can be used to model the problem.
The following two sections examine the integration of a dual-channel retailer
under a centralized management using two pricing strategies: differential pricing mode
and uniform pricing mode. They also examine online and physical stores’ equilibriums
when the stores use two different competitive pricing schemes: Stackelberg game and
Nash game. In the Stackelberg game, a retailer’s online store leads. It announces its
selling price first and is followed by its physical store. However, in the Nash game both
channels are equally powerful in price determination. Thus, they set their price strategies
simultaneously. Table 3.1 presents a summary of the notations used in Chapter 3.
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𝒓

Notation

Description
Probability an item purchased from the physical store is returned to the physical store

𝒘

Probability an item purchased from the online store is returned to the online store

𝒗

Probability an item purchased from the online store is cross-returned to a physical store

𝒌𝒓

Probability an item purchased from and returned to the physical store is resalable

𝒌𝒐

Probability an item purchased from and returned to the online store is resalable

𝒌𝒐𝒓

Probability an item purchased from the online store and cross-returned to the physical
store is resalable

𝒄&𝒔

Unit purchasing cost and salvage value, respectively

𝒅&𝒕

Return collection and shipping costs, respectively

𝒄

Amount a physical store pays to an online store for every cross-channel return in the
decentralization scheme

𝑫𝒓 & 𝑫𝒐

Retail and online stores’ total sales including returns, respectively

𝑸𝒓𝜺 & 𝑸𝒐𝜺

Quantities ordered by retail and online stores, respectively

𝜶, 𝜶𝒓 & 𝜶𝒐

Enterprise, physical store and online store base levels of sale, respectively

𝜽

Customer preference for the physical store

𝜷&𝜸

Ownership price and cross-price sensitivities of a channel, respectively

𝒑𝒓 & 𝒑𝒐

Retail and online store’s prices, respectively

𝑪

𝑪

𝝅𝜺 𝒓 , 𝝅𝜺 𝒐 & 𝝅𝑪𝜺
𝑫

𝑫

Physical store, online store, and enterprise profits in the centralized case, respectively

𝝅𝜺 𝒓 & 𝝅𝜺 𝒐

Physical store and online store profits in the decentralized case, respectively

𝜺

Number of times a resalable return can be resold in a selling season
Table 3.1: Third Chapter’s Notations

3.3

Centralized Dual-Channel Retailing System

This section studies pricing policies in a centralized system wherein a retailer’s
physical and online stores are vertically integrated. One may assume the existence of a
central decision maker who pursues the maximum total supply chain profit (𝜋!! ). The
central decision maker simultaneously determines the physical store’s price, 𝑝! , and the
online store’s price, 𝑝! , to meet the retailer’s goals and objectives.
The online store’s profit function is modeled as the following:
!

𝜋! ! = 𝐷!

1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑠

!!! !!!
!
!

!!! !

− 𝑄!! 𝑐.

(3.11)

A portion from 𝐷! , 1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 , is a final sale and contributes positively. Every sold
item contributes negatively due to the shipped cost 𝑡 paid by the store. A 𝑤 portion from
𝐷! is returned to the online store and contributes negatively due to collection and
shipping costs. A portion of 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! from 𝐷! is salvaged and contributes positively as
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!!! !!!

it is returned as non-resalable. The term 𝑠

!
!

!!! !

assures the salvaging of an item that

ends up being returned as resalable after the end of the selling season. Notice that this
term will be zero when 𝜀 = ∞. The second term is the ordering cost for the quantity
assigned to the online store.
The physical store’s profit function is modeled as:
!

𝜋! ! = 𝐷!
𝑠

!!" !!! !
!
!

!!! !

1 − 𝑟 𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑠

!!! !!!
!
!

!!! !

+ 𝑣𝐷! −𝑑 + 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 +

− 𝑄!! 𝑐.

(3.12)

In the first term, a portion of 1 − 𝑟 from 𝐷! is a final sale and contributes positively, a
portion of 𝑟 from 𝐷! is returned to the physical store and contributes negatively due to its
collection cost, and a portion of 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! from 𝐷! is salvaged and contributes positively
as it is returned as a non-resalable item. The term 𝑠

!!! !!!
!
!

!!! !

assures the salvaging of items

that end up being resalable returns after the end of the selling season when the system
experience no cross-channel returns. This term will be zero when 𝜀 = ∞. In the second
term, a portion of 𝑣 from 𝐷! is cross-returned to the physical store and contributes
negatively due to its collection cost. A portion of 𝑣 1 − 𝑘!" from 𝐷! is salvaged and
contributes positively as it is cross-returned as a non-resalable item. The term 𝑠

!!" !!! !
! !! !
!
!

considers the increment in salvaged resalable returns at the physical store when the
system experience cross-channel returns. Again, the term will be equivalent to zero when
𝜀 = ∞. The third term is the ordering cost for the items assigned to the physical store.
The total supply chain profit function can be modeled by adding functions (3.11)
and (3.12) as the following:
!

!

𝜋!! = 𝜋! ! + 𝜋! ! = 𝐷!
𝑣𝑑 + 𝑣 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 + 𝑣𝑠

1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑠
𝑘𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑘𝑟 !
! 𝑟𝑘 𝑛
𝑟
0

+ 𝐷!

1 − 𝑟 𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑠

𝑄!! 𝑐 − 𝑄!! 𝑐.

𝑤𝑘𝑜 !+1

! 𝑤𝑘 𝑛
𝑜
0

𝑟𝑘𝑟 !+1

! 𝑟𝑘 𝑛
𝑟
0

−

−
(3.13)

By replacing the quantity 𝑄!! and 𝑄!! with their functions, the total supply chain
profit can be transformed into the following:
General Case (i.e. 𝜺 ∈ 𝟏, ∞ ):
Using the formulas (3.4) and (3.6), one gets:
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𝜋!! = 𝐷!

1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 +

𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑 +
𝑠 𝑟𝑘𝑟 !+1 −𝑐
! 𝑟𝑘 𝑛
𝑟
0

!
!

𝑘𝑜𝑟 !

!!! !!! !𝑠 𝑟𝑘𝑟 !
!
!

+ 𝐷!

!!! !

𝑠 𝑤𝑘𝑜 !+1 −𝑐
! 𝑤𝑘 𝑛
𝑜
0

+𝑣

1−

1 − 𝑟 𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 +

.

(3.14)

Especial Case (i.e. 𝜺 = ∞):
With the formulas (3.8) and (3.10), one obtains:
!
𝜋!!!
= 𝐷! 1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 − 1 − 𝑤𝑘! 𝑐 +

𝑣 𝑐𝑘!" + 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑

+ 𝐷! 1 − 𝑟 𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 − 𝑐 1 − 𝑟𝑘! .

(3.15)

One may reformulate profit functions (3.13) and (3.14) as the following:
!!

𝜋!! = 𝐷! 𝐽𝑝! − 𝐵! + 𝐷! 𝐼𝑝! − 𝐴! = 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

!!

+ 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

.

(3.16)

Where;
𝐼 = 1 − 𝑟, 𝐽 = 1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣, 𝐴! = 𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 −

𝑠 𝑟𝑘𝑟 !+1 −𝑐
! 𝑟𝑘 𝑛 ,
0

𝑟

𝐵! =
𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 −

𝑠 𝑤𝑘𝑜 !+1 −𝑐
! 𝑤𝑘 𝑛
0

𝑜

−𝑣

1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑 +

𝑘𝑜𝑟

! !! !!! !!! !𝑠 𝑟𝑘𝑟 !
!
!

!!! !

,

𝐴!!! = 𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑐 1 − 𝑟𝑘! , and
𝐵!!! = 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 1 − 𝑤𝑘! 𝑐 − 𝑣 𝑐𝑘!" + 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑 .
!!

Notice that 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

!!

and 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

is the revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from

the online store and physical store, respectively. Thus, the optimal solution is subjected to
the following constraints:
!!

𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

!!

≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

≥ 0, and 𝑄!! ≥ 0.

Section 3.3.1 presents an analysis of a situation wherein a central decision maker
adopts a differential pricing strategy or does not add any constraint to prices. Section
3.3.2 studies a situation wherein a central decision maker adopts a unified pricing strategy
or constrains prices so that they are equal.
3.3.1 Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Differential Pricing
Strategy
It has been argued that differential pricing is the optimal strategy when higher
prices are assigned to the channel with the highest operational costs (Zhang et al. 2010
and Yan 2008). Neslin et al. (2006) have also argued in favour of differential pricing, but
with higher prices assigned to the channel with the fewest price-sensitive customers.
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However, several other authors have argued that a unified pricing strategy is not optimal
for a dual-channel retailer and that a channel’s pricing strategy should be proportional to
its customer’s preference and its provided services (Chen et al. 2012; Dan et al. 2012;
Hua et al. 2010). Thus, this section investigates the effect customer preference and rates
of return have on pricing policies when a sole manager chooses to run its enterprise using
the differential pricing strategy.
Proposition 3.1
!!!!

i.

!"

< 0 and

!!!!
!"

<0

The profit function (3.16) is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝! and 𝑝! , given that

ii.

4𝛽 ! 𝐼𝐽 ≥ 𝛾 ! 𝐼 + 𝐽 ! . The system will perform at its best with the online store’s optimal

price of 𝑝!! and the physical store’s optimal price of 𝑝!! :
𝑝 !! =
𝑝 !! =

!"!! !! ! !! !!! !!"!! !!! !!! !"!! !! ! !!

.

!!"! ! !! ! !!! !
!"!! !! ! !!

!!! !!"!! !!! !!!

!"!! !! ! !!

!!"! ! !! ! !!! !

(3.17)
(3.18)

.

From (3.17) and (3.18) we get:
!!!!
!!

!" !!"!! !!!

= !!"!! !!!

!!!

,
!

!!!!
!!

!" !!"!! !!!

= − !!"!! !!!

!!!

,
!

!!!!
!!

−

!!!!
!!

!" !!! !!!

= !!"!! !!!

!!! !

If 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! , then
𝜃 =

!" !!"!! !!! !!" !!! !! !!! !!! ! !!! !!!! !! ! !!! !! !!!
! !!"#!! !!! !

.

(3.19)

The proofs for Proposition 3.1 and all other propositions can be found in the
appendix. The first part of the proposition indicates that returns impose difficulty and loss
on the system. The assumption that the same-channel return can infinitely generate
salvage value with each sale does not impose the superiority of a system with returns over
a system without returns. Since this is true for the worst-case scenario 𝜀 = ∞, then it will
be true for the general case. Thus, the proof for the later is omitted.
The condition stated in Proposition 3.1 may not apply if 𝛾 is very close to 𝛽 and
the total return rate of a channel is much higher than what it is for the other channel.
Those cases are less likely to occur since 𝛾 is expected to be much less than 𝛽. Also, a
channel with excessive total return rate will, most likely, be eliminated or its return policy
will, at least, be changed.
The optimal price for a certain channel will not always increase as customers’
preference for that channel increases. It could instead increase or decrease depending on
the signs 2𝛽𝐼 − 𝛾 𝐼 + 𝐽 and 2𝛽𝐽 − 𝛾 𝐼 + 𝐽 for the physical store and the online store,
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respectively. That is, managers should not assume that higher customer preference for a
certain channel drives prices in that channel up; they must first consider customer returns.
Compare the above result with the fact that a higher base level of demand in a single sale
channel leads to a higher selling price. Also, if the physical store has a high level of
customer preference (i.e., if there is a higher base level of demand for the physical store),
then when customer returns are not considered, the physical channel should have a higher
selling price than the online channel (Dan et al. 2012 and Hua et al. 2010).
As 𝜃 increases, the online store is found to have a higher corresponding rate of
change in its optimal price than the physical store if 𝑤 + 𝑣 < 𝑟, an identical rate if
𝑤 + 𝑣 = 𝑟, and a lower rate if 𝑤 + 𝑣 > 𝑟. If 𝜃 = 𝜃 and 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1, then it is optimal for
both channels to have a similar pricing strategy. Note that 𝜃 will mostly lie out of range if
!!!!
!!

and

!!!!
!!

are either positive or negative. From the above proposition, one may

observe that customer preference for a certain channel has a significant impact on the
optimal prices of channels.
3.3.2 Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Unified Pricing Strategy
Webb and Lambe (2007) have stated that pricing strategy causes most of the
conflicts that arise between channels. In addition, several authors have stated that one
may avoid customer confusion and retain a business’s image by using a unified price
across all channels (Neslin and Shankar 2009; Webb and Lambe 2007). Consequently,
80% of all multichannel retailers choose to unify their pricing strategies across all
channels (Ofek et al. 2009). Thus, this section investigates the effect that customer
preference and rates of return have on pricing policies when a sole manager choses to run
its enterprise with a unified pricing strategy. Due to the added constraint (i.e., 𝑝! = 𝑝! =
𝑝), it is trivial that the profit generated by the unified pricing strategy is less than or equal
to the profit generated by the differential pricing strategy.
Proposition 3.2

If 𝑝! = 𝑝! = 𝑝, the profit function is strictly concave in 𝑝. Thus, there is a unique optimal
solution of 𝑝!! that derives the maximum system’s profit 𝜋 !! .
𝑝 !! =

!
!

!!! !! !!! !!! !!!! !
!!! !!!

From (3.20) we get

!!!!
!!

=

(3.20)

.

!

!!!

!

!!! !!!

.
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The optimal price will increase as 𝜃 increases under the condition 𝑟 < 𝑣 + 𝑤, and
will decrease as 𝜃 increases under the condition 𝑟 > 𝑣 + 𝑤. Intuitively, the change in 𝜃
has no effect on the dual-channel retailer’s pricing strategy when 𝑟 = 𝑣 + 𝑤. One may
notice that the decision to increase or decrease the unified price solely depends on the
values 𝑟, 𝑣, and 𝑤. This places an emphasis on customer returns when one selects pricing
policies for dual-channel retailing systems.

3.4

Decentralized Dual-Channel Retailing System

According to Zhang et al. (2010), “most retail corporations manage their channels
in a decentralized fashion and many of them maintain separate teams of inventory
management.” Falk et al. (2007) claim that integration may not be optimal if it is
associated with a high implementation cost. As previously stated, a failure to centralize or
integrate a dual-channel retailer will trigger price and service competition that is normally
initiated by cannibalization. Notice that a cross-channel return policy allows online stores
to increase both sales and customer satisfaction and allows physical stores to create crossselling opportunities. Assume that 𝑐 is the amount a physical store pays to an online store
for every cross-channel return. If 𝑐 is constructed fairly, then it is of all channels’ best
interest to accept such a return policy. Thus, there is no contradiction between having a
cross-channel return as an accepted practice and the fact that competition takes place
between channels.
The performance of the competing channels is studied using a sequential game,
namely the Stackelberg game, discussed in Section 3.4.1, and a simultaneous game,
namely the Nash game, discussed in Section 3.4.2. Yan et al. (2010), Yan (2010), and
Yan (2008) have stated that Target, Nike, and Kohl’s are all good candidates for
Stackelberg competition. They have also stated that a Stackelberg game always
outperform a Nash game. Similarly, Lu and Liu (2013) have argued that a Stackelberg
game influences the profitability of channels more effectively than a Nash game. In a
competitive environment, each channel forms its own decision in isolation to maximize
its individual profit. One may assume that all sales function parameters, return rates, cost
parameters, and decision rules are known to both competitors.
Due to decentralization, the profit functions below are constructed in a manner
similar to formulas (3.11) to (3.16), with the exception that 𝑐 is included in the
formulation.
General Case (i.e. 𝜺 ∈ 𝟏, ∞ ):
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!

𝜋! ! = 𝐷!

1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑣𝑐 +

! !!! !!! !!
! !! !
!
!

(3.21)

.

!

𝜋! ! =
𝐷!

! !!! !!! !!
! !! !
!
!

1 − 𝑟 𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 +

+ 𝑣𝐷!

!!" ! !! !!! !!! !! !!! !
! !! !
!
!

+

1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 .

(3.22)

Special Case (i.e. 𝜺 = ∞):
!

!
𝜋!!!
= 𝐷! 1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑣𝑐 − 1 − 𝑤𝑘! 𝑐 .

(3.23)

!

!
𝜋!!!
= 𝐷! 1 − 𝑟 𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 − 1 − 𝑟𝑘! 𝑐 + 𝑣𝐷! 𝑐𝑘!" + 1 −

𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 .

(3.24)

One may reformulate the above profit functions as the following:
!

!!

𝜋! ! = 𝐷! 𝐽𝑝! − 𝐺! = 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

(3.25)

.

!

!!

𝜋! ! = 𝐷! 𝐼𝑝! − 𝐴! + 𝑣𝐷! 𝐹! = 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

(3.26)

+ 𝑣𝐷! 𝐹! .

Where;
𝐺! = 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 − 𝑣𝑐 −
𝐹! =

!!" ! !! !!! !!! !𝑠 !!! !
!
!

!!! !

! !!! !!! !!
!
!

!!! !

,

+ 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 ,

𝐺!!! = 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 − 𝑣𝑐 + 1 − 𝑤𝑘! 𝑐, and
𝐹!!! = 𝑐𝑘!" + 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 .
𝐹! represents the savings or losses the physical store makes by accepting each crosschannel return. One may subject the optimal solution to the following constraints:
!!

𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

!!

≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

≥ 0, and 𝑄!! ≥ 0.

Since each channel aims to maximize it own profit in the competitive setting, the
online store may over estimate the value of cross-channel returns 𝑐. In return, the physical
store may stop cooperating with the online store. Such a lack of cooperation may create
havoc in the system and cause unnecessary practices such as returning all cross-channel
returns back to the online store at its own expense. Therefore, the following condition on
the value of 𝑐 should be satisfied:
General Case (i.e. 𝜺 ∈ 𝟏, ∞ ):
𝑐≤

!!" ! !! !!! !!! !! !!! !
!
!

!!! !

+ 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑.

(3.27)

To better comprehend, assume that 𝜀 = 1. Thus, relationship (3.27) becomes:
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𝑐≤

!!" !
!!!!!

+

!!" !"!!
!!!!!

+ 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑.

(3.28)

The right-hand side of the above relationship represents how a physical store should
consider a cross-channel return. The first term denotes the physical store’s valuation of a
resalable cross-channel return. Since an item purchased by the physical store at the
beginning of the selling season can satisfy 1 + 𝑟𝑘! sales, it is worth a value of 𝑐. In
contradistinction, since a resalable cross-channel return can only satisfy one sale it is
worth a value of

!
!!!!!

. The second term calculates the increase in salvaged resalable

returns at the end of the selling season caused by each resalable cross-channel return. The
third term denotes the physical store’s gain, due to salvaging, from a non-resalable crosschannel return. The fourth term denotes the physical store’s loss, due to the collection
cost, from each cross-channel return.
Special Case (i.e. 𝜺 = ∞):
𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑘!" + 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑.

(3.29)

Due to the assumption that an item owned by a physical store is infinitely sold until it is
permanently sold or returned but not resalable, both an item purchased by the physical
store at the beginning of the selling season and a resalable cross-channel return can satisfy
!
!!!!!

sales. Thus, they are both worth a value of 𝑐.

3.4.1 Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Stackelberg Game
In contrast to the physical store, forming a customer base for the online store is
not limited to the store’s neighbourhood. Also, due to the advancement in cellular phones
and IT, customers of a dual-channel retailer may always check the prices of an online
store before they conduct their purchases from a physical store. Additionally, online
stores are normally considered to be the distribution centers of enterprises. Therefore,
they can start the selling season before their competitors. For the aforementioned facts,
the online store is considered to have more price influence on customers compared to the
physical store. Thus, a retailer’s online store will lead and its physical store will follow. In
this game, the physical store optimizes its performance based on the online store’s
optimal price. The online store optimizes its performance based on the physical store’s
best response function.
Proposition 3.3.
!

i.

!!! !
!"

< 0 and

!

!!! !
!"

<0
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ii.

Given the online store’s optimal price, the physical store’s profit function (3.26) is

strictly concave in 𝑝! . Given the physical store’s optimal price function, the online store’s
profit function (3.25) is strictly concave in 𝑝! . Thus, the physical store’s maximum profit
of 𝜋 !! and the online store’s maximum profit of 𝜋 !! are generated by selecting the unique
physical store’s optimal price of 𝑝 !! and online store’s optimal price of 𝑝 !! .
𝑝 !! 𝑝 !! =
𝑝 !! =

!!
!!

+

! !!
! !

+

!! !

!!
!

+

!! ! !! !

+

!! !"
!"

!

+ 𝑝 !! .

(3.30)

!

!! !
! !! ! !! !

+

!! !"
!! !! ! !! !

+

!! ! !!
!! !! ! !! !

.

(3.31)

From (3.30) and (3.31), one gets:
!!!!
!!

!

= −!

!!!! !!!
!!!!

!!!!
!! ! !! !

< 0,

!!!!
!!

!

= !!

!! ! !!!"!! !
!! ! !! !

> 0,

!!!!
!!

!!!!

−

!!

= !!

!! !
!! ! !! !

> 0,

!

= !! > 0.

If 𝑝 !! = 𝑝 !! , then
𝜃=

2𝛽 2𝛽2 −𝛾2
2

𝛼 8𝛽 −𝛾2 −4𝛽𝛾

𝐺𝜀
𝐽

−

𝐴𝜀
𝐼

𝐺 𝛾

𝜀
− 2𝐽𝛽
+

4𝐼𝛽𝛼+2𝐴𝜀 𝛽𝛾−2𝐼𝛼𝛾−𝐴𝜀 𝛾2 +2𝑣𝛾2 𝐹𝜀
2

2𝐼 2𝛽 −𝛾2

−

𝑣𝛾3 𝐹𝜀
2

2𝛽𝐼 2𝛽 −𝛾2

−

𝐹𝜀 𝑣𝛾
𝛽𝐼

.

(3.32)

The above relationships indicate that a physical store’s optimal price will increase
as 𝜃 increases, while an online store’s optimal price will decrease as 𝜃 increases. The
follower’s (physical store’s) pricing strategy is always less affected by the change in 𝜃
than the leader’s (online store’s) pricing strategy. If the online store’s best response of 𝑝 !!
increases by a single unit, then the physical store’s best response of 𝑝 !! will increase by
half a unit at the most. Dan et al. (2012) came to a similar conclusion for a dual-channel
system without customer returns. This in fact shows how much control the leader has
over the follower, especially when customer returns are allowed. Similar to Dan et al.
(2012), Chen et al. (2012), and Hua et al. (2010) a 𝜃 exists, such that if 𝜃 = 𝜃, then the
pricing strategies in both channels are similar. If customer preference for the physical
store is lower than the threshold (𝜃 < 𝜃), then the selling price in the physical store is
lower than the selling price in the online store (𝑝 !! < 𝑝 !! ). If customer preference for the
physical store is higher than the threshold (𝜃 > 𝜃), then the selling price in the physical
store is higher than the selling price in the online store (𝑝 !! > 𝑝 !! ). For example, when
remanufactured or used items are offered for sale, customers are most likely eager to
verify the quality of the offered items before completing a purchase. Thus higher prices
should be offered in the physical store. While changing the 𝜃 value may impose a
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different outcome on the decentralized setting than on the centralized setting, in both
cases it significantly impacts pricing decisions.
3.4.2 Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Nash Game
In a dual-channel Nash game, online and physical stores are equally powerful. The
market has no price leader. Thus, prices are selected simultaneously in both channels. In
this game, each store optimizes its performance given the rival’s price.
Proposition 3.4

A unique Nash equilibrium exists under the physical store’s price, 𝑝!! , and the online
store’s price, 𝑝!! . Under equilibrium, the physical store generates a profit of 𝜋 !! and the
online store generates a profit of 𝜋 !! .
!

𝑝 !! =

2𝛽𝛼! + 𝛾𝛼! +

!! ! !! !
!

𝑝 !! =

2𝛽𝛼! + 𝛾𝛼! +

!! ! !! !

!! ! !!
!!
!! ! !!
!

+
+

!! ! !!
!
!!!!
!

+

+

!!"!!!
!

!! ! !!
!

−

!!!
!!

.

(3.33)

.

(3.34)

From (3.33) and (3.34), one gets:
! 𝑝 𝑁𝑟
!!
! 𝑝 𝑁𝑜
! 𝑝 𝑁𝑟

2𝛽𝛼 − 𝛾 𝛼 − 1 . Since 𝛼 − 1 ≈ 𝛼 , then

!! ! !! !
!

=

!!

!!

!

=

𝛾𝛼 − 2𝛽 𝛼 − 1 . Since 𝛼 − 1 ≈ 𝛼 , then

!! ! !! !

−

! 𝑝 𝑁𝑜
!!

=

!!!!
!! ! !! !

! 𝑝 𝑁𝑟
!!
! 𝑝 𝑁𝑜
!!

≈
≈

!
!! ! !! !
!!
!! ! !! !

2𝛽 − 𝛾 > 0.
2𝛽 − 𝛾 < 0.

2𝛽 − 𝛾 > 0.

If 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! , then
𝜃=

1
2𝛼

𝛼+

𝛽𝐺𝜀
𝐽

−

𝛽𝐴𝜀
𝐼

−

𝑣𝛾𝐹𝜀
𝐼

.

(3.35)

As 𝜃 increases, the physical store’s optimal price will increase and the online
store’s optimal price will decrease. Different than the Stackelberg game, the online store’s
pricing strategy is less affected by the change in 𝜃 than the physical store’s pricing
strategy. Also, there exists a 𝜃, such that if 𝜃 = 𝜃, then the pricing strategies in both
stores are similar. If customer preference for the physical store is higher than the
threshold (𝜃 > 𝜃), then the selling price in the physical store is higher than the selling
price in the online store (𝑝!! > 𝑝!! ). If customer preference for the physical store is
lower than the threshold (𝜃 < 𝜃), then the selling price in the physical store is lower than
the selling price in the online store (𝑝!! < 𝑝!! ). Due to functions’ complexity, it is
difficult to carry on a comparison between a channel’s price and profitability under the
different games. Thus, the comparison is done in the sensitivity analysis.
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3.5

Sensitivity Analysis

This numerical study aims to provide several key managerial insights by
answering the following questions: Does a unified pricing strategy under centralized
management have a higher total profit than competing dual channels? If not, under what
conditions is this statement not correct? The latter’s answer leads to the following
question: Under what competition setting and conditions is the total performance best?
How does a channel’s pricing strategy compare to different cases? Which case will be the
most affected if returns can be resold several times in a selling season? This study uses
the following parameters:
𝑐 = 30, 𝑠 = 10, 𝑑 = 2, 𝑡 = 4, 𝑟 = 0.2, 𝑤 = 0.2, 𝑣 = 0.2, 𝑘! = 0.6, 𝑘! = 0.4, 𝑘!" =
0.4, 𝜃 = 0.45,0.65 , 𝛾 = 5, 𝛽 = 10, 𝛼 = 15𝑘, 𝜀 = 1, ∞ ,
𝑐𝜀!! =

𝑘𝑜𝑟 𝑐+𝑠𝑟𝑘𝑟
!!!!!

+ 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑 , & 𝑐𝜀!! = 𝑐𝑘!" + 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑 .

The parameter 𝜀 = 1 is used throughout this sensitivity analysis except in Section 3.5.4
where the change in retailer’s performance is tracked and compared.
3.5.1 Total System Performance under Unified Pricing Strategy and
Competition
If the centralization process eliminates conflict by including the unification of
selling prices across all channels (Yan 2010), then an enterprise may be better off with
uncoordinated channels. As presented in Figure 3.2a, when customer preference for the
physical store, 𝜃, and the physical store’s rate of return, 𝑟, are sufficiently high,
competition between channels leads to a better retailer’s total performance. Similarly,
when customer preference for the online store, 1 − 𝜃, and the online store’s same-channel
rate of return, 𝑤, are sufficiently high, an enterprise should encourage competition rather
than coordination (Figure 3.2b). Indeed, embracing a sole price will reduce channel
conflict but deprive the system of agility. That is, it is difficult for an enterprise to divert
sales from a high return-rate channel to a low return-rate channel. It should be noted that
centralization with a differential pricing strategy has not been considered in this section.
Similar to the findings of Yan (2008, 2010) and of Yan et al. (2010), such a setting will
lead to the best system performance for all applicable parameters, especially when
coordination cost is not considered.
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Figure 3.2: Total profit comparison between centralization with unified pricing strategy and decentralization

3.5.2 Channel's Performance and Pricing Strategy under Competition
Schemes
This section will compare between the Stackelberg game and the Nash game.
Similar to the findings of Yan et al. (2010), Yan (2010), and Yan (2008), the Stackelberg
competition has better channels' profits and thus system performance than the Nash
competition (Figure 3.3). It also induces higher equilibrium prices compared to Nash
competition (Figure 3.4). This finding is intuitive, since Stackelberg game imposes a
higher coordination level between channels. Additionally, both channels are equally
powerful in the Nash game. This implies that there will be increased price competition.
This provides an explanation for why the channels prices in a Nash game are lower than
the channels prices in a Stackelberg game. Thus, enterprises should consider employing
the Stackelberg scheme rather than Nash scheme to set channel prices in a competitive
market. However, this statement can’t be generalized on all possible parameters sets, as it
is not analytically proven.
4000000

8000000

x=S
X=N

3000000

6000000

π xo 2000000

π xr

1000000

x=S
X=N

4000000
2000000

0

0
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

θ

θ

(a)

(b)

Figure 3.3: Comparison of a channel’s profit under different competition schemes

Under the competition schemes, one may notice that the impact a return rate has
on stores’ prices is not profound. A channel will not drastically increase its selling price
as it experiences a higher return rate. Intuitively, such an increase will cause a channel to
lose sales in favour of the competing channel (Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4: Return rates’ effect on physical and online store pricing strategies in competition schemes

3.5.3 Pricing Strategies under Centralized Management
A comparison of Figures 3.4 and 3.5 shows that channels have higher selling
prices when coordinating rather than when decentralizing. Since the prices under the two
settings are not equal, it can be stated that decisions in a decentralized setting deviate
from the overall system’s perspective. Indeed, coordination eliminates price competition,
providing a chance for both channels to increase prices. Similarly, Yan et al. (2010) have
indicated that differential prices set by a sole manager are higher than those set by
competing channels. In contrast, Ryan et al. (2013) have indicated that coordination
increases total retailer’s profit, but at the same time decreases the prices of both channels.
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Figure 3.5: Return rates’ effect on physical and online pricing strategies under centralization schemes

As 𝑟 increases within the differential case, the physical store’s price increases in
an attempt to decrease the negative effect of return. Consequently, the physical store’s
sales will decline. The online store should decrease the selling price to attract more
customers and to shift part of the lost sales from the physical store to the online store
(Figure 3.5 a and b). Under an extremely high 𝑟, the physical store can be used as a show
room and most purchases can be directed to the online store. When 𝑤 or 𝑣 increase,
channel prices are set such that sales shifts from the online store to the physical store
(Figure 3.5 c to f). If 𝑤 and/or 𝑣 are extremely high, then the online store can serve as an
information channel and the physical store can serve as a transaction channel (Neslin and
Shankar 2009; and Steinfield 2004). Both channels operate in coordination to fulfill
organizational-level goals rather than channel-level goals. Indeed, the compensation
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system in the centralized case should not depend upon the channel’s profitability. It
should instead depend upon the degree of coordination and the total supply chain’s
profitability.
Compare the above pricing strategy to that of both Stackelberg and Nash games
wherein a store has no intention of losing customers in favour of the competing store
(Figure 3.4). For example, as 𝑟 increases, a slight increase in the retail price is
implemented. The online store will consider this increase in the rival’s price as an
opportunity to increase the channel’s price and to generate more profit. The findings in
this section support Baal’s (2014) hypothesis that “the higher the degree of
harmonization, the greater the degree of cannibalization.”
In the case of unification, it is difficult to mitigate the customer returns problem
by shifting sales from one channel to another due to the pricing policy used. It has been
found that the unified price should decrease if the rate of return for the channel with high
customer preference increases. In contradistinction, if the rate of return for the channel
with low customer preference increases, the unified price will increase (Figure 3.5).
3.5.4 Retailer’s Performance under Single Resalability and Infinite
Resalability
When returns can be resold several times during a selling season, the quantity that
is needed is reduced while profit is increased. Thus, this section measures the increase in
total profitability for the different cases when infinite resalability is applicable. If the
change is high, then it is probably worth altering the return policy (e.g., by reducing the
return time limit) or investing in the reverse supply chain (e.g., investing in collection,
shipping, fixing, and/or repackaging processes).
As the resalability rate (𝑘! ) increases, the profitability of the system increases.
One may notice that all cases have experienced almost the same changes to ∆𝜋 (Figure
3.6 a). The system will behave in a similar way when 𝑣, 𝑤, 𝑘! or 𝑘!" change. However,
the unified pricing strategy experiences the highest change in profitability when the rate
of return, 𝑟, increases. With a high 𝑟, ∆𝜋 scored $25,000 in the unified pricing case and
$15,000 in all other cases (Figure 3.6 b). Thus, there is a need to shorten the length of
time that a return stays off shelves, especially when an enterprise uses the unified pricing
strategy.
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3.6

Managerial Insights

This chapter has several implications in regards to the pricing strategies of a dualchannel retailer wherein both same- and cross-channel returns have been considered. It
has examined several insights related to the centralization of a dual-channel retailer under
unified pricing or differential pricing schemes. It has also examined insights related to the
decentralization of a dual-channel retailer under Stackelberg or Nash games.
It has been found that when customer preference for the physical channel is higher
than a threshold value, then the retailer’s set price should be higher in the physical
channel than in the online channel. The threshold is defined as 𝜃 and 𝜃 in the Stackelberg,
and Nash games, respectively. Such a situation may occur when products have been
custom designed or when remanufactured or used items have been offered for sale.
Consequently, customers are more likely to verify the design or quality of the offered
items before completing their purchase. However, when customer’ preference for the
physical channel is lower than the threshold value, the retailer’s set price should be lower
in the physical channel than in the online channel. Such a situation may occur when the
products that have been offered for sale do not require a high level of examination in
regards to their design or quality level before being purchased. For example, products that
are standardized or mature (such as books and CDs) better fit this category. In a
centralized situation, the threshold value is defined as 𝜃. Under valid, but unusual
parameters, 𝜃 could be higher than one, which means that the online store should always
be priced higher than the physical store. Additionally, 𝜃 could be less than zero, which
means that the online store should always be priced lower than the physical store.
Centralization with a differential pricing scheme may cause a retailer to
significantly shift sales from one channel to another, leaving the first channel with
virtually no customers. Such a management style imposes hardship on the retailer when it
comes to tailoring a compensation program that is fair for both channels and dependent
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on coordination level rather than on sales. As a result, many retailers centralize decisionmaking under a unified pricing strategy. Thus, retailers should be aware of several
important issues related to the price unification process. This strategy, compared to all
strategies studied in Chapter 3, has the highest positive correlation between profit and
number of times an item can be resold in a single selling season, especially when the
online store has a low customer preference and the physical store has a high same-channel
return rate. In this situation, the retailer may adopt a more stringent return policy when it
comes to the trial period, or may consider increasing the capability of the reverse supply
chain by investing more in the collection, shipping, fixing, and/or repackaging processes.
Additionally, when under a centralized dual-channel retailer and a unified price strategy,
a retailer’s profit is not always higher than when under a decentralized dual-channel
retailer. Thus, the retailer should be careful in regards to encouraging or discouraging
competition between channels. For example, if a channel experiences a sufficiently high
customer preference and a same-channel rate of return, then it is better for the retailer to
encourage competition rather than coordination. This could occur in the apparel industry,
for example, wherein customers are increasingly inclined to use online stores despite
having up to a 75% chance that they will return their purchases due to size or material
mismatches.
Prices in the Nash game when neither channel is a price leader, are lower than in
the Stackelberg game, when the online channel is the price leader. Our study shows that
both channels are worse off in the Nash game. This can be attributed to the fact that
higher competition induces lower prices. Consequently, one may argue that Nash game
leads to a lower total retailer’s profitability. These results indicate that game schemes
have a significant impact on retailer payoffs, and that the schemes have a substantial
influence on sales and customer welfare.

3.7

Conclusion

Chapter 3 has studied the effect that same- and cross-channel customer returns
have on a dual-channel retailer wherein an enterprise runs both a physical store and an
online store. The results confirm that accounting for both types of returns is very
important when calculating channels’ optimal prices. Closed form formulas were
assigned to the optimal unified price and the differential prices set by centralized
management. The optimal prices for the competing channels were derived using the
Stackelberg game and the Nash game.
It has been found that customer preference for a certain channel greatly affects the
pricing strategy of that channel. For example, the optimal price for a channel facing
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competition will increase as customer preference for that channel also increases. Unlike
common perception, the optimal price for a channel under centralized management and a
differential pricing strategy could either increase or decrease when customer preference
for that channel increases. The previous setting may not possess a customer preference
value that causes both channels to optimally be priced equally. When the physical store’s
rate of return is less than all online store’s rates of returns, then the optimal unified price
will increase as customer preference for the physical store increases.
From the numerical example it has been observed that the prices set by centralized
management are higher than those set by competing channels. When compared to
Stackelberg competition, Nash competition imposes lower pricing strategies for both
channels and lower total supply chain profitability. When a channel faces high rate of
returns and high customer preference, then the retailer should promote competition over
coordination with price unification. Having the ability to resell returns several times
rather than once in a selling season increases the total profitability of the system. This has
been found to be the highest increment when using a unified pricing strategy and when a
channel with high customer preference experiences a high rate of returns.
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CHAPTER 4:

PRICES AND RESPONSIVENESS
LEVEL DECISIONS

4.1

Introduction and Motivation

Only a few works addressed in Chapter 2 considered the service level provided by
a certain channel and its effect on a system’s performance. According to Ramanathan
(2011), services provided by a retailer can be categorized into two groups: pre-purchase
services and post-purchase services. Hua et al. (2010) have considered a post-purchase
service level offered by an online channel. The responsiveness of the forward supply
chain was an important decision variable in their study. However, Dan et al. (2012) have
studied comprehensive service levels (pre-purchase and post-purchase) offered by a
physical store. Due to the nature and quantity of returns, one of the online store’s most
important post-purchase services is its responsiveness level to customer returns. The level
greatly influences customer demands, customer loyalties, service expenses, and return
reselability (Ramanathan 2011; Dan et al. 2012).
As stated earlier, there is no work that has collectively considered all common
forms of customer returns experienced by a dual-channel retailer. Hence, the impact of
resalable cross-channel returns on both stores has not being studied previously. In
addition, no published paper that has investigated online store’s ability to better handle
returns and, thus, optimize returns’ resalability rate. Accordingly, this chapter is an
extension of Chapter 3. It discusses dual-channel retailers with both return types, and
examines optimal pricing policies. Additionally, it studies the optimal responsiveness
level for online stores when handling product returns, as responsiveness influences online
and offline channel sales and online store resalability rate. While theoretical game
frameworks are addressed in regards to competition between channels, unified and
differential pricing strategies are addressed in regards to integration.
The study in this chapter makes four important contributions to the existing body
of work, as shown below.
• All common forms of customer returns that may arise in a dual-channel retailing
system are examined. As stated earlier, purchasing an item from a physical store and
returning it to an online store is not a common practice and, thus, it is not considered in
this work.
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• Various theoretical games are used to investigate competition that may arise between
the channels of a dual-channel retailer.
• The ability to resell a same-channel online return is related to the responsiveness level
provided by the store.
• A comparative study between the total dual-channel retailer’s performance under the
different schemes is provided.

4.2

Model Formulations
As stated before, the online store is normally the distribution centre of the

enterprise and is not limited to customers in its neighbourhood. Also, the online store
experiences a much higher return rate compared to the physical store. Thus, it has the
capability and the need to optimize its resalability rate. In this chapter 𝑘! is assumed to be
responsiveness level dependent and can be estimated by the linear function 𝑘! 𝑒 = 𝑎 +
𝑏𝑒. 𝑎 measures the online store’s resalability rate if the store fully utilizes its current
reverse supply chain capability or responsiveness level. For example, if the online store
fully utilizes the employees, buildings, tools, systems, and contracts from previous selling
seasons, then it would have a resalability rate of 𝑎. We assume here that customers do not
acquire knowledge on products from previous seasons. Otherwise, it is imperative to
increase resalability rate as they gain more knowledge. This assumption can be satisfied
when dealing with fashionable apparel items wherein customers’ return behaviour can be
forecasted from earlier periods and items are regularly redesigned. On the other hand, 𝑏
represents the sensitivity of the online store’s resalability rate to the change in
responsiveness level. In another word, it measures the increase (decrease) in resalability
rate when the store invests in (underutilize) responsiveness level. Two cases are studied: a
case 𝜀 = 1 where returns are assumed to be resold once and a case 𝜀 = ∞ where returns
are assumed to be resold infinitely.
To simplify our problem setting, the models proposed in this paper do not
consider the salvage value of leftovers, i.e. non-resalable returns or resalable items that
were returned after the end of the selling season. A change in responsiveness level (an
increase or a decrease) would cause the online store to bear a cost of 𝑐 𝑒 = 𝜂𝑒 ! 2. The
previous function is strictly convex and has the property 𝜕 ! 𝑐 𝑒 𝜕𝑒 ! > 0. If 𝑒 > 0, then
the online store’s management would invest more in the channel’s reverse supply chain to
increase its responsiveness when handling returns. For example, the management could
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initiate a quality control department to check and fix returns if possible. This will increase
resalability and boost sales in the online store due to the fact that the store will have a
reputation not to send damaged items. Additionally, providing pickup services may ease
the return process. It will also allow the online store to increase its resalability by
providing a safer packaging for returns. Management could also invest in a department
that performs data collection and analysis. With such a capability, customers are offered
more suitable products for their needs. For example, a customer buys shoes online
regularly and returns uncomfortable ones. When data are collected and analysed, better
suggestions are given to the customer. Consequently, if a return is to be made by this
customer, most likely it is material or fabric mismatch. This will decrease the likelihood
that the return is not resalable. However, if 𝑒 < 0, then the online store’s management
would underutilize the online store’s current reverse supply chain capability to decrease
its responsiveness level. Such a technique could be used to shift sales from an online store
to a physical store when channels are run collectively.
The total overall sales functions (3.1) and (3.2) have been changed to
accommodate the effect of responsiveness level as follows:
𝐷! = 𝛼! − 𝛽𝑝! + 𝜆𝑝! − 𝜌𝑒.

(4.1)

𝐷! = 𝛼! − 𝛽𝑝! + 𝜆𝑝! + 𝜌𝑒.

(4.2)

𝜌 is the sensitivity to responsiveness level. It measures the rate at which sales are affected
by the responsiveness level set by the online store.
The next two sections investigate the integration of a dual-channel retailer using
two pricing strategies: uniform pricing and differential pricing. They also consider the
equilibrium decisions of the online and physical stores at times when the stores are
undergoing Stackelberg and Nash competitive schemes. In the Stackelberg scheme, the
online store leads, declaring its selling price and responsiveness level first and is then
followed by the physical store. In the Nash scheme, online and physical stores are
commensurate in power. They therefore make their decisions simultaneously. A summary
of this chapter’s notations is showing in Table 4.1 below.
Notation
𝒓

Description
Probability an item purchased from the physical store is returned to the physical store

𝒘

Probability an item purchased from the online store is returned to the online store

𝒗

Probability an item purchased from the online store is cross-returned to a physical store

𝒌𝒓

Probability an item purchased from and returned to the physical store is resalable

𝒌𝒐

Probability an item purchased from and returned to the online store is resalable
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Probability an item purchased from the online store and cross-returned to the physical

𝒌𝒐𝒓

store is resalable
𝒂

Online store’s current resalability rate

𝒆

Online store’s responsiveness level

𝒃&𝝆

Sensitivity of online store’s resalability rate and a channel’s sales to responsiveness
level, respectively

𝒄

Unit purchasing cost

𝒅&𝒕

Return collection and shipping costs, respectively

𝒄

Amount a physical store pays to an online store for every cross-channel return in the
decentralization scheme

𝑫𝒓 & 𝑫𝒐

Retail and online stores’ total sales including returns, respectively

𝑸𝒓𝜺 & 𝑸𝒐𝜺

Quantities ordered by retail and online stores, respectively

𝜶, 𝜶𝒓 & 𝜶𝒐

Enterprise, physical store and online store base levels of sale, respectively

𝜽

Customer preference for the physical store

𝜷&𝜸

Ownership price and cross-price sensitivities of a channel, respectively

𝒑𝒓 & 𝒑𝒐

Retail and online store’s prices, respectively

𝑪

𝑪

𝝅𝜺 𝒓 , 𝝅𝜺 𝒐 & 𝝅𝑪𝜺
𝑫

𝑫

Physical store, online store, and enterprise profits in the centralized case, respectively

𝝅𝜺 𝒓 & 𝝅𝜺 𝒐

Physical store and online store profits in the decentralized case, respectively

𝜺

Number of times a resalable return can be resold in a selling season
Table 4.1: Fourth Chapter’s Notations

4.3

Centralized Dual-Channel Retailing System

This section investigates the optimal decisions of a dual-channel retailer under a
centralized management. The physical store and online store are integrated vertically. It
may be assumed that a central decision maker is used with an objective to achieve the
retailer’s total possible profit. He or she decides the price for the physical store, which is
𝑝! , the price for the online store, which is 𝑝! , and the responsiveness level for the online
store, which is 𝑒, at the same time.
The online store’s and physical store’s profit functions are modeled respectively
as follows:
!

𝜋! ! = 𝐷! 1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡

!

− 𝑄!! 𝑐 − 𝜂𝑒 ! .
!

!

𝜋! ! = 𝐷! 1 − 𝑟 𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 − 𝐷! 𝑣𝑑 − 𝑄!! 𝑐.

(4.3)
(4.4)

A description of the above profit functions has been omitted due to their similarity to the
profit functions presented in Chapter 3. The retailer profit function can be modeled as
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!

!

𝜋!! = 𝜋! ! + 𝜋! ! = 𝐷! 𝐽𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑣𝑑 + 𝐷! 𝐼𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 − 𝑄!! 𝑐 − 𝑄!! 𝑐 −
!
!

𝜂𝑒 ! .

(4.5)

Where 𝐼 = 1 − 𝑟 and 𝐽 = 1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣. By replacing the quantity 𝑄!! , the quantity 𝑄!! , and
the resalability 𝑘! with their functions, the retailer profit function 𝜋!! is transformed into
the equations below.
Selling Resalable Returns Once (𝜺 = 𝟏)
Based on formulas (3.4) and (3.6) when 𝜀 = 1, one has
!
𝜋!!!
= 𝐷! 𝐽𝑝! − 𝐵!!! −

!

!

!!!"!!"#

+ 𝐷! 𝐼𝑝! − 𝐴!!! − 𝜂𝑒 ! .
!

(4.6)

Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞)
With formulas (3.8) and (3.10), one obtains
!

!
𝜋!!!
= 𝐷! 𝐽𝑝! − 𝐵!!! + 𝑤𝑏𝑒𝑐 + 𝐷! 𝐼𝑝! − 𝐴!!! − 𝜂𝑒 ! .
!

(4.7)

Where
!"!

!

𝐵!!! = 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑣𝑑 − !!!!!" , 𝐴!!! = 𝑟𝑑 + !!!! ,
!

!

𝐵!!! = 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐 + 𝑣𝑑 − 𝑐𝑣𝑘!" + 𝑐, and 𝐴!!! = 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑐 1 − 𝑟𝑘! .
One may reformulate (4.6) and (4.7) as
!!

!

!!

𝜋!! = 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

− 𝜂𝑒 ! .

+ 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!
!!

Notice that 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

(4.8)

!

!!

and 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

is the revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from

the online store and physical store, respectively. Thus, the optimal solution is subjected to
the constraints
!!

𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

!!

≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

≥ 0, 𝑄!! ≥ 0, and − 𝑎 𝑏 ≤ 𝑒 ≤ 1 − 𝑎 𝑏.

Section 4.3.1 presents an analysis of a situation wherein the central decision
maker chooses a differential pricing strategy or does not constraint prices to be equal.
Section 4.3.2 examines a scenario in which a central decision maker uses a unified pricing
strategy or sets equal prices in both stores.
4.3.1 Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Differential Pricing
Strategy
This section of the work examines a situation in which a centralized management
decides to operate its business while utilizing a pricing approach that is differential.
Proposition 4.1
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The profit function (4.7) is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝! , 𝑝! , and 𝑒, given that
4𝐼𝐽𝛽 ! − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼

!

!

!
> 0 and 𝐻!!!
< 0. Similarly, the profit function (4.6) is strictly

and jointly concave in 𝑝! , 𝑝! , and 𝑒 within the feasible region, given that 4𝐼𝐽𝛽! −
𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼

!

!

!
> 0 and 𝐻!!!
< 0.

The conditions in this proposition guarantee the existence of a unique equilibrium
point. If those conditions were not satisfied, then the profit functions (4.6) and (4.7) could
have several equilibrium points. This would make the prediction of the system’s
behaviour difficult in practice. Throughout this work one or two conditions have been set
in a similar fashion to guarantee the existence of a sole equilibrium point. As stated in
Chapter 3, the condition 4𝐼𝐽𝛽 ! − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼

!

> 0 may not be satisfied if cross-price

sensitivity is very close to ownership price sensitivity, and if one channel experiences
much higher return rates than the other.
!

!

The online store’s optimal price (𝑝! ! ) and responsiveness level (𝑒! ! ) and the
!

physical store’s optimal price (𝑝! ! ) are then found for the cases 𝜀 = ∞ and 𝜀 = 1,
respectively.
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜀 = ∞)
!
!!!!!

If one sets

!!!

!
!!!!!

= 0,

!!!

= 0, and

!
!!!!!

!!

= 0 and then solves the first-order

conditions simultaneously, one gets
!! ! !"!!! !!! ! !"#!! !!!!!! !!!!!! ! !"!!"#$ !!" !!! !!!!!! !!!!!! !! !!! !!! !!!!!! !!!!!!
!!
𝑒!!!

! !"!!"#$ !!" !!! !!!!!! !!!!!! !! !!! !!! !!!!!! !!!!!!
!! ! !"!! ! !!! ! !!!!"#$ ! !"!!"#$ !" !!"!! !!! !!"# !!! ! !! ! !!!

=

,
(4.9)

! !"!!"#$ !" !!"!! !!! !!"#$% !!!

!

!
𝑝!!!
=

!

!!
!!!!

!!" !!! !!!!!! !!!!!! !! !!! !!! !!!!!! !!!!!! ! !" !!"!! !!! !!"# !!! ! !!! !!!
!! ! !"!! ! !!! !

, and

(4.10)

!

!
𝑝!!!
=

!
!!" !!! !!!!!! !!!!!! !! !!! !!! !!!!!! !!!!!! ! !" !!"!! !!! !!"#$% !!! !!!!

!! ! !"!! ! !!! !

.

(4.11)

Selling Resalable Returns Once (𝜺 = 𝟏)
If one sets
𝐽𝜌 −

!!!

!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

!

!
𝑝!!!
𝑒 =

!

!
!!!!!

!
𝑝!!!
𝑒 =

!

!!! !!

= 0,

𝑝! − 𝜌𝐼 −

!

!!!

!
!!!!!

!!!

= 0 and

!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

!
!!!! !!!!"!!"#

𝑝! +

!
!!!!!

!!

!"!! !
!!!"!!"# !

= 0, then
− 𝜌 𝐵!!! − 𝐴!!! +

!! !!! ! !! !!" !!!"# !! !!" ! !!! !"!!!!

!!"! ! !! ! !!! !
!" !!!

!
!!!! !!!!"!!"#

!

!!!"# !! !!" !! !!! ! !! !!" ! !!! !!

!

.

!!! !!!!

!!"! ! !! ! !!! !

.

!!!" !
!!!"!!"# !

− 𝜂𝑒 = 0.

(4.12)
(4.13)
(4.14)

Substitute (4.14) and (4.13) in (4.12). If the restrictions in Proposition 4.1 are satisfied,
then the first-order condition in (4.12) has at most one real root for the responsiveness
!

!
level 𝑒 between − 𝑎 𝑏 and 1 − 𝑎 𝑏. This root is the optimal responsiveness level 𝑒!!!
.
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!

!
One may substitute the value of 𝑒!!!
in (4.13) and (4.14) to get the online store’s optimal

!

!

!
!
price 𝑝!!!
and the physical store’s optimal price 𝑝!!!
.

4.3.2 Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Unified Pricing Strategy
This section examines a scenario in which a sole manager makes the decision to
operate its business using a unified pricing approach. Because of an added constraint (i.e.,
𝑝! = 𝑝! = 𝑝), the unified pricing scheme’s generated profit is equal to or less than that of
a differential pricing scheme.
Proposition 4.2
!

!
!
The profit functions 𝜋!!!
is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝 and 𝑒, given that 𝐻!!!
>

!
0. Similarly, The profit functions 𝜋!!!
is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝 and 𝑒 within the
!

!
feasible region, given that 𝐻!!!
> 0.

Similar to proposition 4.1, one should confirm that 𝜂 is high enough to satisfy the
above condition so that one may have a single equilibrium point rather than multiple
!

points. The retailer’s optimal unified price (𝑝! ! ) and online store’s responsiveness level
!

(𝑒! ! ) are then found for the cases 𝜀 = ∞ and 𝜀 = 1, respectively.
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞)
!
!!!!!

If one sets

!!

= 0 and

!
!!!!!

!!

= 0 and then simultaneously solve the first-order

conditions, one gets
!

!
𝑒!!!
=

!

!
𝑝!!!
=

! !!! !!!

!! !"#!!!!!! !!!!!! ! !" !!! !!! !!!
! !!! !!" !!! !! ! !!! !!!

!!! !!!! ! !!! !!!! !!!!! ! ! !!! !!" !!! !

!!
!!!!

! !!! !!!

!!! !!!! ! !!! !!!! !!!!!

!!!!"#$

.

(4.15)

.

(4.16)

Selling Resalable Returns once (𝜺 = 𝟏)
If one sets
!
! !!!

!!

𝐵!!! + 𝐴!!! +

!" !! !!" !
!!!"!!"# !
!!
𝑝!!!

!
!!!!!

𝑒 =

= 0 and
!
!!!"!!"#

+

!
!!!!!

!!

= 0, then

! !! !!" !! !! !!"
!!!

𝜌 𝐽−𝐼 −

!" !!! !
!!!"!!"# !

− 𝜂𝑒 = 0.
!

! !!!

𝐵!!! + 𝐴!!! +

− 𝜌 𝐵!!! − 𝐴!!! +

!
!!!"!!"#

+

(4.17)
!
!!!"!!"#

+

! !! !!" !! !! !!"
!!!

.

(4.18)

The first-order condition in (4.17) has at most one real root for the responsiveness level 𝑒
within the range 𝑒 ∈ − 𝑎 𝑏 , 1 − 𝑎 𝑏 . If found, then this is the optimal
!

!

!
!
responsiveness level 𝑒!!!
. Substitute the value of 𝑒!!!
in (4.18) to get the dual-channel’s
𝑢
optimal unified price 𝑝𝐶𝜀=1
.
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4.4

Decentralized Dual-Channel Retailing System

This section investigates the optimal decisions of a dual-channel retailer under a
decentralized management. Thus, each channel makes an isolated decision so that it may
achieve its greatest individual profit. A Stackelberg game, discussed in Section 4.4.1, has
been used to examine the performance of channels that are sequentially competing. Also,
a Nash game, discussed in Section 4.4.2, has been used to examine the performance of
channels that are simultaneously competing. Apart from the inclusion of 𝑐, the profit
functions below have been constructed in a manner similar to the profit functions in the
centralization scheme.
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞)
!

!

!
𝜋!!!
= 𝐷! 𝐽𝑝! − 𝐺!!! + 𝑤𝑏𝑒𝑐 − 𝜂𝑒 ! .

!

(4.19)

!
𝜋!!!
= 𝐷! 𝐼𝑝! − 𝐴!!! + 𝑣𝐷! 𝐹!!! .

(4.20)

!

Selling Resalable Returns Once (𝜺 = 𝟏)
!

!

!
𝜋!!!
= 𝐷! 𝐽𝑝! − 𝐺!!! −

!!
𝜋!!!

!

!!!"!!"#

− 𝜂𝑒 ! .

(4.21)

!

= 𝐷! 𝐼𝑝! − 𝐴!!! + 𝑣𝐷! 𝐹!!! .

(4.22)

Where
𝐺!!! = 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐 − 𝑣𝑐 + 𝑐 , 𝐹!!! = 𝑐𝑘!" − 𝑐 − 𝑑 ,
!!

!"
𝐺!!! = 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑣𝑐 , and 𝐹!!! = !!!!
− 𝑐 − 𝑑.
!

The profit functions of the above may be reformulated as
!

!!

𝜋! ! = 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!
!

!!

𝜋! ! = 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

!

− 𝜂𝑒 ! .

(4.23)

+ 𝑣𝐷! 𝐹! .

(4.24)

!

𝐹! represents the savings or losses the physical store makes by accepting each crosschannel return. The optimal solution is to be subjected to the following constraints:
!!

𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝑄!! ≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

!!

≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!

≥ 0, and − 𝑎 𝑏 ≤ 𝑒 ≤ 1 − 𝑎 𝑏.

4.4.1 Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Stackelberg Game
Under a Stackelberg game, the online stores have more price influence on
customers compared to the physical store. Consequently, online stores lead and physical
!

stores follow. As the leader, an online store will determine the selling price, 𝑝! ! , and the
responsiveness level, 𝑒!! , first. As a follower, a physical store will determine its selling
!

price, 𝑝! ! , based on the online store’s optimal decisions. We analyze first the case
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wherein a returned item can be resold several time in a selling season (i.e. case 𝜀 = ∞),
then the case wherein a returned item can be resold only one time in a selling season (i.e.
case 𝜀 = 1).
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞):
!

!
Given 𝑝! and 𝑒 in (4.20), then the physical store’s profit function (𝜋!!!
) is concave on
!

!
! ! !!!!

(𝑝! ). This is due to the fact that

!

!
!!!!!

= −2𝐼𝛽 < 0. Thus, if we set

!!!!

!!!

= 0, then we

get the physical store’s optimal price function
!

!
𝑝!!!
𝑝! , 𝑒 =

! !!
! !

+

!!!!
!

!"!!!!

+

!"

!

!

!

!

+ 𝑝! − 𝑒 .

(4.25)
!

!
If (4.25) is substituted into (4.19), one get the online store’s profit 𝜋!!!
as a function of

𝑝! and 𝑒
!

!
𝜋!!!
= 𝛼! −

!! ! !!!
!!

𝑝! +

! !!
!

!

+

!!!!
!

+

!"!!!!

!!!!

+

!"

!!

𝜌𝑒

!

𝐽𝑝! − 𝐺!!! + 𝑤𝑏𝑒𝑐 − 𝜂𝑒 ! .
!

(4.26)

Proposition 4.3

The above online store’s profit function (4.26) is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝! and 𝑒
!
under the condition 𝐻!!!
> 0.

The condition in proposition 4.3 assures the existence of a unique equilibrium point. If it
!

!
is satisfied, one can find the online store’s optimal price (𝑝!!!
) and responsiveness level

!
(𝑒!!!
) by solving the set of equations
!

!
𝑝!!!
=

!
𝑒!!!
=

!!!!
!!

+

!!!
!! ! !!!

+

!!!
! !! ! !!!

+

!

!
!!!!!

!!!

!"!!!!
!! !! ! !!!

+

= 0 and

!!! !!!!
!! !! ! !!!

! !!!!
!"#!𝜀!! !"!! !𝜀!!
!!"!! !!"!! !
!
!!𝜀!! !! ! !!!
!
!
!! !!! !!!
!"#
!! !" !!! !𝜀!! !! !𝜀!! !!!𝜀!!
!!! ! ! ! !
!
!
!
!
!
!"
!"
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!! !!!
!! !!!!
!"#$ !!!!
!!
!
!
!!
!!"
!! !!! !!!

+

!

!
!!!!!

!!

= 0. Thus

!!!! !
! !! ! !!!

−

!"#
!!

!
𝑒!!!
.

(4.27)

!

.
(4.28)

Substitute (4.27) and (4.28) into (4.25) to get the physical store’s optimal price

!!
𝑝!!!
.

Selling Resalable Returns once (𝜺 = 𝟏):
!

!
Given 𝑝! and 𝑒 in (4.22), the physical store’s profit function (𝜋!!!
) is concave on (𝑝! ).
!

This is due to the fact that

!
! ! !!!!

!!!!

= −2𝐼𝛽 < 0. Thus, if one sets

!

!
!!!!!

!!!

= 0, one gets the

physical store’s optimal price function
!

1

𝑟
𝑝!!!
𝑝𝑜 , 𝑒 =
2

𝛼𝑟
𝛽

+

𝐴!=1
𝐼

+

𝑣𝜆𝐹!=1
𝛽𝐼

𝜆

𝜌

𝛽

𝛽

+ 𝑝𝑜 − 𝑒 .

(4.29)

(4.29) is substituted into (4.21) to get the online store’s profit as a function of 𝑝! and 𝑒:
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!! ! !!!
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𝜋𝜀!!
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! !!
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!!
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!"!𝜀!!
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𝜌𝑒

𝐽𝑝! − 𝐺𝜀!! −

!

− 𝜂𝑒 ! .

!!!"!!"#

(4.30)

!

Proposition 4.4.

The aforementioned online store’s profit function (4.30) is concave in 𝑝! , but not jointly
concave in 𝑝! and 𝑒.
Proposition 4.4 indicates that one may not find the optimal values of 𝑝! and 𝑒 by using
the first-order conditions. Thus, one can deal with it using the two-stage optimization
!

!
technique, i.e., we first find the optimal value of 𝑝!!!
for a given 𝑒, and then find the

!

!
!
optimal responsiveness level 𝑒!!!
that maximizes 𝜋!!!
. Set

!

!
!!!!!

!!!

= 0 in (4.30) to get the

!

!
online store’s optimal price as a function of 𝑒, i.e., 𝑝!!!
𝑒 . Thus,
!

!
𝑝!!!
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+
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(4.31)

If (4.31) is substituted into (4.30), then one gets the online store’s profit as a function of
𝑒.
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!

!

!
!
Now we can start the second stage, i.e., we find the optimal 𝑒!!!
that maximizes 𝜋!!!
in
!

!
(4.32). We differentiate 𝜋!!!
in (4.32) with respect to 𝑒, which yields the first-order

condition
!"#
! !!!"!!"#

!

!! ! !!!

!!!!

!"

!

+𝜌 1−
+
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!! ! !!!
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𝛼! +
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!!!!!
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− 𝜂𝑒 = 0.

+

!!! !!!!
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+ 𝜌𝑒 1 −

!
!!

−

(4.33)

One may notice that the first-order condition in (4.33) has at most three real roots for the
!

!
responsiveness level 𝑒. Compare the values of 𝜋!!!
at all 𝑒 roots that lie within the range

− 𝑎 𝑏 , 1 − 𝑎 𝑏 . The one at which (4.32) is the largest is the optimal responsiveness
!
!
level 𝑒!!!
. Substitute the value of 𝑒!!!
in (4.31) to get the online store’s optimal price
!

!

!
!
!
𝑝!!!
. Substitute the values of 𝑒!!!
and 𝑝!!!
in (4.29) to get the physical store’s optimal

!

!
price 𝑝!!!
.
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4.4.2 Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Nash Game
Under a dual-channel Nash game, physical and online stores are commensurate in
power and the market does not have a leader. As a result, the channels make decisions
simultaneously. In this game, the performance of each store is optimized, dependent upon
the rival’s decisions.
Proposition 4.5

Under infinite resalability (i.e. case 𝜀 = ∞), there is a unique Nash equilibrium if the two
!
!
conditions 𝐻!!!
> 0 and 𝐻!!!
< 0 are satisfied. Similarly, under one resalability (i.e.

case 𝜀 = 1), there exist a unique Nash equilibrium at the most within the feasible region if
!
!
the two conditions 𝐻!!!
> 0 and 𝐻!!!
< 0 are satisfied.
!

Next, the online store’s optimal price (𝑝! ! ) and responsiveness level (𝑒!! ) are found, as
!

well as the physical store’s optimal price (𝑝! ! ) for the cases 𝜀 = ∞ and 𝜀 = 1,
respectively.
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞)
!

One may set

!
!!!!!

!!!
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!

!
!!!!!

!"

!

!
!!!!!

= 0 and

!!!

= 0. When one simultaneously solves the

three equations, one gets
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.

(4.35)
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(4.36)

Selling Resalable Returns once (𝜺 = 𝟏)
!
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(4.39)
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The first-order condition in (4.39) has at most one real root for the responsiveness level 𝑒
!
within the range 𝑒 ∈ − 𝑎 𝑏 , 1 − 𝑎 𝑏 . If one substitutes the value of 𝑒!!!
in (4.37)
!

!

!
!
and (4.38), then one gets the online and physical store’s optimal prices 𝑝!!!
and 𝑝!!!
,

respectively.

4.5

Sensitivity Analysis

In this section the relationships between a physical store’s price, an online store’s
price and responsiveness level, and the total system’s profit in both centralized and
decentralized systems are studied. A comparison is made between responsiveness
decisions, pricing strategies, and total system profits in the two settings. All parameters
for this section were chosen such that the constraints and the theorems’ conditions were
satisfied in order to make the models feasible and meaningful. It was found that the
customer preference for a certain channel and the different return rates experienced by a
dual-channel retailer make a significant impact on responsiveness and pricing decisions.
For this analysis the following parameters 𝑟 = 0.2,0.4 , 𝑤 = 0.1, 𝑣 = 0.1,
𝑐 = 30, 𝑑 = 2, 𝑡 = 4, 𝑘! = 0.2, 𝑘!" = 0.2, 𝑎 = 0.2, 𝑏 = 0.05, 𝛼 = 5𝑘, 𝜃 = 0.5, 𝛽 =
10, 𝛾 = 1,5 , 𝜌 = 1, and 𝜂 = 300 were used. Additionally, a situation wherein returns
can be resold several times in a selling season (i.e. 𝜀 = ∞) has been used. A firm’s
physical store will pay the firm’s online store the highest amount possible for crosschannel returns (i.e. 𝑐 = 𝑐𝑘!" − 𝑑 = 14 as per Eq. 3.29 when 𝑠 = 0). Thus, apart from
the cross-selling opportunities associated with such a policy or practice, the physical store
does not gain any financial advantage (i.e. 𝐹!!! = 0).
The impact that customer preference for the physical store imposes on the prices
of the dual-channel retailer is shown in Figure 4.1. One may compare the results of the
aforementioned figure to all propositions given in Chapter 3. In addition, one may find
that the online store’s responsiveness level decreases (increases) when customer
preference for the physical store increases (decreases) under all studied schemes.
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Figure 4.1: Effect that 𝜽 and 𝒓 have on the equilibrium prices and responsiveness level

To proceed, a reader is referred to Chapter 3 in regard to the customer preference
thresholds that cause all channels to be priced equally. To further explore, it should be
noted that when under decentralization, this threshold (i.e., 𝜃 ≈ 0.5, as used in the
example) is not noticeably affected by the values of the different return rates experienced
by the system. However, under a centralized management with a differential pricing
scheme, when 𝑟 − 𝑣 + 𝑤

increases (decreases), then this threshold decreases

(increases). This occurs as a result of increasing (decreasing) the physical store’s prices
and decreasing (increasing) the online store’s prices under all 𝜃 values, in an attempt to
switch the sales from the channel experiencing an overwhelmingly high return rates to the
channel experiencing lower return rates. It should be noted that increasing (decreasing)
the online store’s responsiveness level also helps in this switch. This should be compared
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to decentralized situations wherein competing stores have no intention to switch sales
from one channel to another.
One may also notice that centralized management sets a lower responsiveness
level compared to decentralised management. Consequently, customers are offered better
return services when their purchases are conducted through the competing channels than
when their purchases are conducted through the integrated channels. In addition, it is
noticed that the online store offers a higher responsiveness level under the Nash game
than under the Stackelberg game. Indeed, the online store’s market power is lower under
the former scheme. Thus, it can be said that the less dominant a channel is in the market,
it should offer a higher responsiveness level so that it may strengthen its market position.
It should be noted that this study does not model a competition in the responsiveness level
between the active channels.
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Figure 4.2: Effect that 𝜽, 𝒓 and 𝝀 have on total system profit

Figure 4.2 shows that when the return rate for purchases conducted through the
physical store is equivalent to the return rates for purchases conducted through the online
store (i.e., when 𝑟 = 𝑣 + 𝑤), then the total performance of the dual-channel retailer under
all schemes except the unification scheme is better when customers has a high preference
53

for one channel over the other. To elucidate, when both channels are equally burdened
with customer returns, then the total dual-channel retailer performance is symmetrical
along customer preference, and the lowest profits occur around the center value (𝜃 ≈
0.5). It should be noted that customer preference for a certain channel has a minimal
effect on the total performance of a system under a unification scheme. This is intuitive
since it has also a minimal effect on the pricing strategy of this scheme under the
condition 𝑟 = 𝑣 + 𝑤 (Figure 4.1).
However, when the return rate for purchases conducted through the physical store
is higher than the return rates for purchases conducted through the online store, then the
total performance of the dual-channel retailer, under all schemes, is better when
customers prefer the online store over the physical store. Conversely, when the return rate
for purchases conducted through the physical store is lower than the return rates for
purchases conducted through the online store, then the total performance of the dualchannel retailer is better when customers prefer the physical store over the online store.
Generally speaking, the system performs better when customers prefer the channel that
causes low return rates over the channel that causes high return rates. Thus, from an
enterprise or top-level perspective, certain measures can be taken to positively increase
customer preference for the less troublesome channel (e.g., by changing the presentation
in the store to create a better shopping experience). Certain technologies can also be used
to decrease the return rate of the channel with higher customer preference level (e.g., by
using smart phone applications to help shoe shoppers identify their shoe sizes).
Additionally, centralized management, as aforementioned, may use the differential
pricing strategy and an appropriate responsiveness level to give a low return rate channel
more appeal than a high return rate channel.
When 𝜆 is low, then the dual channels have a low degree of cannibalization or
customers of a certain channel do not respond well to the prices of the competing channel.
This could happen when the channels’ customers are highly segregated. Consequently,
customers would tend to choose another retailer if their preferred channel were to not
meet their price expectations. It has been found that in such situations, competition
(regardless of the channels’ dominance) generates a slightly higher total profit for the
system than integration. When the dual channels have a high degree of cannibalization,
then a centralized management with a differential pricing strategy will always out
perform decentralization. This is also true for a centralized management with a unified
pricing scheme that is under low observed return rates. In contradistinction, as 𝑟 becomes
higher (𝑟 ≥ 0.4), all decentralization schemes tend to perform better than a unified
54

pricing strategy when customer preference for the physical store is high. Similarly, when
𝑣 and/or 𝑤 are high, then competition is better than centralization with unification when
the customer preference for the online store is high. Generally speaking, competition will
outperform centralization with a unified pricing scheme when the channel with highest
customer preference experiences high return rates.
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Figure 4.3: Effect that different return rates have on responsiveness level

Using Figure 4.3, the diverse impact that different return rates have on
responsiveness level has been explored. In decentralized settings, the optimal
responsiveness level stays unchanged when the physical store’s return rate (𝑟) increases.
This is trivial since such an increase has no effect on the physical store’s competing
channel (i.e., the online store). In contradistinction, 𝑣’s increase indicates that online
customers become increasingly inclined to return purchases to the physical store. In this
situation, fewer customers benefit from the responsiveness provided by the online
channel. Thus, the online channel’s management reduces responsiveness level as 𝑣
increases. Intuitively, when 𝑤 increases, the online channel’s management should
increase its responsiveness level to enhance both sales and resalability at the same time. It
should be noted that the system will behave as indicated above under all values of 𝜃.
In centralized situations, no competition exists between channels. Thus,
encouraging customers to conduct purchases from the more profitable channel is a goal
the enterprise would work for. When 𝑟 increases, the system’s sole management increases
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the responsiveness level, encouraging customers to switch to the online store in an effort
to decrease the negative effect of returns in the physical store. When 𝑣 increases,
management should decrease this level to avoid unnecessary spending on the online
store’s responsiveness.
When 𝑤 increases, the system’s sole management faces a question as to whether it
should increase the online store’s responsiveness level to better handle return and increase
sales or decrease its responsiveness level to switch customers to the physical store and
decrease the negative effect of return. It has been noted that with the online channel’s low
customer preference level of 𝜃 = 0.7, there is no need to increase its responsiveness level
in order to boost resaleability. Thus, in general the responsiveness level has a steady to
decreasing trend. In contradistinction, when the customer preference level for the online
channel is high (𝜃 = 0.3), then the system’s sole management faces high return
quantities. It is thus important to increase resalability by increasing responsiveness level.
Since the management with a differential pricing strategy can better use prices to
encourage or discourage the use of one channel over the other, it can be said that the
unified pricing strategy has a higher dependence on responsiveness level to conduct a
similar task.

4.6

Conclusion

Chapter 4 has studied the effect that customer returns have on a dual-channel
retailer when deciding on prices and responsiveness level. Similar to Chapter 3, this
chapter has studied dual-channel integration under unified and differential pricing
strategies and dual-channel competition under the Stackelberg, and Nash games. Returns
have been assumed to be resold either once or several times in a selling season.
Through numerical examples and a sensitivity analysis the effect that customer
preference for a certain channel and that customer return rates have on a dual-channel
retailer’s pricing and responsiveness decisions have been studied. For example, an
increase in customer preference for an online channel encourages both centralized and
competing online managements to increase the channel’s responsiveness level to better
handle a higher amount of returns. Additionally, the change in the return rates triggers a
different responsiveness level reaction when under integration than when under
competition. For instance, while the increase in the physical store’s same-channel return
rate does not trigger any response from the competing online management, it forces the
centralized management to increase responsiveness level in order to switch sales to the
online store. Moreover, while the competing online management simply increases
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responsiveness level as the online store’s same-channel return rate increases, the
centralized management faces challenges. The latter must choose between increasing
online store’s responsiveness level to better handle online returns, and decreasing online
store’s responsiveness level to switch customers to the physical store and decrease the
negative effect of online returns. Intuitively, both a competitive and an integrated online
channel will decrease responsiveness when the rate of cross-channel returns increases.
Moreover, it has been found that there is a negative correlation between the
responsiveness level of a competitive online store and the online store’s dominance or
market power.
It has been found that a dual-channel retailer generates a higher total profit when
its customers prefer a low return rate(s) channel. Consequently, when channels
experience similar return rates, a higher total profit is generated when customers greatly
prefer any one channel over another. When a dual-channel retailer experiences a degree
of high cannibalization, then competition can only generate a higher total profit than
integration with price unification when the channel with the high customer preference
level experiences high return rate(s). Otherwise, centralization schemes always generate a
higher total profit. However, when the dual-channel retailer experiences a degree of
cannibalization that is low enough, then all competition schemes outperform all
integration schemes.
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CHAPTER 5:

OPTIMIZING CROSS-CHANNEL
RETURN POLICY

5.1

Introduction and Motivation

The cross-channel return policy positively impacts online stores’ sales and
customer satisfaction, and provides physical stores with additional cross-selling
opportunities. Nonetheless, such a policy creates disruption in the supply chains of
enterprises (Zhang et al. 2010; Cao and Li 2015). Consequently, several important
questions arise regarding such a policy. For example, under what conditions is it ideal to
permit cross-channel returns? If cross-channel returns are allowed, when is it optimal to
have physical stores ship all cross-channel returns back to online stores, and when is it
optimal to have the physical stores retain cross-returned items for coming sales? How
should the order quantity decisions be rectified if a dual-channel retailer faces both samechannel returns and cross-channel returns?
Despite an intensive effort, we could not find any paper that analytically studies
the different cross-channel return strategies and their impact on dual-channel order
quantities. Thus, this study has three contributions: first, we study four return strategies
while simultaneously considering same- and cross-channel returns in a dual-channel
retailing system; second, we propose mathematical models to determine the optimal order
quantities for each strategy under uncertain demand; third, we present decision making
insights by comparing the impacts of the different strategies that would help retailers to
choose the suitable solution for their specific business environment.
According to practice, the first strategy is that cross-channel returns are allowed
with the condition that they are regularly shipped back to the original point of purchase.
In another word, they are allowed without shifting inventory from an online store to a
physical store. The second strategy is that cross-channel returns are not allowed or
banned. The third and fourth strategies are that there is a transfer of ownership or a shift
of inventory for cross-channel returns from the online store to the physical store under
decentralized management and centralized management, respectively.

5.2

Model Formulation

This work considers a dual-channel retailer that operates noncompeting physical
and online stores. A full refund is granted for purchases returned in accordance to the
retailer’s rules and conditions. There is a 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 1 chance that a customer of the
retailer’s physical store will return the purchased product to the physical store. There is a
0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1 chance that a customer of the retailer’s online store will return the purchased
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product to the online store. There is a 0 ≤ 𝑣 ≤ 1 chance that a customer of the online
store will prefer to return a purchased product to the physical store if cross-channel
returns are permissible. If not, the customer will have to return the purchased item to the
online store (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1: A Dual-Channel Retailer with All Common Forms of Customer Returns

Similar to Chapter 3, we assume that an item purchased from and returned to the
physical store has a resalability rate of 𝑘! , an item purchased from and returned to the
online store has a resalability rate of 𝑘! , and an item purchased from the online store and
returned to the physical store has a resalability rate of 𝑘!" . This Chapter examines a
general case where resalable returns can be resold countable number of times in a selling
season, i.e. 𝜀 ∈ 1, ∞ , and a special case where resalable returns can be resold infinitely
in a selling season, i.e. 𝜀 = ∞. We give resalable returns a selling priority over unsold
items. It is worth noting that this priority assumption is only required for classification
and simplification purposes. Since both resalable returns and unsold items are sold at the
same price, the decision not to apply this prioritization will impose no change on the
system’s profitability.
Items are sold for an exogenous unified price of 𝑝 in both channels. A sale request
that is not satisfied costs the enterprise a shortage value of 𝑔 whether it will be
permanently sold or returned. This assumption is realistic since missing a sale request
greatly affects a retailer’s reputation and its customers’ loyalty. Additionally, a returned
item should be processed for inventory level correction and reimbursement purposes.
Thus, it is associated with a return collection cost of 𝑑. If an item is returned as not
resalable or resalable after the end of the selling season, then it is salvaged in a secondary
market for a value of 𝑠. The unit’s salvage value is less than or equal to the unit’s
purchasing cost 𝑠 < 𝑐; otherwise the profit function is unbounded. Under the third
strategy, the physical store pays a value of 𝑐 to the online store to transfer the ownership
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of each cross-channel return. Items that are purchased from or returned directly to the
online store will cost a per-unit shipping expense of 𝑡!" . Items that are shipped
collectively from the physical store to the online store will cost a per-unit shipping
expense of 𝑡!" .
Due to customer returns and the different associated types of costs, the profit
functions are constructed using the expected revenue generated by satisfying a single sale
rather than the selling price of the item. Thus, the expected revenue generated by
satisfying a single sale in the physical store should satisfy the condition 𝑝! > 𝑐.
Otherwise, the system generates losses by conducting the business. Similarly, depending
on the strategy in use (𝑖), the expected revenue generated by satisfying a single sale in the
online store should satisfy the condition 𝑝!! > 𝑐. We remark that 𝑝! and 𝑝!! have their
highest values (i.e. 𝑝! = 𝑝!! = 𝑝) when the system experiences no returns (i.e. 𝑟 = 𝑤 =
𝑣 = 0).
Each channel faces a total sales request that is random and independent of the
other channel. Thus, we assume that the online store’s total sales request (𝑥! ) has a
probability density function (PDF) of 𝑓! 𝑥! , a cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
𝐹! 𝑥! , and a mean of 𝜇! , while the physical store’s total sales request (𝑥! ) has a
probability density function (PDF) of 𝑓! 𝑥! , a cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
𝐹! 𝑥! , and a mean of 𝜇! . The objective of the channel’s (or channels’) manager is to
maximize the profit of the store (or stores) by selecting the optimal order quantity (or
quantities). Chapter’s notations are presented in Table 5.1 below.
Notation
𝒓

Description
Probability an item purchased from the physical store is returned to the physical store

𝒘

Probability an item purchased from the online store is returned to the online store

𝒗

Probability an item purchased from the online store is preferably cross-returned to a
physical store

𝒌𝒓

Probability an item purchased from and returned to the physical store is resalable

𝒌𝒐

Probability an item purchased from and returned to the online store is resalable

𝒌𝒐𝒓

Probability an item purchased from the online store and cross-returned to the physical
store is resalable

𝒑

Channels’ selling price

𝒈

Shortage cost

𝒄

Unit purchasing cost

𝒅

Return collection cost
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𝒔

Salvage value

𝒄

Amount the physical store pays to the online store to transfer the ownership of each
cross-channel return

𝒕𝒄𝒐

Per unit shipping cost from a customer to the online store

𝒕𝒓𝒐

Per unit shipping cost from the physical store to the online store

𝒙𝒐

Online store’s total sales; where 𝑓! 𝒙𝒐 & 𝐹! 𝒙𝒐 are 𝒙𝒐 ’s PDF and CDF, respectively

𝒙𝒓

Physical store’s total sales; where 𝑓! 𝑥! & 𝐹! 𝑥! are 𝑥! ’s PDF and CDF, respectively

𝑸𝒓 & 𝑸𝒐

Quantities ordered by physical and online stores, respectively

𝝅𝒊𝒓 & 𝝅𝒊𝒐

Physical store, and online store profits, respectively

𝒊

Cross-channel return strategy used 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜, 𝑟𝑜, 𝐷, 𝐶

𝜺

Number of times a resalable return can be resold in a selling season
Table 5.1: Fifth Chapter’s Notations

5.3

Ship all Cross-Channel Returns Back to Online Store
(𝒊 = 𝒓𝒐)

Under this practice, items purchased from a retailer’s online store and crossreturned to its physical store should be shipped back to their original point of purchase.
The physical store in this strategy should only act as a facilitator, and thus all costs
associated with cross-channel returns (e.g. collection and shipping costs) are paid by the
online store. We assume that the time it takes an item to be shipped from a customer to
the online store by a third-party logistics provider (3LP) is equivalent to the time it takes
an item to be shipped from the physical store to the online store after being cross-channel
returned. Thus, we use the same online store resalability rate (𝑘! ) for both types of
returns.
If resalable returns can be resold 𝜀 number of times in a selling season, then the
online store’s ordered quantity 𝑄! can satisfy a total sales request of up to 𝑄! 1 +
𝑤 + 𝑣 𝑘! + ⋯ +

𝑤 + 𝑣 𝑘!

!

= 𝑄!

!
!

𝑤 + 𝑣 𝑘!

!

= 𝜂! 𝑄! .

Similarly,

the

physical store’s ordered quantity 𝑄! can satisfy a total sales request of up to
𝑄! 1 + 𝑟𝑘! + ⋯ + 𝑟𝑘!

!

= 𝑄!

!
!

𝑟𝑘!

!

= 𝛿! 𝑄! .

For the special case where resalable returns can be resold an infinite number of
times, i.e. 𝜀 = ∞, in a selling season, the online store’s ordered quantity 𝑄! can satisfy a
total sales request of up to 𝑄! 1 + 𝑤 + 𝑣 𝑘! + ⋯ +

𝑤 + 𝑣 𝑘!

!

!

!
= !! !!!

!!

=

𝜂!!! 𝑄! . Similarly, the physical store’s ordered quantity 𝑄! can satisfy a total sales
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request of up to 𝑄! 1 + 𝑟𝑘! + ⋯ + 𝑟𝑘!

!

!

!
= !!!!
= 𝛿!!! 𝑄! . A similar procedure was
!

used in works such as Mostard and Teunter (2006) and Mostard et al. (2005).
The expected revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from the online store is
𝑝!!" = −𝑡!" + 1 − 𝑣 − 𝑤 𝑝 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡!" − 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 − 𝑣 2𝑑 + 𝑡!" − 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 +

!
!!

𝑤 + 𝑣 𝑘!

!!!

.

In the first term, every sold item contributes negatively due to the shipped cost 𝑡!" paid
by the store. In the second term, there is a 1 − 𝑣 − 𝑤 chance that the item is a final sale
and contributes positively due to the selling price. In the third term, there is a 𝑤 chance
that the item is returned to the online store and contributes negatively due to the
collection cost, negatively due to the shipping cost, and positively due to salvaging nonresalable returns. In the fourth term, there is a 𝑣 chance that the item is cross-returned to
the physical store and contributes negatively due to the collection cost at both stores,
negatively due to the shipping cost, and positively due to salvaging non-resalable returns.
The fifth term assures the salvaging of an item that ends up being returned as resalable
after the end of the selling season. Notice that this term will be zero when 𝜀 = ∞.
Similarly, the expected revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from the physical
!

store is 𝑝! = 1 − 𝑟 𝑝 − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + ! 𝑟𝑘!
!

!!!

. Due to the similarity, a detailed

explanation of the relationship has been omitted. Under this strategy, the decision of one
channel does not impose any changes to the optimal decision of the other channel. Thus,
each channel maximizes its own profit function in isolation.
The profit function for the online store can be constructed as
𝜋!!" =

!! !!
!

!

𝑥! 𝑝!!" + 𝑠 𝑄! −

!!

𝑥!

𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! +

!
!! !!

𝜂! 𝑄! 𝑝!!" − 𝑔 𝑥! − 𝜂! 𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! − 𝑐𝑄! .

(5.1)

Since priority is given to resales rather than first sales and the items are sold several times
until they become non-resalable, the online store’s total sales request of 𝑥! can be
satisfied by the quantity 1 𝜂! 𝑥! . Accordingly, the first term includes the expected
revenue and salvage value of items that have never been sold before when the sales
request is less than 𝜂! 𝑄! . Notice that the expected salvage value for non-resalable returns
and those items that end up being returned as resalable after the end of the selling season
are included in the expected revenue (i.e. 𝑝!!" ). The second term depicts the expected
revenue and shortage value when the sales requests are more than 𝜂! 𝑄! . The third term is
the cost of purchasing inventory for the online store.
The profit function for the physical store is constructed as
𝜋!!" =

!! !!
!

𝑥! 𝑝! + 𝑠 𝑄! −

!
!!

𝑥!

𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! +

!
!! !!

𝛿! 𝑄! 𝑝! − 𝑔 𝑥! − 𝛿! 𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! − 𝑐𝑄! .
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(5.2)

The physical store’s profit function is constructed similarly to the online store’s profit
function. Thus, a detailed explanation of it has been omitted.
Proposition 5.1

The expected profit function 𝜋!!" is strictly concave on 𝑄! . Thus, a unique maximum
exists at 𝑄!!" ∗ .
∗

𝑄!!" =

!
!!

𝐹!!!

!!!" !! !!!! !!

.

!!!" !! !!!! !!

(5.3)

The expected profit function 𝜋!!" is strictly concave on 𝑄! . Thus, a unique maximum
exists at 𝑄!!" ∗ .
∗

𝑄!!" =

!
!!

𝐹!!!

!! !! !!!! !!
!! !! !!!! !!

.

(5.4)

Assuming that the total sales request of each store follows a uniform distribution
is sufficiently general to capture the effect that same- and cross-channel returns have on
both stores. Such a generality made the application of uniform distribution common in the
field of supply chain management (Yao et al. 2009). Furthermore, the distribution is
bounded and tractable. Hu and Li (2012) stated that sales uncertainty for the apparel
industry is best described by a uniform distribution.
Thus, the total sales request of the online store (𝑥! ) is distributed between 0 and
𝑏! , i.e. 𝑥! ~𝑈 0, 𝑏! . Additionally, the total sales request of the physical store (𝑥! ) is
distributed between 0 and 𝑏! , i.e. 𝑥! ~𝑈 0, 𝑏! . Accordingly, the optimal quantity and
maximum profit for the online and physical stores when sales are uniformly distributed
are given below.
∗

𝑄!!" =
∗

𝜋!!" =
∗

𝑄!!" =
∗

𝜋!!" =

!! !!!" !! !!!! !!
!! !!!" !! !!!! !!
!!
!!!

.

(5.5)

!!!" !! !!!! !! !
!!!" !! !!!! !!

!! !! !! !!!! !!
!! !! !! !!!! !!

− 𝑔𝜂! .

(5.6)

.

!!

!! !! !!!! !!

!!!

!! !! !!!! !!

(5.7)
!

− 𝑔𝛿! .

(5.8)

Under the condition that 𝑏! = 𝑏! , the magnitude in which a channel’s order
quantity and profitability differ from the other channel is determined by return rates and
return processes (Equations 5.5 – 5.8). Also, one may notice that a channel’s optimal
order quantity and profit is similar to that of a classical newsvendor model. In fact, they
become identical when a retailer does not permit customer returns (i.e. 𝑟 = 𝑤 = 𝑣 = 0
and 𝑝! = 𝑝!! = 𝑝).
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No Cross-Channel Returns (𝒊 = 𝒄𝒐)

5.4

This strategy requests that all online customers return unsatisfactory items to the
location the items were purchased from. Thus, cross-channel returns are not allowed.
According to Steinfield (2004), more than 90% of all examined retailers and more than
60% of all examined department stores ban cross-channel returns. Due to the added
constraint in the online store’s return policy, some customers may develop channel
intolerance and stop purchasing from the online store. Thus, a fixed portion of 1 − 𝛼 of
the online store’s total sales request 𝑥! is lost. Consequently, the store loses an expected
shortage value of

!
𝑔
!

1 − 𝛼 𝑥! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! just by embracing this strategy. The observed

total sales request for the online store is defined as 𝑦! = 𝛼𝑥! . We assume that multiplying
the random variable 𝑥! with the constant 𝛼 will not change the general shape of the
distribution. Such a property exists in the uniform and normal distributions.
Consequently, 𝛼𝜇! , 𝑓! 𝑦! , and 𝐹! 𝑦! are the mean, PDF, and CDF for the online
store’s observed total sales request, respectively. Note that the parameter 𝛼 might be
thought of as the portion of the online store’s customers who are loyal and willing to stay
with the channel even when the store’s policies change.
While the expected revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from the online
store becomes 𝑝!!" = −𝑡!" + 1 − 𝑣 − 𝑤 𝑝 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡!" − 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 − 𝑣 𝑑 + 𝑡!" − 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 +
!
!!

𝑤 + 𝑣 𝑘!

!!!

, it is unchanged in the physical store. The profit function for the online

store can be formulated as
𝜋!!" = −

!
!

𝑔 1 − 𝛼 𝑥! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! +

!! !!

𝑦! 𝑝!!" + 𝑠 𝑄! −

!

!
!!

𝑦!

𝑓! 𝑦! 𝑑𝑦! +

!
!! !!

𝜂! 𝑄! 𝑝!!" − 𝑔 𝑦! −

(5.9)

𝜂! 𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑦! 𝑑𝑦! − 𝑐𝑄! .

Since this strategy has no effect on the physical store, the store’s optimal quantity and
maximum profit stay unchanged – i.e., 𝑄!!" ∗ = 𝑄!!" ∗ and 𝜋!!" ∗ = 𝜋!!" ∗ .
Proposition 5.2

The expected profit function 𝜋!!" is strictly concave on 𝑄! . Thus, a unique maximum
exists at 𝑄!!" ∗ .
∗

𝑄!!" =

!
!!

𝐹!!!

!!!" !! !!!! !!
!!!" !! !!!! !!

.

(5.10)

From the previous proposition one may find the optimal quantity and maximum
profit when the online store’s total sales request is uniformly distributed. Thus,
∗

𝑄!!" =

!!! !!!" !! !!!! !!
!! !!!" !! !!!! !!

, and

(5.11)
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∗

𝜋!!" =

!!!
!!!

!!!" !! !!!! !! !
!!!" !! !!!! !!

−

!!!
!

.

(5.12)

Based on formulas (5.5) and (5.11), when 𝛼 is higher than a threshold of 𝛼, the online
store’s order quantity under policy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 is higher than its order quantity under policy
𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜, i.e. 𝑄!!" ∗ > 𝑄!!" ∗ , where 𝛼 is calculated as
𝛼=

!!!" !! !!!! !! !!!" !! !!!! !!
!!!" !! !!!! !! !!!" !! !!!! !!

.

(5.13)

Similarly, when 𝛼 is higher than a threshold of 𝛼, the online store’s maximum profit
under policy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 is higher than its maximum profit under policy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜, i.e.
𝜋!!" ∗ > 𝜋!!" ∗ , where 𝛼 is formulated as
𝛼=

!!!" !! !!!! !! !!!" !! !!!! !! !
!!!" !! !!!! !!

!!!" !! !!!! !! !

=𝛼

!!!" !! !!!! !!

.

!!!" !! !!!! !!

(5.14)

∗

Since 𝜋!!" ∗ = 𝜋!!" ∗ , the value of 𝜋!! identifies which strategy, i.e. 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 or
𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜, generates a higher retailer profit. Furthermore, 𝑡!" is uniquely defined in strategy
𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜. Consequently, one can easily use it for a comparison of the above-stated
strategies. If the derivative for 𝛼 with respect to 𝑡!" is taken, then the outcome is a
negative term as per relationship (5.15). That is to say, as the shipping cost for each item
moved from the physical store to the online store increases, the superiority of strategy
𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 over strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 occurs at a lower value of 𝛼.
!!
!!!"

= −𝑣𝜂!

!!!" !! !!!! !! !!!" !! !!!! !!
!!!" !! !!!! !! !

!!!" !! !!!! !!
!"
!! !! !!!! !! !

! !!!

.

(5.15)

Corollary 5.1: 1 ≥ 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 ≥ 0
From the previous corollary we notice that the online store will not order a higher
quantity under policy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 than under policy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 unless the former policy is more
profitable than then the latter. That is to say, 𝑄!!" ∗ > 𝑄!!" ∗ if and only if 𝜋!!" ∗ > 𝜋!!" ∗ .
Additionally, due to the effect that 𝛼 has on 𝑄!!" ∗ , managers may jump to a false
conclusion that it is lower than 𝑄!!" ∗ . Therefore, observing the costs associated with each
strategy is essential to make such a claim.

5.5

Perform Inventory Shift for Cross-Channel Returns Under
a Decentralized Management (𝒊 = 𝑫)

Zhang et al. (2010) indicated that if cross-channel returns are not offered at the
physical store, then they must be shipped to the online store. Otherwise they could be
claimed by the physical store through an inventory-shift process that is subject to the
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retailer’s internal rules. Channels might have not aligned their objectives at that point or it
might be too expensive to do so; thus each channel seeks to maximize its own profit
regardless of the other channel’s performance. To transfer the ownership of a crosschannel return, the physical store pays a value of 𝑐 to the online store. For simplicity, the
physical store will use the expected, rather than the observed, total amount of crosschannel returns (𝑄!" ) to conduct its analysis. A portion 𝑘!" of 𝑄!" is resalable and can be
used to satisfy some of the sales requested through the physical store. We assume that all
parameters and decision rules are known to both supply chain members. Therefore 𝑄!"
can be correctly estimated by the physical store.
If resalable returns can be resold 𝜀 number of times, then 𝑄! can satisfy a total
sales request in the online store of up to 𝑄! 1 + 𝑤𝑘! + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑘!

!

= 𝑄!

!
!

𝑤𝑘!

!

=

𝜆! 𝑄! . Notice that the online store normally starts the selling season before the physical
store does and most of its sales occur at the beginning of the season. Thus, we may
assume that all cross-channel returns reach the physical store at the beginning of its
selling season. Consequently, the quantity ordered from the supplier (𝑄! ) and the
resalable cross-channel returns of (𝑘!" 𝑄!" ) can satisfy a total sales request in the physical
store of up to

𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!" 1 + 𝑟𝑘! + ⋯ + 𝑟𝑘!

!

= 𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!"

!
!

𝑟𝑘!

!

=

𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!" .
For the special case where resalable returns can be resold an infinite number of
times, i.e. 𝜀 = ∞, the ordered quantity of 𝑄! can satisfy a total sales request in the online
store of up to 𝑄! 1 + 𝑤𝑘! + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑘!

!

!

!
= !!!!
= 𝜆!!! 𝑄! . However, the quantity
!

𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!" can satisfy a total sales request in the physical store of up to 𝑄! +
𝑘!" 𝑄!" 1 + 𝑟𝑘! + ⋯ + 𝑟𝑘!

!

=

!! !!!" !!"
!!!!!

= 𝛿!!! 𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!" .

While the expected revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from the physical
store is unchanged, the expected revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from the
online store becomes
𝑝!! = −𝑡!" + 1 − 𝑣 − 𝑤 𝑝 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡!" − 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑣𝑐 +

!
!!

𝑤𝑘!

!!!

.

(5.16)

The profit function for the online store is formulated as
𝜋!! 𝑄! =

!! !!
!

𝑥! 𝑝!! + 𝑠 𝑄! −

!
!!

𝑥!

𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! +

!
!! !!

𝜆! 𝑄! 𝑝!! − 𝑔 𝑥! − 𝜆! 𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! − 𝑐𝑄! .

(5.17)

The expected quantity of all cross-channel returns is estimated as
𝑄!" = 𝑣

!! !!
𝑥! 𝑓!
!

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! + 𝑣

!
𝜆 𝑄 𝑓
!! !! ! ! !

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! .
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(5.18)

The profit function for the physical store is formulated as
𝜋!! 𝑄! =

!! !! !!!" !!"
!

𝑔 𝑥! − 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!"

𝑥! 𝑝! + 𝑠 𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!" −

!
!!

𝑥!

𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! +

!

𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!" 𝑝! −

!! !! !!!" !!"

(5.19)

𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! − 𝑐𝑄! − 𝑐 + 𝑑 − 𝑠 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑄!" .

In function (5.16), we assumed that the reimbursement process for all crosschannel returns was done through the original point of purchase (i.e., the online store and
not the physical store). Due to the similarity between function (5.17) and online store’s
previous profit functions, a detailed explanation has been omitted. Equation (5.18) has
two parts. The first part captures the expected number of cross-channel returns if the
online store’s sales request is below 𝜆! 𝑄! . The second part captures the expected number
of cross-channel returns if the online store’s sales request is above 𝜆! 𝑄! . Finally, in
constructing the profit function for the physical store, i.e. formula (5.19), we considered
several issues. The physical store will have to pay a value of 𝑐 to the online store for all
expected cross-channel returns, pay a collection cost for all expected cross-channel
returns, and collect a salvage value for all expected non-resalable cross-channel returns.
The physical store will also use all resalable cross-channel returns to satisfy some of the
sales requested through its channel. Otherwise, the profit functions (5.19) and (5.2) were
constructed similarly.
Proposition 5.3

The expected profit function 𝜋!! is strictly concave on 𝑄! . Thus, a unique maximum
∗

exists at 𝑄!! .
∗

𝑄!! =

!
!!

𝐹!!!

!!! !! !!!! !!
!!! !! !!!! !!

.

(5.20)

The expected profit function 𝜋!! is strictly concave on 𝑄! . Therefore, a unique maximum
∗

∗

exists at 𝑄!! , where 𝑄!! is conditioned to be positive.
∗

𝑄!! =

!
!!

𝐹!!!

!! !! !!!! !!
!! !! !!!! !!

− 𝑘!" 𝑄!" .

(5.21)

When a channel’s total sales request follows a uniform distribution, using the
above functions one may derive the online store’s optimal order quantity, the online
store’s maximum profit, the physical store’s optimal order quantity, and the physical
store’s maximum profit, respectively.
∗

𝑄!! =
∗

𝜋!! =
∗

𝑄!! =

!! !!! !! !!!! !!
!! !!! !! !!!! !!
!!
!!!

.

!!! !! !!!! !!
!!! !! !!!! !!

!! !! !! !!!! !!
!! !! !! !!!! !!

−

(5.22)
!

− 𝑔𝜆! .
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!
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(5.24)
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∗

𝜋!! =
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! ! !!! !!
!!
!
!

!!! !!!!! !!!" !!!

! ! !!! !!
! !!
!
!

! ! !!! !! ! !!!
!!
!
!
!

.

(5.25)

Comparing the profit function (5.25) to the profit function (5.8), one may notice
that the physical store will incur losses by cooperating with this strategy if the amount
paid to the online store for each cross-channel return, i.e. value 𝑐, is more than 𝑠 − 𝑑 +
𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 . Under such a condition the physical store should refuse to perform the
inventory shift or to be part of this strategy. However, it is vital that the online store
calculate the minimum 𝑐 that will make this policy more appealing than the previous two
∗

∗

policies, i.e. 𝜋!! > 𝜋!! , where 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜, 𝑐𝑜 . By equating the profit function (5.23) to both
profit functions (5.6) and (5.12), one may derive the relationship
𝜆!! 𝑝!!

!

+ 𝜆! 𝑔𝜆! − 2𝑐 −

!!!
!!

𝜋!!

∗

𝑝!! +

𝑠 − 𝑔𝜆!

!!!
!!

∗

𝜋!! − 𝑔𝜆! 2𝑐 − 𝑠 + 𝑐 ! = 0.

(5.26)

The function (5.26) is convex in terms of 𝑝!! and has at most two real positive roots
𝑝!! , 𝑝!! . Thus, the online store generates a higher profit under policy 𝑖 = 𝐷 than under
policy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜, 𝑐𝑜 , if the value of 𝑐 drives 𝑝!! to be higher than 𝑝!! .
∗

Consider the retailer’s profit under policy 𝑖 = 𝐷, i.e. 𝜋!! . It may be calculated by
summing both the online store’s profit function (5.23) and the physical store’s profit
∗

function (5.25). If the derivative for 𝜋!! with respect to 𝑐 is taken, then one gets
!!!!

∗

!!

=

! ! !! !! !!!!!!!!" !!!
!!! !! !!!! !!

!

!!! !

.

(5.27)

Notice that the sign of the previous derivative is dependent on the value of 𝑐. Since the
physical store will not be involved in policy 𝑖 = 𝐷 if the value of 𝑐 is higher than
𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 , one may say that

!!!!
!!

∗

∗

> 0 and 𝜋!! score the highest profit when
∗

𝑐 = 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 . It is worth noting that the highest value of 𝜋!! requires the
physical store to not generate any financial benefit out of this strategy.
∗

When 𝑣 and 𝑘!" are non-zeroes, then it can be noted that 𝑄!! < 𝑄!!" ∗ and
∗

𝑄!! < 𝑄!!" ∗ . It is intuitive to say that physical stores will have higher order quantities
under strategies that do not include shifts in inventories. If we take the derivative of 𝑄!!

∗

in equation (5.22) with respect to 𝑐, then one may notice that it is strictly positive (please
∗

refer to function (5.28), given below). In contrast, if we take the derivative of 𝑄!! in
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equation (5.24) with respect to 𝑐, then one may notice that it is strictly negative (please
refer to function (5.29), given below).
!!!!

∗

=

!!
!!!!

!!! !!!
!!! !! !!!! !!

∗

=−

!!

!,

and

! ! !! !!" !! !!! !
!!! !! !!!! !!

!

(5.28)

.

(5.29)

This indicates that the online store is encouraged to order a higher quantity when the
value of 𝑐 increases. Accordingly, the expected total amount of cross-channel returns will
increase, allowing the physical store to decrease its order quantity.

5.6

Perform Inventory Shift for Cross-Channel Returns Under
a Centralized Management (𝒊 = 𝑪)

It is well known that centralization is expensive and requires a significant amount
of effort. Therefore, it is important that the enterprise realize whether it enhances profits
or it is not vital for the enterprise. However, under this practice the objectives are aligned
and a sole decision-maker maximizes the total profit of the supply chain. The internal
transactions between channels can thus be excluded from the analysis, as they do not
induce any change to the system’s profit. Thus, an inventory shift is still conducted, but
no payment is required for cross-channel returns. The expected revenue generated by
satisfying a single sale from the online store changes to 𝑝!! = −𝑡!" + 1 − 𝑣 − 𝑤 𝑝 −
!

!!!

𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡!" − 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 − 𝑣 𝑑 − 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 + ! 𝑤𝑘!
!

. The total profit of the

retailer is formulated as below. Due to similarity, no explanation is needed to comprehend
its terms.
𝜋! =
!! !!
!

𝑥! 𝑝!! + 𝑠 𝑄! −

!! !! !!!" !!"
!

!
!!

𝑥!

𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! +
!

𝑥! 𝑝! + 𝑠 𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!" −

𝑘!" 𝑄!" 𝑝! − 𝑔 𝑥! − 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!"

!!

!
!! !!

𝑥!

𝜆! 𝑄! 𝑝!! − 𝑔 𝑥! − 𝜆! 𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! +

𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! +

!
!! !! !!!" !!"

𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! − 𝑐 𝑄! + 𝑄!

𝛿! 𝑄! +

(5.30)

Proposition 5.4

The expected profit function 𝜋 ! is strictly and jointly concave on 𝑄! and 𝑄! , and thus a
∗

∗

∗

unique global maximum exists at 𝑄!! and 𝑄!! , where 𝑄!! is conditioned to be positive.
∗

𝑄!! =
∗
𝑄!!

=

!
!!
!
!!

𝐹!!!
𝐹!!!

!!! !! !!!! !!!!" !!! !!
!!! !! !!!! !!!!" !!! !!

!! !! !!!! !!
!! !! !!!! !!

.

(5.31)

− 𝑘!" 𝑄!" .

(5.32)
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If uniform distributions are used for total sales requests, then one may use the
above functions to derive the online store’s optimal order quantity, the physical store’s
optimal order quantity, and the retailer’s maximum profit, respectively.
∗

𝑄!! =
∗

𝑄!! =
∗

𝜋! =

!! !!! !! !!!! !!!!" !! !!!
!! !!! !! !!!! !!!!" !! !!!

!! !! !! !!!! !!
!! !! !! !!!! !!
!!
!!!

−

.

(5.33)
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!!
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!

.

(5.34)

− 𝑔𝛿! .

(5.35)
∗

∗

Similar to before, when 𝑣 and 𝑘!" are non-zeros, then 𝑄!! < 𝑄!!" ∗ and 𝑄!! <
𝑄!!" ∗ . Next we compare the online store’s optimal order quantity under strategies 𝑖 = 𝐷
and 𝑖 = 𝐶 – i.e. equations (5.22) and (5.33). One may notice that by comparing between
the values 𝑝!! and 𝑝!! + 𝑣𝑘!" 𝑐 we can identify under what policy the online store will
have a higher ordered quantity. The latter is written as −𝑡!" + 1 − 𝑣 − 𝑤 𝑝 −
𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡!" − 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑣 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠

!

+ ! 𝑤𝑘!
!

!!!

.

Since 𝑐 ≤ 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 , then 𝑝!! ≤ 𝑝!! + 𝑣𝑘!" 𝑐. Therefore, the online
store’s ordered quantity under policy 𝑖 = 𝐷 is at most as high as its ordered quantity
∗

∗

∗

∗

under policy 𝑖 = 𝐶, i.e. 𝑄!! ≤ 𝑄!! . Notice that 𝑄!! = 𝑄!! when 𝑐 = 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 −
𝑠 . In a similar fashion, one may compare the physical store’s optimal order quantity
under policies 𝑖 = 𝐷 and 𝑖 = 𝐶, i.e. equations (5.24) and (5.34). Following the above
logic one may find that the physical store’s ordered quantity under policy 𝑖 = 𝐶 is at most
∗

∗

as high as its ordered quantity under policy 𝑖 = 𝐷, i.e. 𝑄!! ≥ 𝑄!! . One may notice that
they are equivalent under the condition 𝑐 = 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 . One may also note that
∗

∗

under this condition policy 𝑖 = 𝐷 performs as ideally as policy 𝑖 = 𝐶, i.e. 𝜋!! = 𝜋 ! .
Next we compare the retailer’s performance under strategies 𝑖 = 𝐶 and 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜.
One may calculate 𝜋!!" ∗ by summing both the online store’s profit function (5.6) and the
∗

physical store’s profit function (5.8). By equating 𝜋 ! in (5.35) to the calculated 𝜋!!" ∗ one
derives the relationship
𝜂!! 𝑝!!"

!

+ 𝜂! 2𝑔𝜂! − 2𝑐 −

!! !!! !! !!!! !!!!" !! !!!
!! !!! !! !!!! !!!!" !! !!!

!

𝑝!!" + 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑐

!

− 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑠

!! !!! !! !!!! !!!!" !! !!!
!! !!! !! !!!! !!!!" !! !!!

!

= 0.

(5.36)

The function (5.36) is convex in terms of 𝑝!!" and has at most two real positive
roots 𝑝!!" , 𝑝!!" . Thus, the retailer generates a higher profit under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 than
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under strategy 𝑖 = 𝐶 if 𝑝!!" 𝑡!" < 𝑝!!" . Notice that we used the parameter 𝑡!" to compare
the two strategies above, because it solely effects the strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜. Thus, if the online
store’s management can lower 𝑡!" so that 𝑝!!" drops below 𝑝!!" , then the channel may not
need to lose its inventory for the physical store.
We then consider the retailer’s profit under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜, i.e. 𝜋!!" ∗ . It is
calculated by summing both the online store’s profit function (5.12) and the physical
∗

store’s profit function (5.8). By equating 𝜋 ! to 𝜋!!" ∗ one may find the threshold at which
∗

𝛼 is higher; then 𝜋!!" ∗ > 𝜋 ! .

5.7

Sensitivity Analysis and Managerial Insights

In this analysis we compare a store’s optimal quantity, a store’s performance, and
a retailer’s performance under the different strategies. We also derive important
managerial insights that form general guidelines for managers running dual-channel
retailing systems. To conduct our analysis we consider the following parameters: 𝑟 = 0.1,
𝑤 = 0.1, 𝑣 = 0.3, 𝑘! = 0.6, 𝑘! = 0.4, 𝑘!" = 0.4, 𝑝 = 100, 𝑐 = 30, 𝑡!" = 4, 𝑡!" = 5,
𝑑 = 3, 𝑠 = 5, 𝑔 = 40, 𝑏! = 300, 𝛼 = 0.995, 𝑏! = 300 and 𝜀 = 1.
Under strategies 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 and 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 the physical store should order the same
quantities, i.e. 𝑄!!" ∗ = 𝑄!!" ∗ . This is intuitive since the system does not permit shifting the
inventories of cross-channel returns and the physical store may only assist in shipping
those returns to their original point of purchase, i.e. online store. However, when the
system permits the inventory shift process, then the physical store will order lower
quantities under strategies 𝑖 = 𝐷 and 𝑖 = 𝐶 than under strategies 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 and 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜, i.e.
∗

∗

∗

∗

𝑄!! ≤ 𝑄!!" ∗ , 𝑄!! ≤ 𝑄!!" ∗ , 𝑄!! ≤ 𝑄!!" ∗ , and 𝑄!! ≤ 𝑄!!" ∗ . This is comprehensible since
the physical store may use resalable cross-channel returns to satisfy some of its sales
requests.
As mentioned before, the majority of online stores’ return policies request that
customers return all unsatisfactory purchases to the online store, i.e. that they apply
strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜. This in turn imposes a constraint that many customers dislike. Thus, only
a portion of 𝛼 will conduct their purchases from the channel. If the portion is higher than
the threshed of 𝛼 defined in equation (5.13), i.e. 𝛼 > 𝛼, then 𝑄!!" ∗ > 𝑄!!" ∗ . Thus, one may
conclude that the reduction in sales requests does not always induce a lower order
quantity for the online store under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 than under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜.
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We then compare the online store’s order quantity when the system does not
permit an inventory shift, i.e. strategies 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 and 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜, and its order quantity when
the system permits an inventory shift, i.e. strategies 𝑖 = 𝐷 and 𝑖 = 𝐶. It is noted that the
order quantity under any no-inventory shift strategy is lower than the order quantity under
∗

∗

∗

any inventory shift strategy. That is to say, 𝑄!! ≥ 𝑄!!" ∗ , 𝑄!! ≥ 𝑄!!" ∗ , 𝑄!! ≥ 𝑄!!" ∗ , and
∗

𝑄!! ≥ 𝑄!!" ∗ . Although this is not analytically proven, several tests were conducted under
different parameter sets. The notion is logical since the inventory shift strategies cause the
online store to lose items for the physical store, and thus order a higher quantity at the
beginning of the season. Not doing so might leave the store starving for items to satisfy
the sales request with. Thus, it is crucial that a dual-channel retailer define the strategy of
handling cross-channel returns prior to the beginning of the selling season, and that it
orders the optimal quantity for a channel accordingly.
When the system permits an inventory shift, one should compare a channel’s
∗

optimal quantity under strategies 𝑖 = 𝐷 and 𝑖 = 𝐶. As indicated in Section 5.6, 𝑄!! is at
∗

∗

∗

∗

most equivalent to 𝑄!! , while 𝑄!! is at least equivalent to 𝑄!! . That is to say, 𝑄!! ≤ 𝑄!!
∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

and 𝑄!! ≥ 𝑄!! . In (5.27) and (5.28) one may note that 𝑄!! increases and 𝑄!! decreases
when 𝑐 increases. Thus as the amount paid to the online store for each cross-channel
return increases, the store will be encouraged to order more as the negative consequences
of such type of return is diminished. As this happens, the expected amount of crosschannel returns will increase, which will allow the physical store to reduce its order
quantity. Conversely, as 𝑐 decreases, the store will order less as the negative
consequences of this type of return are intensified. As a result, the expected number of
cross-channel returns will decrease, forcing the physical store to increase its order
quantity.
We next study the channel’s performance and the retailer’s performance when
strategies 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 and 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 are followed. Under the earlier strategies, the physical store
only assists in returning cross-channel returns to the online store. Thus, its measurable
performance under both strategies is the same, i.e. 𝜋!!" ∗ = 𝜋!!" ∗ . Note that there could be
an increase in the physical store’s sales and thus in the profit under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 due to
the cross-channel selling opportunity. That is to say, the online customer might return an
item purchased from the online store to the physical store and at the same time purchase
an item that is appealing to him or her. Such a purchase is mostly impulsive and not
planned. According to Neslin and Shankar (2009), a physical store may experience up to
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a 20% increase in sales if the online store’s policy allows for cross-channel returns. Thus,
another study in the field of dual-channel retailing and customer returns might include
cross-channel selling opportunities in the system analysis.
Regarding the profitability of the online store and the retailer, they are higher
under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 than under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 if 𝛼 > 𝛼, they are lower if 𝛼 < 𝛼, and
they are equal if 𝛼 = 𝛼. Therefore, managers should pay a careful attention to the value
of 𝛼. This value is controllable as the online store can invest in several other reverse
supply chain options. For example, the service of picking up items from customers’
locations at their chosen times may increase 𝛼 drastically. Indeed, such a service may be
costly to the online channel, and switching to another strategy could be a wiser decision.
Thus, studying the benefits and drawbacks of the provided services are vital to the
success of the enterprise. Nonetheless, one of the parameters that has a clear effect on the
threshold 𝛼 and can be controlled by the enterprise is the value 𝑡!" . As per relationship
(5.15), 𝛼 increases as 𝑡!" decreases. Thus, if 𝑡!" is too small, then it might be hard for
strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 to outperform strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜. This could be the case when the online
store performs the function of a distribution center and ships items to the physical store
on a regular basis. Thus, empty trucks could return to the online store and be used freely
(e.g. 𝑡!" = 0) to ship cross-channel returns to their original points of purchase.
For the physical store to prefer strategy 𝑖 = 𝐷 over the no-inventory shift
∗

∗

strategies, i.e. 𝜋!! > 𝜋!!" ∗ and 𝜋!! > 𝜋!!" ∗ , the amount paid to the online store for each
cross-channel return (𝑐) should be less than 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 . If 𝑐 is higher than the
indicated value, then the physical store will benefit more from satisfying its entire
inventory needs from the supplier. If they are equivalent, then the store will not generate
∗

any extra measurable profit or loss under the strategy, i.e. 𝜋!! = 𝜋!!" ∗ = 𝜋!!" ∗ . Note that
based on the parameters given above, 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 = 12.
For the online store to prefer strategy 𝑖 = 𝐷 over the no-inventory shift strategies,
∗

∗

i.e. 𝜋!! > 𝜋!!" ∗ and 𝜋!! > 𝜋!!" ∗ , the amount paid by the physical store for each cross∗

channel return should be sufficient. The minimum 𝑐 that allows for 𝜋!! > 𝜋!!" ∗ is
calculated next. By applying formula (5.29) and using the above parameters, one gets
0.097𝑐 ! + 26.30𝑐 − 213.53 = 0. Solving the quadratic equation reveals that 𝑐 =
∗

−278,7.9 . Thus, when 𝑐 > 7.9, 𝜋!! > 𝜋!!" ∗ . By applying the same formula and
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∗

procedure for strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 one finds that when 𝑐 > 9, 𝜋!! > 𝜋!!" ∗ . The above
outcomes can also be found in Figure 5.2 when 𝑐 changes from 5 to 12.
1800
1700
1600

πo i

1500

i = ro

1400

i = co

1300

i=D

1200
5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Ĉ
Figure 5.2: 𝒄’s Effect on Online Stores’ Profits

In (5.27), one may notice that as 𝑐 increases within the range 0, 𝑠 − 𝑑 +
∗

𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 , the retailer’s profit under strategy 𝑖 = 𝐷, i.e. 𝜋!! , increases. Conversely, as
∗

𝑐 increases within the range 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 , ∞ , 𝜋!! decreases (Figure 5.3). At the
point that 𝑐 = 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 , the strategy performs at its full potential and is
∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

equivalent to strategy 𝑖 = 𝐶, i.e. 𝜋!! = 𝜋!! , 𝑄!! = 𝑄!! , and 𝑄!! = 𝑄!! . According to
∗

our parameters, one may note that the difference in the retailer’s performances 𝜋!! − 𝜋!!

∗

is insignificant. Note that under different parameters the difference may increase to a
significant level.
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Figure 5.3: 𝒄’s Effect on Retailers’ Profits

Thus, if our focus is aimed at the total performance rather than at a channel’s
performance, the physical store should pay the maximum value of 𝑐 to the online store.
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Consequently, there will be no tangible profit increase for the physical store under
strategy 𝑖 = 𝐷. This could be considered a form of channel cooperation. One would need
to remind the physical store that the online store would also be involved in this
cooperation indirectly. For example, cross-channel returns increase the physical store’s
sales, as stated before. Moreover, items’ descriptions posted on the online store’s website
would positively impact the physical store’s sales and, eventually, its profit. Indeed, many
physical store customers have a desire to purchase certain products only after going
through the items’ descriptions. Additionally, it is known that centralization is expensive
and requires a significant amount of effort. Since the two strategies 𝑖 = 𝐷 and 𝑖 = 𝐶 are
equivalent in performance under the highest value of 𝑐, then we see no point to
centralization.
The rates 𝑘! and 𝑘!" induce tangible and contradicting effects on the superiority
of inventory shift strategies, i.e. 𝑖 = 𝐷 and 𝑖 = 𝐶, over no-inventory shift strategies, i.e.
𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 and 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜. In Figure 5.4, one may notice that as 𝑘! increases the no-inventory
shift strategies generate higher profits and start to perform better than the inventory shift
strategies at a similar value of 𝑘! ≈ 0.525. Conversely, as 𝑘!" increases, the inventory
shift strategies generate higher profits and start to perform better than the no-inventory
shift strategies at a similar value of 𝑘!" ≈ 0.525. Notice that both rates, to some extent,
can be controlled by the enterprise. For example, simple measures such as sending emails
to customers and asking for their feedback regarding a product’s look and functionality
may be used. A return form and a return procedure may be attached to that email. Such an
approach might positively increase the resalability rates 𝑘! and 𝑘!" . Additionally, the
online store could be provided with a refabricating facility to fix damaged items and thus
increase the online store’s resalability rate of 𝑘! . Indeed, the enterprise must weigh the
financial benefits and drawbacks of such measures to better judge their effectiveness.
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Figure 5.4: 𝒌𝒐 ’s and 𝒌𝒐𝒓 ’s Effects on Retailer’s Profit
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5.8

Conclusion

Identifying the optimal order quantity through the use of the newsvendor model is
a tangible problem in the field of supply chain management. As customers are able to
return their purchases and a high percentage of those returns are considered as good as
new and resalable, many retailers seem to overestimate their order quantities. Thus,
researchers have expanded the newsvendor model to include customer returns. Today’s
retailing businesses normally run both a physical store and an online store to meet
customers’ desires to shop through multiple channels. The complications that customer
returns impose on the optimal quantities of a dual-channel retailing system have not yet
been sufficiently studied. Customers can return items to the items’ original points of
purchase. They also can cross-return online purchases to physical stores. Cross-channel
returns may destabilize the retailing system and retailers may simultaneously
overestimate one channel and underestimate another. Thus, in Chapter 5 we developed
newsvendor models that consider both same- and cross-channel returns experienced by a
dual-channel retailer running a physical store and an online store. Four strategies that may
be used to handle cross-channel returns were studied. The first strategy was to collect all
cross-channel returns on a regular basis and to send them back to the online store (𝑖 =
𝑟𝑜). The second strategy was to ban cross-channel returns (𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜). The third and fourth
strategies were to transfer the ownership of all cross-channel returns to the physical store
under decentralized (𝑖 = 𝐷) and centralized (𝑖 = 𝐶) management styles, respectively. Our
results confirmed that selecting the right policy might noticeably increase a system’s
performance and profitability. To simplify the analysis of the different strategies, uniform
distributions were assigned to sales requests in both channels.
The optimal order quantity for the physical store (the online store) under any
inventory shift strategy is at most (least) equivalent to its order quantity under any noinventory shift strategy. Additionally, the order quantity for the physical store (the online
store) under strategy 𝑖 = 𝐷 is at least (most) equivalent to its order quantity under
strategy 𝑖 = 𝐶. If customer loyalty to a retailer’s online store exceeds a threshold of 𝛼,
then the online store will order a higher quantity under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 than under strategy
𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜.
If customer loyalty to the retailer’s online store exceeds a threshold of 𝛼, then the
online store will generate a higher profit under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 than under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜.
This threshold increases as the cost of shipping each unit from the physical store to the
online store decreases. The physical store is encouraged to be part of the decentralized
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inventory shift strategy if the amount paid to the online store for each cross-channel
return (𝑐) is less than 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 . However, the online store is encouraged to be
part of this strategy if 𝑐 derives 𝑝!! to be higher than 𝑝!! . Both the decentralized and
centralized inventory shift strategies have exact quantities and total performance when 𝑐’s
value is equivalent to 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 .
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CHAPTER 6:

OPTIMAL ONLINE STORE’S
OUTSOURCING STRATEGY

6.1

Introduction and Motivation

Customer returns have a massive effect on a DCR’s business functions, especially
on the field of operations management. The failure to satisfy customers’ orders and the
expenses associated with customer returns were among the major reasons for
unsuccessful e-tail attempts. Certainly, potential unsatisfied customers may exhaust the
enterprise with forward and reverse logistics. It is common for e-tail stores to heavily
invest on marketing activities, while exerting much less efforts on managing customers’
orders and returns. Indeed, an elegant online store is useless if it is not able to deliver
goods as promised, deal with customer returns, and still generate profit. Therefore,
successful management of channels’ inventory levels when customer returns are allowed
is vital for the DCR existence.
Over the past years, third party logistics and service providers (herein called
providers) have drastically developed their competences to support services such as
transportation, warehousing, inventory management, fleet management, production
management, and many others. The management of a retailer-provider relationship is a
complex task and literature has reported conflicting results with regard to outsourcing
(Hartmann and de Grahl 2012). However, successful outsourcing for services can boost a
retailer’s competitiveness and improve its performance.
In today’s market, several common inventory, logistics and warehousing
strategies are being used by DCRs. For example, a number of firms pile their selling
items in a single warehouse, i.e. a big store or a distribution center, from where both e-tail
and retail stores demand fulfillment are satisfied. Such businesses include The Home
Depot, and Wal-Mart Stores (Yan 2008). Other DCRs use two different locations or two
different inventory piles in the same location to fulfill demand from each channel.
According to Yao et al. (2009), Penny is implementing such a business strategy to avoid
the intermixing of inventory items for both stores. Other firms adopt such a strategy to
avoid the expensive and difficult coordination process between channels (Zhang et al.
2010; Yan 2008; Berger et al. 2006).
It is common to have selected e-tail store-related logistics and warehousing tasks
outsourced to one or several providers. Such outsourcing strategy allows a firm to
improve its services and concentrate on its main competency, while exploiting external
resources and expertise. For example, around 70% of the retailing firms outsource the
transportation needs to third party logistics providers (Lei et al. 2006). According to Min
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(2013), outsourcing policies range from a simple per service charge (most common) to a
real partnership with gain sharing (least common). Modern examples of this partnership
are the alliance between several logistics providers and Sheetz Corporation as well as the
alliance between Transplace and AutoZone Inc. According to Lei et al. (2006), profit
sharing is the vital compensation policy that enabled the success of the previous
partnerships. Also, Toys“R”Us had formed a well known alliance with Amazon.com to
provide inventory management, site development, order fulfilment, and customer services
for duration of ten years (Berger et al. 2006). Amazon.com, in this case, housed the
inventory of Toys“R”Us in its distribution centers.
Research on outsourcing logistical activities to a third party logistics and service
provider has been growing noticeably in recent years. For example, Giri, and Sarker
(2017) examined the supply chain’s performance under a manufacturer, a third party
logistics service provider, and multiple independent retailers facing price sensitive and
uncertain demand. Buyback and revenue sharing contracts are implemented to coordinate
the decentralized supply chain wherein production disruption may take place in the
manufacturing facility. He et. al (2016) studied several strategies that can be implemented
between the manufacturer’s and retailer’s online stores. They assumed demand to be
influenced by price, national advertising effort, and logistics service level. Jiang et al.
(2014) investigated decision and coordination in a system consisting of a manufacturer, a
third-party logistics provider, and two competing retailers wherein the product
distribution functions are implemented. Cai et. al (2013) considered a producer providing
a fresh product to a distant distributor who sells it to end customers. The product is
transported through a third-party logistics provider where both quantity and quality may
deteriorate during the transportation process. They assumed market demand to be
stochastic, and sensitive to selling price and product freshness. Liu et al. (2013)
investigated the fairest revenue-sharing coefficient for a two-echelon system consisting of
a logistics integrator and provider, and a three echelon system consisting of a logistics
integrator, provider and subcontractor. Through the use of profit distribution equity, a fair
entropy function is introduced and the fairest coefficient is measured. Lei et al. (2006)
studied the impact that coordination and pricing policies have on system’s profitability
when the cost function of the logistics provider is concave in nature. Jharkharia and
Sankar (2007) proposed two methodologies that can assist in the selection process of a
third-party logistics and service provider: preliminary screening of the available
providers, and analytic network process-based final selection. Fabbe-Costes et al. (2009)
examined the logistics providers’ role in supporting supply chain integration and clients’
performance. Lim (2000) developed a game-theoretic model that examines the
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contractual agreement between a third party logistics buyer and a third party logistics
provider. The paper assumes that service quality and service cost to be known to the
logistics provider only. Chen et al. (2001) analyzed third party warehousing contracts
wherein demand on space is uncertain. A contract is set by an initial space commitment
and it can be modified for a certain number of times. Alp et al. (2003) studied designing
the parameters of a specific transportation contract that may be used between a
transporter and a manufacturer. They claimed that vehicle dispatching, inventory control,
and contract value define the contract-designing problem. Their proposed model
minimizes the total cost of the manufacturer by considering various parameters
combinations. Although its importance in the modern retailing systems, none of the above
papers have considered customer returns and their impact on the interactions between a
retailer and a third-party logistics and service provider.
However, there is no work that has considered and compared the different
inbound/outbound outsourcing options for the online store when a DCR faces customer
returns. Thus, a profound task in Chapter 6 is to determine the inventory level of both
stores of a DCR when all common forms of customer returns are allowed. This paper
considers the case when customers are split in their preference between the two channels
and the system’s total demand is random. It, also, investigates three different outsourcing
policies a DCR may implement with a third-party logistics and service provider as the
following:
(1) Transaction-based fee strategy: In this strategy, the DCR fulfills retail and etail stores’ customer demand from two inventory piles or two different
locations. With regard to the e-tail store’s orders and returns, the firm may
depend on its fleet to perform the required logistic activities or hire a provider
with a transaction-based fee compensation policy. In such a policy, a dollar
amount is paid to the provider per delivered or returned order, without a
significant amount of upfront fee. Since this policy lacks a long-term retailerprovider agreement, the fee is assumed to be exogenous to the system and,
thus, there exist a sole decision maker within this strategy.
(2) Flat-based fee strategy: In this case, the firm only fulfills the retail store’s
orders from the traditional store. However, a provider is outsourced to manage
the e-tail store’s orders. As a Stackelberg leader, the provider charges the
retailer a quantity dependent flat fee for the entire selling season. As a
Stackelberg follower, the retailer decides the order quantity for both stores.
Since the retailer is the one making the inventory decision on the e-tail store,
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then this strategy is similar to that of the vendor-managed inventory (VMI)
strategy.
(3) Gain sharing strategy: Similar to the previous strategy, the retailer fulfills the
retail store’s orders from the traditional store and the provider fulfills the
online orders from the e-tail store. On top of the quantity dependent seasonal
fee paid by the retailer, the partners strengthen their strategic alliance by
sharing the profit of the e-tail store.

6.2

Model Formulation

This research considers a dual-channel retailer with both traditional retail and etail stores selling a single item that is perishable or has a short life cycle. Thus, our
problem may be modeled using the single period or newsvendor modeling technique.
Customers may purchase the product through the DCR’s retail store or e-tail store.
System’s total demand is assumed to be stochastic. A portion 𝜃 of buyers prefers to
conduct their purchases through the retail store, while a portion 𝜃 = 1 − 𝜃 of buyers
prefers to conduct their purchases through the e-tail store. Since customers prefer a
certain channel over another, their unmet demand from that channel is considered to be
lost. This is rational for customers that are channel loyal. For example, e-tail store’s
customers may enjoy making their purchases online due to store’s all day availability and
convenience. They are more likely to switch to another online store if the requested items
are not available. On the other hand, retail store’s customers may seek to touch and feel
the product before conducting their purchases. Thus, they are more likely to switch to
another product or retail store if their requested items are not available. We assume that
there is no transhipment between channels if a product is out of stock due to the shortage
of the selling season.
We also assume that system’s demand is drawn from a certain distribution and in
accordance to customer preference it splits between the two channels. Therefore, if the
observed system’s demand is 𝑥, then the retail store’s demand and the e-tail store’s
demand will be 𝜃𝑥 and 𝜃𝑥, respectively. Demand split has appeared in papers related to
the topic of dual-channel supply chain (For example, in Chiang and Monahan 2005, Yao
et. al 2009). Also, 𝑓 𝑥 is the probability density function of total system’s demand.
Since the Uniform distribution is tractable and bounded, then we assume that total
demand is Uniformly distributed, i.e., 𝑥 ~ 𝑈 𝑎, 𝑏 . 𝑥 = 𝑎 represents minimum possible
total demand, while 𝑥 = 𝑏 represents maximum possible total demand. The uniform
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distribution is general enough to capture variability in a short selling season with little or
no demand history. This is why it is commonly used in the supply chain literature.
We assume here that channel’s selling prices are exogenously determined due to
market competitiveness. Thus, 𝑝! and 𝑝! are the unit sale price for retail store and e-tail
store, respectively. Unmet demand from the retail store costs the channel a shortage value
of 𝑔! , while unmet demand from the e-tail store costs the channel a shortage value of 𝑔! .
Buyers are provided the opportunity to acquire a full refund of their purchases if
the items are returned within a time-period specified by the firm. We assume the
following: a ratio of 𝑟! from the retail store’s total demand will be returned back to the
retail store in person, a ratio of 𝑟!" from the e-tail store’s total demand will be crossreturned back to the retail store in person, and a ratio of 𝑟! from the e-tail store’s total
demand will be returned back using the e-tail store’s logistic services. Due to the seasonal
length constraint, we assume that returned items may not be resold again in the same
selling season. However, they can be salvaged in a secondary market with a value of 𝑠! .
We assume that an unsold item can be salvaged for a value higher than that of a
returned item, i.e. 𝑠! > 𝑠! . This assumption is satisfactory since salvagers (i.e. secondary
market customers or the manufacturer) can, normally, distinguish between sold and
unsold items. Both salvage values are assumed to be less than the unit’s purchasing cost,
i.e. 𝑤 > 𝑠! > 𝑠! . If this is not the case, then the profit function will be unbounded above.
Due to the economy of scale, a provider incurs a lower forward/return handling cost
compared to a retailer who uses his own fleet or pays the provider a transaction fee for
each logistical service performed, i.e. ℎ! < ℎ! .
Indeed, many DCRs fail in their first attempt to establish successful e-businesses
that can balance between the services provided to customers and deal with the negative
consequences of customer returns. Therefore, the inventory strategy implemented when
customer returns are allowed is a vital decision to be made from the retailer’s perspective.
This work offers inventory related decision-making models for a DCR aiming to
maximize channels’ profits wherein customer returns are permitted and demand is
uncertain. For suitability, we refer to the retailer as he, and to the provider as she. Next,
we study a centralized case where the retailer uses his own logistics fleet or uses a
provider with a transaction-based fee compensation strategy. Table 6.1 presents a
summary of the notations used in Chapter 6.
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𝒓𝒆

Notation

Description
Probability an item purchased from a retail store is returned to the retail store

𝒓𝒆

Probability an item purchased from an e-tail store is returned to the e-tail store

𝒓𝒆𝒓

Probability an item purchased from an e-tail store is cross-returned to a retail store

𝒘

An item wholesale price or purchasing cost

𝒑𝒓 & 𝒑𝒆

Unit sale price for retail store and e-tail store, respectively

𝒔𝒏 & 𝒔𝒓

Unit salvage value for new items and open items, respectively. Note that 𝑤 > 𝑠! > 𝑠!

𝒉𝒓 & 𝒉𝒍

Forward/reverse per unit transaction handling cost incurred by retailer and provider,
respectively. Note that ℎ! > ℎ!

𝒈𝒓 & 𝒈𝒆

Unit shortage cost for the retail channel and e-tail channel, respectively

𝒙

Total system’s demand

𝒇 𝒙

Probability density function of total system’s demand

𝜽

Customer preference for the retail store

𝜽=𝟏−𝜽

Customer preference for the e-tail store

𝑸𝒓 & 𝑸𝒐

Quantities ordered for retail and e-tail stores, respectively

𝝅𝒓𝒊 & 𝝅𝒆𝒊

Retail store and e-tail store profits, respectively

𝝅𝑳𝒊

Third party logistics and service provider’s profit

𝑭𝒊

Flat fee or seasonal fee paid to the provider at the beginning of the selling season

𝒊

Strategy used to manage the e-tail store; where 𝑖 = 1,2,3
Table 6.1: Sixth Chapter’s Notations

6.3

Transaction-Based Fee Strategy (𝒊 = 𝟏)

In this setting, the provider is not a key player, and the retailer fully controls the
decision making process of the whole system. Therefore, there is no strategic alliance
between the retailer and the provider. Channels’ demands are satisfied from segregated
inventories within the same facility or from two different stores. Companies, such as
Penny, use segregation to avoid items intermingling, and, thus, assure satisfying e-tail
store’s accepted orders. E-tail orders and returns are shipped from or back to the facility
using the retailer’s own fleet or using a provider where she is paid a service fee per
delivery. Thus, the retailer optimizes two objective functions and the decision variables
here are retail store’s inventory level 𝑄! and e-tail store’s inventory level 𝑄! .
The revenue generated by satisfying a single demand from the e-tail store is
𝑝!! = 1 − 𝑟! − 𝑟!" 𝑝! + 𝑟! + 𝑟!" 𝑠! − 1 + 𝑟! ℎ! . In the first term, there is a 1 − 𝑟! −
𝑟!" chance that a sold item is a final sale and contributes positively due to the selling
price. In the second term, there is a 𝑟! + 𝑟!" chance that a sold item is returned back to
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the retailer and contributes positively due to the salvage value. The third term measures
the expected handling or shipping cost acquired when a single customer demand is met.
Similarly, the expected revenue generated by satisfying a single demand from the retail
store is 𝑝!! = 1 − 𝑟! 𝑝! + 𝑟! 𝑠! . Due to the similarity, a detailed explanation of the
previous relationship has been omitted. For the e-tail and retail stores to generate profits,
the following conditions are essential 𝑝!! > 𝑤 and 𝑝!! > 𝑤. The total expected profit for
the retail store is modeled in Eq. (6.1):
𝜋!!

𝑄! =

!!
!
!

𝜃𝑥𝑝!! + 𝑄! − 𝜃𝑥 𝑠! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 +

!
!!
!

𝑄! 𝑝!! − 𝜃𝑥 − 𝑄! 𝑔! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 − 𝑤𝑄!

(6.1)

The first term in Eq. (6.1) is the expected profit when the channel’s demand 𝜃𝑥 is
less than or equal to the order quantity 𝑄! . It considers the expected revenue generated by
the channel and the salvage value for unsold items. The second term is the expected profit
when the channel’s demand 𝜃𝑥 is more than the order quantity 𝑄! . This is the expected
revenue generated by satisfying orders excluding the shortage cost for unsatisfied demand
at the retail store. The third term is the purchasing cost associated with the inventory level
𝑄! . Similarly, the total expected profit for the e-tail store could be modeled as:
𝜋!!

𝑄! =

!!
!
!

𝜃𝑥𝑝!! + 𝑄! − 𝜃𝑥 𝑠! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 +

!
!!
!

𝑄! 𝑝!! − 𝜃𝑥 − 𝑄! 𝑔! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 − 𝑤𝑄!

(6.2)

Given the aforementioned expected profit functions, we find the optimal inventory
levels as follows:
Proposition 6.1
The optimal order quantity for the retail store and the e-tail store are given respectively as
follows:
𝑄!! = 𝜃 𝑏 −

𝑏 − 𝑎 𝑤 − 𝑠!
𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!

𝑄!! = 𝜃 𝑏 −

𝑏 − 𝑎 𝑤 − 𝑠!
𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!

Proposition 6.1 gives closed-form solutions of the retail and e-tail stores’ optimal
order quantities. If all customers prefer the retail store (i.e. 𝜃 = 1), and returns are not
allowed by the store (i.e. 𝑟! = 0), then optimal order quantity is similar to that of the
classical newsvendor problem. Also, Proposition 6.1 shows that the variation in 𝑄!! and
𝑄!! when 𝜃 changes are different. It is interesting to see that as customer preference to the
retail store, i.e. 𝜃, increases, the inventory level in the retail store increases at a rate of
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𝑏−

!!! !!!!

𝑏−

!!! !!!!

!!! !!! !!!

!!! !!! !!!

and the inventory level in the e-tail store decreases at a rate of
. We can, also, state that as 𝜃 increases the total retailer’s inventory

level, i.e. 𝑄!! + 𝑄!! , changes in correspondence to the rates in both channels. That is to
say, total inventory level will increase as 𝜃 increases if 𝑝!! + 𝑔! < 𝑝!! + 𝑔! , will decrease
as 𝜃 increases if 𝑝!! + 𝑔! > 𝑝!! + 𝑔! , and will stay unchanged if 𝑝!! + 𝑔! = 𝑝!! + 𝑔! .

6.4

Flat-Based Fee Strategy (𝒊 = 𝟐)

In this section, we consider another outsourcing strategy that requires a higher
involvement of the provider. Presently, several companies outsource e-tail store’s orders
fulfillment to a provider, because they lack the competency needed to handle small and
unstable customer demand. Normally, those providers have validated their competency
and acquired fairly noticeable reputation in the market. Such outsourcing strategy allows
retailers to avoid capital investment while improving flexibility, productivity, and
customer satisfaction. For example, HP has a warehouse in Memphis that is used to fulfill
e-tail store’s customer orders. The management of the entire warehouse (i.e. facility
layout, and orders transaction processing, picking up, labeling, bar coding/RFID,
packaging and packing) and the execution of orders delivery were outsourced to FedEx.
This form of integration enabled the retailer to better use the provider’s efficient
operation and economy of scale. Therefore, reducing the unit handling cost for sales
conducted over the Internet. Another way to apply this strategy is when the provider is
used to carryout the inventory of the e-tail store in her own distribution center. An
example for that is Global Sports outsourcing Kmart.com (Yao et al. 2009). When
customer returns are allowed, then the provider is responsible for the fulfillment of e-tail
store’s orders and returns. The retailer in return pays a seasonal fee that is correlated to
the size of the business. Rationally, this business size can, also, be correlated to the
number of units the provider will manage, i.e. 𝑄! . We notify here that the retailer still
decides on the quantity ordered for the e-tail store.
In this strategy, both the retailer and provider select their decisions in isolation to
maximize their individual profits. Despite the fact that outsourcing is referred to as a
‘strategic alliance’, the partners involved may have contradicting interests. Consequently,
it is vital for the firm to compare between the negative consequences stemmed from
double marginalization and those incurred by the high handling fees. We need to point
out here that it is not always advantageous for a firm to outsource a logistics provider
when she can be hired for a single service instead. In this study, we assume that the
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retailer and provider undergo a Stackelberg competition where the provider is the leader
and the retailer is the follower. The game’s decisions sequences are as the following:
(1) In order to maximize her expected profit, the provider decides first on the flat
fee (𝐹) paid by the retailer in response to the management of each online item.
This is done given the expected response function of the e-tail store that is run
by the DCR. We assume here that the provider has full knowledge of the
parameters associated with customer demand and return behavior in the e-tail
store.
(2) In response to the provider’s decision, the retailer decides on the order
quantity of the e-tail store, i.e. 𝑄! , to maximize his own expected profit.
A similar procedure has been implemented by Giri and Sarker (2017) study wherein the
retailer places the order size in response to the service charge set by the provider. Notice
that this strategy has no effect on the decision process carried at the retail store. Also, the
revenue generated by satisfying a single demand from the e-tail store becomes 𝑝!! =
1 − 𝑟! − 𝑟!" 𝑝! + 𝑟! + 𝑟!" 𝑠! .
6.4.1 The Retailer’s Problem
The expected profit for the e-tail store is formulated as the following:
𝜋!!

𝑄! 𝐹 =

!!
!
!

𝜃𝑥𝑝!! + 𝑄! − 𝜃𝑥 𝑠! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 +

!
!!
!

𝑄! 𝑝!! − 𝜃𝑥 − 𝑄! 𝑔! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 − 𝑤 + 𝐹 𝑄!

(6.3)

Due to similarity, a detailed explanation of the previous profit function is omitted. In the
coming proposition we find the best response function of the e-tail store (the Stackelberg
follower) given 𝐹.
Proposition 6.2
The optimal order quantity for the e-tail store is as follows:
𝑄!! = 𝜃 𝑏 −

𝑏 − 𝑎 𝑤 + 𝐹 − 𝑠!
𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!

From Proposition 6.2, one may notice that for as long as the seasonal fee 𝐹 is less
than the term

! !!! !!! !!!
!!!

− 𝑤 − 𝑠!

tail store decreases at a rate of 𝑏 −

, then as 𝜃 increases the inventory level in the e!!! !!!!!!
!!! !!! !!!

. One may, also, notice that the

satisfaction of such a condition promotes a positive inventory level in the e-tail store.
Corollary 6.1 proofs that this is always the case under the Stackelberg competition.
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6.4.2 The Provider’s Problem
The profit function of the provider (the Stackelberg leader) can be modeled as the
following:
𝜋!!

𝐹 = 𝑄! 𝐹 −

!!
!

!

𝜃𝑥𝑐𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 −

!

!!
!

𝑄! 𝑐𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥

(6.4)

The first term in Eq. (6.4) is the total seasonal fee paid by the retailer to acquire
the provider’s logistical and handling services. The second term is the expected handling
expenditure when the e-tail store’s demand is less than or equal to the order quantity 𝑄! .
The third term is expected handling expenditure when the e-channel’s demand is more
than the channel’s order quantity. Notice that 𝑐 = ℎ! 1 + 𝑟! is the expected handling
cost incurred by the provider when a single customer demand is met. In the next
proposition we find the provider’s optimal policy given the retailer’s best response
function.
Proposition 6.3
The optimal seasonal fee for each item handled by the provider is as follows:
𝑏
𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! ! − 𝑤 − 𝑠! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! − 𝑐
𝑏
−
𝑎
𝐹! =
𝑐
2 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! − 2
Proposition 6.3 gives a closed-form solution of the optimal seasonal charge for
each e-tail store’s item managed by the provider. One may notice that this charge is
influenced by the revenue acquired when a single online request is met, purchasing cost,
salvaging value, shortage cost, return rates, and handling costs. Nonetheless, it is
interesting to see that customer preference to a certain channel has no effect on this
charge from the provider’s perspective.
Corollary 6.1: 𝐹! <

! !!! !!! !!!
!!!

− 𝑤 − 𝑠!

Corollary 6.1 shows that the optimal seasonal fee does not prevent the retailer
from conducting business with the logistics provider. In another word, the e-tail store’s
inventory level is always positive, i.e. 𝑄!! > 0, when the involved parties undergo
Stackelberg competition.

6.5

Gain Sharing Strategy (𝒊 = 𝟑)

This section studies a scheme wherein the parties involved further strengthen their
alliance or partnership. The study Hartmann and de Grahl (2012) has identified that
sharing of benefits and burdens are among the most important factors in the formation of
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retailer-provider successful alliance. It reflects the parties’ willingness to accept hardships
and success. In this compensation policy, each partner has a specific role to perform and
they eventually share the total revenue of the e-channel. On top of that, the provider may
charge the retailer a seasonal fee for each item assigned to the e-channel. An example of
this strategy is the long-term alliance that was established by Toys “R” Us and
Amazon.com during the year of 2001. Toys “R” Us was responsible of identifying,
buying and managing inventory, while Amazon.com was responsible of developing site,
fulfilling customer orders, conducting customer services and carrying inventory in her
own distribution center. Under the terms of their agreement, Amazon.com will be
rewarded with fixed payments, per unit payments, and a share of the total revenue.
According to Min (2013), due to the substantial risk involved in the gain sharing
compensation policy, it is scarcely being used despite the possible enhancement in the
firms’ long-term performance, productivity and profitability. Another reason that caused
the low popularity of the gain sharing policy is the difficulty in specifying a share for
each partner that will govern a win-win situation. Also, the performance stress exerted
upon the provider when such a partnership is offered may leave the management reluctant
to accept it. The aforementioned facts give this work a tangible potential to help retailers
form a successful alliance with their logistics providers.
We assume here that all costs and revenue associated with the e-tail store is shared
between partners. The retailer’s share is ∅, while the provider’s share is 1 − ∅. The value
of ∅ is influenced by each partner’s market position and, thus, negotiation power. It, also,
reflects each partner’s share in the responsibilities needed for the success of the echannel. On top of that, the retailer is charged a seasonal fee for each item managed by
the provider.
Notice that the retail store’s inventory decision is similar to what it is in the
previous sections. However, 𝑝!! = 1 − 𝑟! − 𝑟!" 𝑝! + 𝑟! + 𝑟!" 𝑠! − 1 + 𝑟! ℎ! is the
revenue generated by satisfying a single sale at the e-tail store. Again, we apply
Stackelberg competition when the provider is the game leader and the retailer is the game
follower. The retailer’s and the provider’s profit functions from the e-channel are
𝜋!! 𝑄! 𝐹 = ∅𝜋!" − 𝐹𝑄! and 𝜋!! 𝐹 = 1 − ∅ 𝜋!" + 𝐹𝑄! , respectively, where:
𝜋!" =

!!
!
!

𝜃𝑥𝑝!! + 𝑄! − 𝜃𝑥 𝑠! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 +

!
!!
!

𝑄! 𝑝!! − 𝜃𝑥 − 𝑄! 𝑔! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 − 𝑤𝑄!

(6.5)

Proposition 6.4
The optimal order quantity for the e-tail store and the optimal seasonal fee for each item
handled by the provider are given, respectively, as:
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𝑄!! = 𝜃 𝑏 −

𝐹
+ 𝑤 − 𝑠!
∅
𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!

𝑏−𝑎

∅! 𝑏 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!
𝐹! =
− 𝑤 − 𝑠!
∅+1
𝑏−𝑎
Proposition 6.4 considers the optimal decisions when the compensation policy
includes both gain sharing and seasonal fee. We notify readers that the two partners can
extract a higher surplus out of the e-channel by centralizing the decision-making process
and, thus, eliminating double marginalization and all forms of retailer-provider
competition. In the fully centralized case, the seasonal fee becomes an internal parameter.
Thus, there is a single decision to be made and that is the channel’s optimal inventory
level. It can be easily calculated using the above stated formula given that 𝐹 = 0.
Consequently, centralization promotes a higher inventory level compared to
decentralization. For centralization to be applicable, retailer’s share from the e-channel
should be lowered such that each player is guaranteed a higher surplus.
Corollary 6.2: 𝐹! < ∅

! !!! !!! !!!
!!!

− 𝑤 − 𝑠!

Similar to Corollary 6.1, the aforementioned corollary shows that the gain sharing
contract does not prevent the retailer from conducting business with the logistic provider.
Therefore, the e-tail store’s inventory level is always positive under such a setting, i.e.
𝑄!! ≥ 0.
Corollary 6.3

i.
ii.
iii.

!!!
!∅
!!!!
!∅

=

∅!! !!
∅ ∅!!

=−

> 0.

!
∅!! !

! !!! !!! !! !! !!!!
!!! !!! !!!

< 0.

𝐹! ≤ 𝐹! .
Corollary 6.3 indicates that as the provider’s share from the gain of the e-channel

increases, i.e. ∅ decreases, the seasonal fee decreases. In another word, a more attractive
compensation policy causes a lower initial payment required for services. Consequently,
the retailer is encouraged to increase the order quantity in an attempt to increase his own
profitability. This, in turns, will positively reflect back on both the provider’s
performance and the e-channel’s performance, as it is yet to come in Corollary 6.5. Due
to the same logic stated above, the seasonal fee when the provider shares the e-channel’s
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gain, i.e. 𝐹! , is lower than the seasonal fee when the provider does not share the echannel’s gain, i.e. 𝐹! .
Corollary 6.4

i.

It is always true that 𝑄!! ≤ 𝑄!! .

ii.

If the condition ℎ! ≤ ℎ! −

!!! !!! !!! ! !!! !!! !! !! !!!!

holds, then 𝑄!! ≤ 𝑄!! .

!!!! !!! !!!!

Otherwise, 𝑄!! > 𝑄!! .
iii.

If the condition ∅ ≥

!!! !!!! !!! !!!!
!

!!! !!! !!

!! !!!!

!!! !!! !!!

holds, then 𝑄!! ≥ 𝑄!! .

Otherwise, 𝑄!! < 𝑄!! .
Compared to flat-based fee compensation policy, revenue sharing offers a more
attractive partnership opportunity for the provider and leads to a lower seasonal payment.
This low initial burden on the retailer encourages the e-store’s management to further
increase the inventory level, i.e. 𝑄!! ≤ 𝑄!! . Also, strategically partnering with a provider
allows the retailer to increase his e-tail store’s initial stocking for as long as she has a high
logistical efficiency, i.e. low ℎ! cost. Consequently, the firm is expected to satisfy a
higher demand from the e-channel, become more responsive, and provide better services
to customers. However, if the provider does not posses high enough logistical efficiency
and her share from the e-channel is low, then the e-tail store’s initial stocking may be the
highest when the retailer forms no partnership with the provider. Therefore, inventory
management in a system with a retailer and a provider is greatly dependent on the type of
strategy used, and the efficiency of the logistics and service provider.

6.6

Managerial insight with numerical analysis

The aim of this numerical analysis is to gain additional insights with regard to the
optimal policies. The optimal profits for the different strategies will be compared. Also,
the change in the optimal profits will be studied under various market conditions
particularly those assumed to be exogenous to our model. The results may generate
several managerial insights into the avenue of the retailer-provider compensation policies.
In this analysis, we normalize the demand such that 𝑥 ~ 𝑈 0,1 . This will greatly simplify
the different mathematical expressions and yet offer reliable insights. The optimal
decision variables and profits are simplified accordingly in Table 6.1 below. Unless
otherwise stated the following parameters are used: 𝑟! = 0.15, 𝑟!" = 0.15, 𝑟! = 0.1,
𝑝! = 60, 𝑝! = 60, ℎ! = 15, ℎ! = 2, 𝑤 = 15, 𝑠! = 10, 𝑠! = 5, 𝑔! = 5, 𝑔! = 5, ∅ = 0.7,
𝜃 = 0.5.
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Strategy

Transaction based fee

𝑖

Strategy 𝑖 = 1

𝑄!!

𝜃

Flat-based fee strategy 𝑖 = 2

𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤
𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!

𝐹!
𝜋!!

𝜃
2

𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 !
− 𝑔!
𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!

𝜋!!

𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 − 𝐹
𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!

𝜃
𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤
∅ + 1 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!

𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! ! − 𝑤 − 𝑠! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! − 𝑐
2𝑝!! + 2𝑔! − 2𝑠! − 𝑐

∅!
𝑝! + 𝑔! − 𝑤
∅+1 !

𝜃

---

Gain sharing strategy 𝑖 = 3

𝜃
2

𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 − 𝑐 ! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!
− 𝑔!
2𝑝!! + 2𝑔! − 2𝑠! − 𝑐 !
𝜃 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 − 𝑐 !
2 2𝑝!! + 2𝑔! − 2𝑠! − 𝑐

---

∅
𝜃
2

𝜃
2

𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 !
− 𝑔!
∅ + 1 ! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!
𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 !
∅ + 1 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!
− 1 − ∅ 𝑔!

Table 6.2: Optimal decision variables and profits when demand is uniformly distributed between zero and one

6.6.1 Effect of Retailer’s Share on the Provider’s Performance
Corollary 6.5

i.

𝜋!! increases as ∅ decreases.

ii.

! !!! !!!!
!∅

iii.

𝜋!! < 𝜋!! .

=−

!!! !!! !! !

!∅
∅!!

!

!!! !!! !!!

< 0.

To be realistic, we assume that the retailer’s profit is positive, i.e. 𝜋!! ≥ 0, given
any split value ∅ . The contrary occurs, i.e. 𝜋!! < 0, when the e-channel’s shortage value
is extremely high. Corollary 6.5 and Figure 6.1 show the increase in the provider’s
performance as she attains a higher portion of the e-store’s gain, i.e. a lower ∅ value. As
indicated in Corollary 6.3, this not only supported by the increase in her own share, but
also by the increase in the e-channel’s total performance. Corollary 6.5, also, indicates
that the provider strictly generates a higher profit under gain sharing strategy compared to
flat fee strategy, i.e. 𝜋!! > 𝜋!! . With this in mind, she can have her mined set even before
the negotiation process starts. Indeed, with gain sharing strategy the provider is expected
to be more involved in preforming the different logistical tasks, however, her gain is
expected to be worthy especially when we know that it is, probably, from the retailer’s
best interest not to attain extremely high share.
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Figure 6.1: Effect of retailer’s share on logistics provider

6.6.2 Effect of retailer’s share on his performance
Corollary 6.6
! ! !!!

i.

!∅!

=−

! !!∅ !!! !!! !! !
∅!! ! !!! !!! !!!

< 0.

If there exist a root, i.e. ∅, for the function ∅! 𝐴 + ∅! 𝐵 − ∅𝐶 + 𝐷 = 0 within the

ii.

range 0,1 , then 𝜋!! > 𝜋!! on the range 0, ∅ and 𝜋!! ≤ 𝜋!! on the range ∅, 1 .
Otherwise, 𝜋!! ≥ 𝜋!! at all values of ∅.
The concavity test in the previous corollary shows that it may not be optimal for
the retailer to earn the highest possible e-store’s revenue share. The retailer needs to
consider the pros and cons of having high share and high flat seasonal fee verses
somewhat fare share and a lower fee. To find the value ∅ that enhances the retailer’s
profit the most, the following relationship is solved:
1

!

− 1 − ∅ 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤

!

!!!!
!∅

= 0 or 𝑔! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! ∅ +

= 0. The aforementioned expression has at the most a sole

root, i.e. ∅, within the range ∅ = 0,1 . If found and ∅ > ∅, then it is from all partners’
interests to lower the retailer’s share to the value of ∅. However, if ∅ < ∅, then a
contradicting outcomes take place when the retailer’s share changes. If not found, then
contradictions with regard to splitting the revenue always exist and each player is better
off with a higher share. Part ii of Corollary 6.6 indicates that the retailer should be careful
when it comes to choosing his proper strategy. Although the flat fee strategy may seem
quite unpredictable from the retailer’s point of view, it could be his best strategy even
with high share allocation when undergoing the gain sharing strategy. This, in fact, may
trigger conflict between the parties involved that could be eliminated by centralizing the
decision process and redefining a new split that guarantees a win-win situation for both
partners. From the above analysis and Figure 6.2, we remark that if there exist a value ∅
with in the range 0,1 , then there exist a value ∅ with in the range ∅, 1 .
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Figure 6.2: Effect of retailer’s share on retailer

6.6.3 Effect of return rates on partners’ performances and choices
Both forms of returns, i.e. same-channel and cross-channel returns, negatively
affect the parties involved. For example, the retailer’s profit, from the e-store, decreases
as 𝑟! increases due to the burden exerted on the online channel. In an effort to mitigate the
losses caused by returns, the retailer should reduce the e-store’s inventory level.
Interestingly, the provider should, also, decrease the seasonal fee (Figure 6.3 a). Since she
is required to exert higher operational and logistical efforts due reverse shipping and
handling, one may think the opposite is true. Notice that the increase in the seasonal fee is
responded by a further decrease in the inventory level, which may drastically decrease the
provider’s financial efficiency. It is, also, noticed that customer returns have profound
effect on the retailer’s choice when it comes to his optimal partnership setting. If the estore experiences low return rates, then he may perform well under the transaction-based
fee strategy. In contrast, if the store experiences high return rates, then a higher logistical
involvement and support are needed (Figure 6.3 b). Thus, with low return rates, the loss
caused by double marginalization exceeds the handling expenditure paid the retailer. One
may find that the opposite is true when the e-channel experiences high return rates. In
relation to what indicated above, Hartmann and de Grahl (2012) confirmed that not all
partnerships developed with logistics and service providers improve retailers’
performances, at least in the short run. To clarify the concept, a different set of variables
have been used as follows: 𝑟! = 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒, 𝑟!" = 0, 𝑟! = 0.1, 𝑝! = 75, 𝑝! = 60, ℎ! = 20,
ℎ! = 2, 𝑤 = 7, 𝑠! = 5, 𝑠! = 2, 𝑔! = 2, 𝑔! = 2, ∅ = 0.7, 𝜃 = 0.5.
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Figure 6.3: Effect of e-tail store’s same-channel return rate on partners’ performances

However, with the decline in trade barriers, decline in obstacles related to crossing
national borders, and increase in transportation and handling efficiencies, current retailing
systems are heading towards further globalization. Also, return rates for purchases
conducted through online stores are staggeringly high in several documented cases, i.e. up
to 70%. Due to the aforementioned facts, there is a tangible demand to have competent
and responsive distribution systems that can handle an increasingly complex supply
chains. Thus, a logistics and service provider may become an essential partner for a DCR
in the coming near future.
6.6.4 Effect of customer preference on the retailer’s profitability
Hua et al. (2010) stated that different products lead to different degrees of
customer preference for the different channels. Products that are customized, require a
high level of examination prior to being purchased, or require after-sale services better-fit
retail stores. In contradistinction, products that do not require a high level of examination,
standardized, or mature better-fit online stores. They, also, indicated that customer
preference for the e-tail store is directly affected by the services provided to customers
(e.g. shipping lead time, customer support, technical and shopping assistance, and return
services). When hiring a competent logistics and service provider all the aforementioned
services are expected to improve. Thus, it is essential for business owners to understand
that such a decision may noticeable decrease customer preference to the retail store.
Definitely, the retailer’s profitability from the e-store may increase (Figure 6.4 a);
nonetheless, he may suffer a decline in his total performance due to customers shifting
from a more profitable channel to a less profitable one (Figure 6.4 b). For example, public
acceptance for purchasing grocery goods through the online channel is increasing. To
accommodate such an acceptance, several grocery stores offer pickup points for online
orders. However, they have not yet taken tangible leaps towards the implementation of
reliable logistical services due to the expected reduction in their total profits.
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Figure 6.4: Effect of customer preference

6.7

Conclusion

Today’s retailing businesses normally run both a retail store and an e-tail store to
meet customers’ desires to shop through multiple channels. Many of those retailers offer
full refunds for unsatisfied purchases and that led to a drastic increase in customer returns
especially in the e-channel. Customers can return items to the items’ original points of
purchase or can cross return the e-channel items to the retail channel. Also, many dualchannel retailers focus on their core competencies while outsourcing e-stores’ logistical
activities to third-party logistics and service providers. Therefore, we studied three
strategies that can be used to handle orders and customer returns under the context of a
dual-channel retailer. The first strategy is the transaction-based fee, where a retailer
handles all logistical activities using his own fleet or pays a logistics and service provider
a per deliver fee. The second strategy is the flat-based fee, where a retailer hand over the
logistical operation of his e-tail store to a logistics and service provider for a flat fee per
managed item. In the third strategy the provider manages the operations of the e-channel
and gains a share of the channel’s revenue and a fee per managed item. Under each
strategy, we present a profit maximization model to select the optimal inventory level in
each channel while considering both same- and cross-channel returns. To make the
analysis of the different strategies tractable, the retailer demand is assumed to follow the
uniform distribution.
Our study shows that as customer preference to the retail store increases, the
inventory level increases in the retail store and decreases in the e-tail store with different
proportions. Those proportions, greatly, depend on channels’ prices, channels’ total return
rate and the e-channel’s logistical effort. Consequently, the total order quantity for both
channels changes as customer preference for a certain channel changes. That is to say,
running a dual channel retailing system would not just divide the inventory level between
the channels, but would also change its level. We, also, compared the e-channel’s
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performance under the aforementioned strategies. We found it to be better under the flatbased fee or gain sharing strategies when the channel’s total return rate is high. However,
we found it to be better under the transaction-based fee when the channel’s total return
rate is low. While the logistics provider always preforms better under the gain sharing
strategy compared to the flat-based fee strategy, the retailer’s performance greatly
depends on his share from the e-channel’s gain.
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CHAPTER 7:

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
RESEARCH

7.1

Conclusion

Many retailers are adopting a dual-channel retailing strategy in which products are
offered through two channels: physical stores and online stores. Due to regulations or
competitive measures, such a strategy allows customers who find a purchase
unsatisfactory to obtain a full refund through a same-channel return (i.e., purchasing an
item from a physical store and returning it to the same physical store or purchasing an
item from an online store and returning it to the same online store) or a cross-channel
return (i.e., purchasing an item from an online store and returning it to a physical store).
Therefore, the objective of this dissertation is to analyze the problem of customer returns
under a dual-channel retailing system. The main goal is to investigate the different crosschannel return practices or polices, examine several outsourcing options for the
management of the online store’s operations, and to develop proper methodologies of
inventory control management, price management and responsiveness level management.
In Chapter 3 we captured competition and goals conflict that may develop
between stores due to cannibalization in sales, scarce resources, or tight objectives. The
optimal pricing policies for a centralized and decentralized dual-channel retailer with
same- and cross-channel returns are studied. We considered two factors: dual-channel
retailer performance under centralization with unified and differential pricing schemes,
and dual-channel retailer performance under decentralization with the Stackelberg and
Nash games. In this study, a channel’s sales requests was modeled as a linear function of
a channel’s own pricing strategy and a cross-channel’s pricing strategy.
Due to the high number of customer returns, one of the online store’s important
post-purchase services is the responsiveness level of its reverse supply chain. This level
greatly influences customer demand, customer loyalty, service expenses, and return
resalability. Also, an online store may fulfill the role of a retailer’s distribution center. It
is not limited to a certain geographical neighbourhood and it is less constrained to area
compared to a physical store. Therefore, it has the capability and the need to optimize its
responsiveness level along its pricing strategy. Consequently, Chapter 4 is an extension of
Chapter 3 and it helps retailers expand their horizon a step further when dealing with
customer returns in a dual-channel context. In Chapter 4, a channel’s sales requests was
modified so that it is a linear function of a channel’s own price, a cross-channel’s price,
and the online store’s responsiveness level. While theoretical game frameworks are
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addressed in regards to competition between channels, unified and differential pricing
strategies are addressed in regards to integration.
Identifying the optimal order quantity through the use of the newsvendor model is
a tangible problem in the field of supply chain management. As customers are able to
return their purchases and a high percentage of those returns are considered as good as
new and resalable, many retailers seem to overestimate their order quantities. Thus,
researchers have expanded the newsvendor model to include customer returns. However,
the complications that customer returns impose on the optimal quantities of a dualchannel retailer have not yet been sufficiently studied. In this context, cross-channel
returns may destabilize the retailing system and retailers may simultaneously
overestimate one channel and underestimate another. Thus, in Chapter 5 we developed
newsvendor models that considered both same- and cross-channel returns experienced by
a dual-channel retailer. Four strategies that may be used to handle cross-channel returns
were studied. The first strategy was to collect all cross-channel returns on a regular basis
and to send them back to the online store. The second strategy was to ban cross-channel
returns. The third and fourth strategies were to transfer the ownership of all cross-channel
returns to the physical store under decentralized and centralized management styles,
respectively.
Due to the continuously growing global recession, many dual-channel retailers
focus on their core competencies while outsourcing e-stores’ logistical activities to thirdparty logistics and service providers. In Chapter 6, we studied three strategies that can be
used to handle orders and customer returns under the context of a dual-channel retailing
system. The first strategy is the transaction-based fee, where a retailer handles all
logistical activities using his own fleet or pays a logistics and service provider a per
deliver fee. The second strategy is the flat-based fee, where a retailer hand over the
logistical operation of his e-tail store to a logistics and service provider for a flat fee per
managed item. In the third strategy the provider manages the operations of the e-channel
and gains a share of the channel’s revenue and a fee per managed item. Under each
strategy, we present a profit maximization model to select the optimal inventory level in
each channel while considering both same- and cross-channel returns.

7.2

Future Research

In Section 7.2 we will consider some of the possible avenues researchers may take
to expand the knowledge of multi-channel retailers who are offering customer returns as a
competitive business strategy.
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Multiple items: This dissertation considers a retailer that offers a single item to
customers. In reality, a retailing business contains thousands of items under the same
return policy. Thus, considering a system with multiple items would be a beneficial
extension of this work. The decision process of selecting the ideal cross-channel return
policy would be more realistic as it considers customers’ behaviours with regards to the
whole retailing system.
Multiple physical stores: In this study one physical store is considered to represent
the offline channel. However, retailers may posses several physical stores in the same
geographical region. Purchases from a physical store can be cross-returned to another
physical store in the same city in a regular bases. The assumptions in this study could be
extended to include such a notion.
Two-echelon system: A supplier of a dual-channel retailer was not considered in
problem formulation of this study. Therefore, it is interesting to see Chapter 5 extended to
include a two-echelon system where the retailer study the option of retuning
unsatisfactory items directly to the supplier. Indeed, such a return process will deprive the
retailer from being able to resell returns. The retailer should clarify under what contract or
agreement this process is optimal.
Partial refund policy: Several researchers support a partial refund rather than a full
refund policy. Such a policy can be implemented by charging unsatisfied customers a
restocking fee or shipping fee. Thus, another beneficial extension of this study is to
optimize the refund policy along the other decision variables in each channel. It is trivial
to notice that return rates and total sales are policy dependant. For example, if
unsatisfactory online purchases should be shipped to the online store at the expense of
customers, then such a return policy might provoke customers to return items to the
physical store instead. Thus, an increase in the rate of cross-channel returns might be
experienced. Also, a noticeable reduction in the online store’s total sales will be observed.
System with more uncertain parameters: Today’s business environment is full of
uncertainties. Thus, extending Chapter 3 and 4 to include sales uncertainty could be
helpful to retailers. Chapters 3 – 6 may also be extended to include uncertainty in the
different return rates. Also, uncertain sales in Chapters 5 and uncertain demand in
Chapters 6 are assumed to follow uniform distributions wherein all possible outcomes are
equally likely. However, this may not be the case and a distribution with a most likely
outcome will be more realistic. Therefore, future works may conduct similar studies with
triangular or normal distributions.
Sales distribution over a selling season: In this dissertation, resalable returns are
those that were returned before the end of the selling season and in their original
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packaging and condition. Since this study does not include the distribution of sales over a
selling season, there might be no demand to consume some of those returns. The problem
is even amplified when cross-channel returns are considered. Thus, it is helpful to see
such an impact on the optimal cross-channel return policy.
Dealing with returns: Having the ability to resell returns several times in a selling
season is not applicable to a wide rage of products. Thus, more realistic assumptions and
models could be used to better study customer returns. For example, a multi-period
setting could be investigated. Indeed, demand range and variability along that range is
different from a period to another as customers develop more knowledge about a product.
Also, customer acceptance to a certain product may not be known at the beginning of the
selling season. Thus, attempting to resell a return could be related to the popularity of the
product especially when the retailer is limited in space.
Stock-out substitution: One of the limitations in this study is not considering stockout substitution where a channel’s customers seek to purchase from the other channel
when stock-out occurs. It is interesting to see the effect of such a fact on cross-channel
return policies. Also, this substitution may have a noticeable impact on the retailer and
provider behaviours, especially when customers are product loyal rather than channel
loyal.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Proof of CHAPTER 3’s propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1 (Part i) and Proposition 3.3 (Part i)
First proof must be provided that 𝑝! > 𝑐 and 𝑝! > 𝑐. Since revenue that is generated by
satisfying a single sale should be positive and for the worst-case scenario (𝑐 = 𝑐𝑘!" +
1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑 and 𝑠 = 𝑐), the following is true.
From (3.15 and 3.23), 𝑝! >

!!! !!! !! !!!! !! !!!!! !!! !!!" ! !!!!" !!!
!!!!!

For the worst case scenario, 𝑝! >
From (3.15 and 3.24), 𝑝! >

!!! !!! !!"
!!!!!

.

+ 𝑐, thus 𝑝! > 𝑐.

!"!! !!!! !! !!!!! !
.
!!!

For the worst case scenario, 𝑝! >

!"
!!!

+ 𝑐, thus 𝑝! > 𝑐.

The first condition for the profit functions is then taken with respect to the rate of samechannel-return (𝑤 or 𝑟).
!
!!!!!

!"
!
!!!!!

!"

!

!
!!!!!

=

!"
!

!
!!!!!

=

!"

= 𝐷! 𝑠 + 𝑐𝑘! − 𝑝! + 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑠𝑘!
= 𝐷! 𝑠 + 𝑐𝑘! − 𝑝! + 𝑑 + 𝑠𝑘!

For the worst-case scenario, assume that 𝑠 is as high as 𝑐, and 𝑑 and 𝑡 are as low as zero.
Thus,
!
!!!!!

!"
!
!!!!!

!"

!

!
!!!!!

=

!"
!

!
!!!!!

=

!"

= 𝐷! 𝑐 − 𝑝! < 0
= 𝐷! 𝑐 − 𝑝! < 0

A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1 (Part ii)
Substitute sales functions into (3.16). Thus,
! ! !!!
!!!!
! ! !!!
!!!!

= −2𝛽𝐼 < 0
= −2𝛽𝐽 < 0

! ! !!!
!!! !!

! ! !!!

= !!

! ! !!! ! ! !!!
!!!! !!!!

! !!

−

=𝛾 𝐼+𝐽
! ! !!!

!!! !!

!

= 4𝛽 ! 𝐼𝐽 − 𝛾 ! 𝐼 + 𝐽 ! .

Thus, if 4𝛽 ! 𝐼𝐽 ≥ 𝛾 ! 𝐼 + 𝐽 ! , then the function is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝! and
𝑝! .
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!!!!

= 0, thus 𝑝!! =

!!!
!!!!

= 0, thus 𝑝!! =

!!!

A.3

!"!! !! ! !! !!! !!"!! !!! !!! !"!! !! ! !!
!!"! ! !! ! !!! !
!"!! !! ! !! !!! !!"!! !!! !!! !"!! !! ! !!
!!"! ! !! ! !!! !

Proof of Proposition 3.2

Substitute sales functions into (3.16) with 𝑝! = 𝑝! = 𝑝. Thus,
! ! !!!
!!!

= −2 𝛽 − 𝛾 𝐼 + 𝐽 < 0.

Thus, the profit function is strictly concave in 𝑝. Therefore,
!!!!

!

!!! !! !!! !!! !!!! !

= 0, thus 𝑝!! = !

!!

!!! !!!

.

A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3 (Part ii)
Substitute sales functions into (3.25) and (3.26). Thus,
Given 𝑝!
!

From (3.26),
!

!!! !
!!!

! ! !! !
!!!!

!

= −2𝛽𝐼 < 0. Thus, 𝜋! ! is concave in 𝑝! .
! !!

= 0, thus 𝑝 !! 𝑝! = !

!

+

!!
!

+

!! !"
!"

!

+ ! 𝑝!

After substituting the value of 𝑝 !! 𝑝! into (3.25),

!

! ! !! !
!!!!

=

! ! ! !!! !
!

< 0 because 𝛽 ≥ 𝛾.

!

Thus, 𝜋! ! is concave in 𝑝! and there exist a unique Stackelberg equilibrium.
!

!!! !
!!!

!

= 0, thus 𝑝 !! = !!! +

!! !

! !

!! ! !! !

+ ! !!!!!!! + !!

!! !"
!! ! !! !

+ !!

!! ! !!
!! ! !! !

Substitute 𝑝 !! into 𝑝 !! 𝑝! gives
! !!
!

𝑝 !! = !
A.5

+

!!

!!

+ !!"! +

!

!! !
!! ! !! !

+ !!

!! ! !
!! ! !! !

+ !!

!! ! !
!! ! !! !

Proof of Proposition 3.4

Substitute sales functions into (3.25) and (3.26). Thus,
!

! ! !! !
!!!!

!

! ! !! !
!!!!

= −2𝐼𝛽 < 𝑜
= −2𝐽𝛽 < 𝑜

!

! ! !! !
!!! !!!
!

! ! !! !
!!! !!!

= 𝐽𝛾
= 𝐼𝛾

!
!
! ! !! ! ! ! !! !

!!!!

!!!!

!

!

! ! !! ! ! ! !! !

− !!

! !!!

!!! !!!

= 𝐼𝐽 4𝛽 ! − 𝛾 ! > 0
102

+ !!"

!! ! !!
!! ! !! !

+

!! !"
!"

Since 𝛽 > 𝛾, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the game.
!

!!! !
!!!
!

!!! !
!!!

= 0, thus 𝑝! 𝑝! =

!!! !!!! !!!!! !!!!!

= 0, thus 𝑝! 𝑝! =

!!! !!!! !!!!!

!!"

!!"

By simultaneously solving the two equations, an equilibrium point is reached. Thus,
𝑝!! =
𝑝!! =

!
!! ! !! !
!
!! ! !! !

2𝛽𝛼! + 𝛾𝛼! +
2𝛽𝛼! + 𝛾𝛼! +

!! ! !!
!!
!! ! !!
!

+
+

!! ! !!
!
!!!!
!

+

+
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!!"!!!
!

!! ! !!
!

.

−

!!!
!!

Appendix B. Proof of CHAPTER 4’s propositions
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞)
Substitute sales function into (4.7). Thus,
!

!
𝐻 !!!
=

! ! ! !!!!
!!!!

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

!!!!

!!! !!!

! ! ! !!!!
!!! !"

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

!!! !!!

!!!!

!!! !"

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

!"!!!

!"!!!

!! !

−2𝛽𝐽
𝜆 𝐽+𝐼
−𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐 + 𝜌𝐽

=

𝜆 𝐽+𝐼
−2𝛽𝐼
𝜆𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝜌𝐼

−𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐 + 𝜌𝐽
𝜆𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝜌𝐼
−𝜂 + 2𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐

= −2𝛽𝐽 < 0

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

!!!!

!!! !!!

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

!!! !!!

!!!!

= 4𝐼𝐽𝛽 ! − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼

!

!

!
𝐻 !!!
= −𝜂 + 2𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐 4𝛽 ! 𝐽𝐼 − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼

!

− 2𝜆 𝐽 + 𝐼 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝜌𝐽 𝜆𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝜌𝐼 + 2𝛽 𝐽 𝜆𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝜌𝐼

Thus, under the conditions 4𝐼𝐽𝛽 ! − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼

!

!

+ 𝐼 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝜌𝐽

!

!

!
> 0 and 𝐻 !!!
< 0 the profit function is

strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝! , 𝑝! and 𝑒. As stated earlier, the value of 𝜂 can be
associated with the cost of signing new contracts, hiring more employees, and/or
incorporating more reliable technologies. Consequently, it is realistic that 𝜂 will derive
!

!
the value of 𝐻 !!!
to be negative.

Selling Resalable Returns Once (𝜺 = 𝟏)
Substitute sales function into (4.6). Thus,
!!
𝐻 !!!

=

! ! ! !!!!
!!!!

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

!!!!

!!! !!!

!!! !"

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

!!! !!!

!!!!

!!! !"

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

!"!!!

!"!!!

!! !

! ! ! !!!!

!!! !!!

!!!!

−𝜂 −
𝜌𝐼

!

𝜆 𝐽+𝐼

𝜆 𝐽+𝐼

=
−

!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

−

−2𝛽𝐼
!"#$

+ 𝜌𝐽

!!!"!!"# !

!"#$
!!!"!!"# !
!"#$

!!!"!!"# !

− 𝜌𝐼

−𝜂 −

!! ! ! ! !!!
!!!"!!"# !

+ 𝜌𝐽

− 𝜌𝐼

+

!!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

= −2𝛽𝐽 < 0

! ! ! !!!!
!!!!
! ! ! !!!!
!!
𝐻 !!!

−2𝛽𝐽

!!! !!!
! ! ! !!!!

= 4𝐼𝐽𝛽 ! − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼

!

=
!! ! ! ! !!!
!!!"!!"# !

+𝐼

+

!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

!!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

− 𝜌𝐽

4𝛽 ! 𝐽𝐼 − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼

!

− 2𝜆 𝐽 + 𝐼

!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

− 𝜌𝐼

!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

− 𝜌𝐼 + 2𝛽 𝐽

!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

−

!

It is required that 4𝐼𝐽𝛽 ! − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼

!

!

!
> 0. Also, if 𝐷! is set to be zero and 𝐻 !!!
is

calculated to be negative for all values of 𝑒 ∈ − 𝑎 𝑏 , 1 − 𝑎 𝑏 , then profit function is
strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝! , 𝑝! and 𝑒 within the feasible region. Since the value of 𝜂
is normally high, the above conditions are satisfied naturally when virtual system
parameters are used.
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B.2

Proof of Proposition 4.2

Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞)
Substitute sales function into (4.7), and set 𝑝! = 𝑝! = 𝑝. Thus,
! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!
!! !

! ! ! !!!!

!! !

!"!#

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

!"!#

!! !

!

!
𝐻 !!!
=

−2 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝐼 + 𝐽
−𝑤𝑏 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝑐 − 𝜌 𝐼 − 𝐽

=

−𝑤𝑏 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝑐 − 𝜌 𝐼 − 𝐽
−𝜂 + 2𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐

= −2 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝐼 + 𝐽 < 0

!

!
𝐻 !!!
= 2 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝐼 + 𝐽 𝜂 − 2𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐 −

!

𝛽 − 𝜆 𝑤𝑏𝑐 + 𝜌 𝐼 − 𝐽

!

!
Thus, under the condition 𝐻 !!!
> 0 the profit function is strictly and jointly concave in

𝑝 and 𝑒.
Selling Resalable Returns Once (𝜺 = 𝟏)
Substitute sales function into (4.6), and set 𝑝! = 𝑝! = 𝑝. Thus,
!!
𝐻!!!

=

! ! ! !!!!
!! !

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

!! !

!"!#

! ! ! !!!!

! ! ! !!!!

!"!#

!! !

−2 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝐼 + 𝐽

=

!" !!! !

−

−

−𝜌 𝐼−𝐽

!!!"!!"# !

−𝜂 −

!" !!! !
!!!"!!"# !

−𝜌 𝐼−𝐽

!!! ! ! ! !!
!!!"!!"# !

+

!!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

= −2 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝐼 + 𝐽 < 0

!

!
𝐻!!!
=2 𝛽−𝜆 𝐼+𝐽

𝜂+

!!! ! ! ! !!
!!!"!!"# !

−

!!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

!

!
If 𝐷! is set to be zero and 𝐻!!!

!!! !"#
!!!"!!"# !

−

!

+𝜌 𝐼−𝐽

is calculated to be positive for all values

𝑒 ∈ − 𝑎 𝑏 , 1 − 𝑎 𝑏 , then the profit function is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝 and 𝑒
within the feasible region.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3
From (4.26).
!

!
! ! ! !!!

!
𝐻!!!
=

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!!!!

!!!!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!!! !"

!
! ! ! !!!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!"!!!

!! !

= −𝐽

!
𝐻!!!
=𝐽

!

!! ! !!!

−

𝜂 − 𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐

!

!! ! !!!

−𝐽

−

!

!"# !! ! !!!
!!

+ 𝐽𝜌 1 −

!
!!

!"# !! ! !!!
!!

!

+ 𝐽𝜌 1 − !!

−𝜂 + 𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐

!!!!
!

<0

!

!! ! !!!

=

!!!!
!

−

!"# !! ! !!!
!!

− 𝐽𝜌 1 −

!

!

!!

!

!
!
Thus, under the conditions 𝐻!!!
> 0 the online store’s profit function 𝜋 !!!
is strictly

and jointly concave in 𝑝! and 𝑒.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4.4
From (4.30):
!

!
! ! ! !!!

!
𝐻!!!
=

!!!!
!!
! ! ! !!!
!"!!!

−𝐽

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!!! !"
!

!
! ! ! !!!

!! !

=

−

!! ! !!!

−

!

!"# !! ! !!!
!! !!!"!!"# !

+

! !!!"!!"#

!" !!!!
!!

!"# !! ! !!!
!! !!!"!!"# !
!"#$ !!!!

𝛼! − 𝑝!
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!! ! !!!
!!

+

!

!!

!

!

+

!!!!
!

+

+

!" !!!!
!!

−𝜂−
!

!"!!!!
!"

+

!" !!!!
!!

!!! ! ! !
!!!"!!"# !

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!! ! !!!

= −𝐽

!!!!

!
𝐻!!!
=𝐽

<0

!

!! ! !!!

𝜂 + 𝛼! − 𝑝!

!

!! ! !!!
!!

+

!

!!

!

!

+

!!!!
!

+

!"!!!!
!"

+

!!! ! ! !
!!!"!!"# !

!" !!!!
!!

−

!"#$ !!!!
! !!!"!!"# !

−

!"# !! ! !!!
!! !!!"!!"# !

−

!

!" !!!!
!!

!
If 𝑝! is high enough, then 𝐻!!!
could be negative. Thus, the online store’s profit
!

!
function 𝜋!!!
is indefinite with respect to 𝑝! and 𝑒 and hence is not strictly and jointly

concave in 𝑝! and 𝑒.
B.5

Proof of Proposition 4.5

Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞)
Substitute sales functions into (4.19) and (4.20). Thus,
!

!
! ! ! !!!

!!!!

!
𝐻!!!
=

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!
! ! ! !!!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!!! !"

!!! !!!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!"!!!

!! !

!"!!!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!!! !!!

!!! !"

!

−2𝐽𝛽
= 𝐽𝜌 − 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐
𝐼𝜆

𝐽𝜌 − 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐
−𝜂 + 2𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐
−𝐼𝜌

𝐽𝜆
𝜆𝑤𝑏𝑐
−2𝐼𝛽

!!!!

= −2𝐽𝛽 < 0

!!!!
!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!
! ! ! !!!

!!!!

!!! !"

!
! ! ! !!!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!

!"!!!

!! !

!!
! ! ! !!!
!!!!

!
= 𝐻!!!
= 2𝐽𝛽 𝜂 − 2𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝐽𝜌 − 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐

!

= −2𝐼𝛽 < 0

!
𝐻!!!
= −𝐼𝐽

4𝛽 ! − 𝜆! 𝜂 + 𝜌𝜆 𝐽𝜌 − 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐 + 2𝜆𝑤𝑏𝑐

+ 2𝐼𝐽𝛽𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐 4𝛽 − 𝜆 + 2𝐼𝛽 𝐽𝜌 − 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐

!

+ 𝐼𝜆! 𝑤𝑏𝑐 𝐽𝜌 − 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐

!
If 𝐻!!!
> 0, then the online store’s profit function is concave on the store’s own

decision variables. Intuitively, the physical store’s profit function is concave on the
!
store’s own decision variable. If 𝐻!!!
< 0, then there exist a unique Nash equilibrium.

Selling Resalable Returns Once (𝜺 = 𝟏)
Substitute sales functions (4.21) and (4.22). Thus,
!

!
! ! ! !!!

!!!!
!

!
! ! ! !!!

!
𝐻!!!
=

!"!!!
!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!!!!

−𝐼𝐽

!! !
!

!!! !"

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!"!!!

−2𝐽𝛽
= 𝐽𝜌 −

!

!
! ! ! !!!

𝐽𝜌 −

!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

−𝜂 −

!!! ! ! ! !!
!!!"!!"# !

𝐼𝜆

!!!!

!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

+

𝐽𝜆

!!"#$

!"#$

!!!"!!"# !

!!!"!!"# !

−𝐼𝜌

−2𝐼𝛽

= −2𝐽𝛽 < 0

!! !

!
𝐻!!!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!!! !!!

!"!!!

!!!!

!!! !!!

!
! ! ! !!!

!
! ! ! !!!

!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!!! !"

!
! ! ! !!!

!!
! ! ! !!!
!!!!
!!
! ! ! !!!

!
! ! ! !!!

!

!
! ! ! !!!

!

!!! !"
!

!
! ! ! !!!

!
= 𝐻!!!
= 2𝐽𝛽 𝜂 +

!!! ! ! ! !!
!!!"!!"# !

−

!!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

− 𝐽𝜌 −

!
!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

= −2𝐼𝛽 < 0
=

4𝛽 ! − 𝜆!

𝜂+

!!! ! ! ! !!
!!!"!!"# !

+ 𝜆𝜌 𝐽𝜌 +

!"# !!!!
!!!"!!"# !

+

!!"#$%&' !!!!
!!!"!!"# !
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+ 2𝐼𝛽𝐽𝜌 −

!"#$ !! ! !!!
!!!"!!"# !

𝐽𝜌 −

!"#$
!!!"!!"# !

!
If 𝐷! is set to be zero and 𝐻!!!

is calculated to be positive for all values

𝑒 ∈ − 𝑎 𝑏 , 1 − 𝑎 𝑏 , then the online store’s profit function is strictly and jointly
concave in 𝑝! and 𝑒 within the feasible region. Also, the physical store’s profit function is
!
concave in 𝑝! . If 𝐻!!!
< 0 under all values 𝑒 ∈ − 𝑎 𝑏 , 1 − 𝑎 𝑏 and 𝐷! = 0, then

there exist a unique Nash equilibrium at the most within the feasible region.
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Appendix C. Proof of CHAPTER 5’s propositions and corollaries
C.1 Proof of Proposition 5.1
The profit function (5.1) is reformulated as:
!

𝜋!!" 𝑄! = 𝑝!!" − !

!

𝑝!!" 𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑠 𝑄!

!
𝑥 𝑓
!! !! ! !

!

𝜇! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 𝑄! − 𝑝!!" + 𝑔 − !
!
𝑓
!! !! !

!

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! +

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!

Then,
!"
!!!

!!!

!
𝑓
!! !! !

= 𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑝!!" 𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑠

!"
! ! !!

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!

A unique optimal solution for profit function (5.1) exists. If
𝑄!!" ∗

!"
! ! !!

= −𝜂! 𝑝!!" 𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝜂! 𝑄! . Since 𝑝!!" > 𝑠 and 𝜂! ≥ 1, then

!!!!

=

!
!!

𝐹!!!

!!
!!!

!!!!

<0

= 0, then

!!!

!
!!
!
!!!" !!!
!!

!!!" !!!

Additionally, profit function (5.2) is reformulated as
!

𝜋!!" 𝑄! = 𝑝! − !
𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑄!

!
𝑓
!! !! !

!

𝜇! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 𝑄! − 𝑝! + 𝑔 − !

!

!

!
𝑥 𝑓
!! !! ! !

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! + 𝑝! 𝛿! +

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!

Then,
!!!!"
!!!

= 𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑝! 𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠

! ! !!!"

!
𝑓
!! !! !

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! , and

= −𝛿! 𝑝! 𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝛿! 𝑄! . Since 𝑝! > 𝑠 and 𝛿! ≥ 1, then

!!!!

A unique optimal solution for profit function (5.2) exists. If
𝑄!!" ∗

=

!
!!

𝐹!!!

!!!!"
!!!

! ! !!!"
!!!!

<0

= 0, then

!
!!
!
!! !!!
!!

!! !!!

C.2 Proof of Proposition 5.2
The profit function (5.5) is reformulated as:
𝜋!!" 𝑄! =
!

𝑝!!" − !

!

𝛼−𝑔 1−𝛼

𝑝!!" 𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑠 𝑄!

!

𝜇! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 𝑄! − 𝑝!!" + 𝑔 − !

!
𝑓
!! !! !

𝑦! 𝑑𝑦!

Then,
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!

!
𝑦𝑓
!! !! ! !

𝑦! 𝑑𝑦! +

!"
!!!

= 𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑝!!" 𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑠

!!!

!"
! ! !!

!!!!

!
𝑓
!! !! !

𝑦! 𝑑𝑦! , and

= −𝜂! 𝑝!!" 𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝜂! 𝑄! . Since 𝑝!!! > 𝑠 and 𝜂! ≥ 1, then

A unique optimal solution for profit function (5.5) exists. If
𝑄!!" ∗

!

=

C.3

𝐹!!!

!!

!"
!!!

!!!

!"
! ! !!

!!!!

< 0.

= 0, then

!
!!
!
!!!" !!!
!!

!!!" !!!

Proof of Corollary 5.1

For 1 ≥ 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 ≥ 0 to hold true, then from (5.14) the relationship 𝑝!!" ≥ 𝑝!!" is true.
Thus, 𝑥 = 𝑝!!" 𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! ≥ 𝑦 = 𝑝!!" 𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! . Based on 𝑥 and 𝑦 values, equation (5.13)
can be rewritten as: 𝛼 =

!!! !!!
!!! !!!

≤ 1. The previous relationship is only satisfied when

𝑥 ≤ 𝑦. That is a contradiction with our previous assumption. Thus, 1 ≥ 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 ≥ 0 at all
reasonable values.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 5.3
The profit function (5.7) is reformulated as:
!

𝜋!! 𝑄! = 𝑝!! − !

!

!
𝑓
!! !! !

𝑔𝜆! − 𝑠 𝑄!

!

𝜇! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 𝑄! − 𝑝!! + 𝑔 − !

!

!
𝑥 𝑓
!! !! ! !

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! + 𝑝!! 𝜆! +

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!

Then,
!
!!!

!!!

= 𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑝!! 𝜆! + 𝑔𝜆! − 𝑠

!
! ! !!

!!!!

!
𝑓
!! !! !

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! , and

= −𝜆! 𝑝!! 𝜆! + 𝑔𝜆! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝜆! 𝑄! < 0. Since 𝑝!! > 𝑠 and 𝜆! ≥ 1, then

A unique optimal solution for the profit function (5.7) exists. If
∗
𝑄!!

!

=

!!

𝐹!!!

!
!!
!
!!! !!!
!!

!!! !!!

The profit function (5.9) is reformulated as:
𝜋!! 𝑄! =
!

𝑝! − !

!

𝜇! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 𝑄! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 𝑄!" −
!

𝑝! + 𝑔 − !

!

!
!! !! !!!" !!"

𝑥! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! +

𝑝! 𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑄! + 𝑘!! 𝑄!"

!
!! !! !!!" !!"
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𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!

!
!!!

!!!

!
! ! !!

= 0, then

!!!!

< 0.

!!!!

!
!! !! !!!" !!"

= 𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑝! 𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠

!!!

! ! !!!
!!!!
! ! !!!
!!!!

𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! , and

= −𝛿! 𝑝! 𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!" . Since 𝑝! > 𝑠 and 𝛿! ≥ 1, then
< 0.

A unique optimal solution for the profit function (5.9) exists. If
∗
𝑄!!

=

!
!!

𝐹!!!

!
!!
!
!! !!!
!!

!! !!!

!!!!
!!!

= 0, then

− 𝑘!" 𝑄!"

C.5 Proof of Proposition 5.4
The profit function (5.12) is reformulated as:
!

𝜋 ! 𝑄! , 𝑄! = 𝑝!! − !
!

𝑝!! + 𝑔 − !

!

!
𝑥 𝑓
!! !! ! !

!
!! !! !!!" !!"

!
!!

!

!

𝜇! + 𝑝! − !

!

𝜇! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 𝑄! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 𝑄! + 𝑠𝑘!" 𝑄!" −

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! + 𝑝!! 𝜆! + 𝑔𝜆! − 𝑠 𝑄!

!
𝑓
!! !! !

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! − 𝑝! + 𝑔 −

𝑥! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! +

𝑝! 𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!"

!
!! !! !!!" !!"

𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! .

Then,
!!!
!!!

!! !!
!!!!
!!!
!!!

= 𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑣𝑘!" 𝜆! 𝑠

!! !!

𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! ,

= −𝛿! 𝑝! 𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!" ,
!
𝑓
!! !! !

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! + 𝑝!! 𝜆! + 𝑔𝜆! − 𝑠

!
𝑓
!! !! !

𝑣𝑘!" 𝜆! 𝑝! 𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠
!!!!

!
!! !! !!!" !!"

= 𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑝! 𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠

!
!! !! !!!" !!"

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!

!
𝑓
!! !! !

𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! , and

=

−𝜆! 𝑝!! 𝜆! + 𝑔𝜆! + 𝑠𝑣𝑘!" 𝜆! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝜆! 𝑄! −
𝑣𝑘!" 𝜆!! 𝑝! 𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠
𝛿! 𝑘!" 𝑣

!
𝑓
!! !! !

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!

𝑓! 𝜆! 𝑄!
!

!
!! !! !!!" !!"

𝑓! 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!"

Since 𝑝! & 𝑝!! > 𝑠 and 𝛿! & 𝜆! ≥ 1, then

!! !!
!!!!

𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! +
.

<0&
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!! !!
!!!!

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! +

< 0.

!! !!

Also, !!

! !!!

= −𝑣𝑘!" 𝜆! 𝛿! 𝑝! 𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!"

!
𝑓
!! !! !

𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! .

Thus,
!! !! !! !!
!!!!

!!!!

!! !!

−

!

!!! !!!

𝑔𝜆! + 𝑠𝑣𝑘!" 𝜆! − 𝑠 + 𝑣𝑘!" 𝜆! 𝑝! 𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠
Since

!! !! !! !!
!!!! !!!!

−

!! !!
!!! !!!

!
!! !! !!!" !!"

𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!

.

!

is positive, then the profit function is strictly and jointly

concave on 𝑄! and 𝑄! , and a unique global maximum exists.
!!!

!!!

!

!

If !! = !! = 0, then
∗
𝑄!!

=

!
!!

𝐹!!!

𝑝!! 𝜆! +

= 𝛿! 𝜆! 𝑝! 𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝜆! 𝑄! 𝑓! 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!" 𝑄!"

!
!!
!
!! !!!
!!

!! !!!

− 𝑘!" 𝑄!" and

∗
𝑄!!

=
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!
!!

𝐹!!!

!
!!
!
!!! !!!!!!" !!
!!

!!! !!!!!!" !!

.

Appendix D. Proof of CHAPTER 6’s propositions and corollaries
D.1 Proof of Proposition 6.1
We can rework function (6.1) to be as follows:
𝜋!! 𝑄! = 𝜃 𝑝!! − 𝑠!
Thus,

! ! !!!

=−

!!!!

!!!
!

!!! !!! !!!
! !!!

− 𝑤 − 𝑠! 𝑄! +

!!! !!! !!!
! !!!

2𝑏𝑄! −

!!!
!

− 𝜃𝑏 ! .
!!!

< 0 and the function is strictly concave in 𝑄! . By solving !!! =
!

0, one may find the optimal inventory level

𝑄!! .

Also, we can rework function (6.2) to be as follows:
𝜋!! 𝑄! = 𝜃 𝑝!! − 𝑠!
Thus,

! ! !!!

=−

!!!!

!!!
!

!!! !!! !!!
! !!!

− 𝑤 − 𝑠! 𝑄! +

!!! !!! !!!
! !!!

2𝑏𝑄! −

!!!
!

− 𝜃𝑏 ! .
!!!

< 0 and the function is strictly concave in 𝑄! . By solving !!! =
!

0, one may find the optimal inventory level

𝑄!! .

D.2 Proof of Proposition 6.2
For the e-tail store decision we rewrite equation (6.3) as the following:
𝜋!! 𝑄! 𝐹 = 𝜃 𝑝!! − 𝑠!
! ! !!!

Given 𝐹,

!!!!

=−

!!!
!

− 𝑤 + 𝐹 − 𝑠! 𝑄! +

!!! !!! !!!
! !!!

!!! !!! !!!
! !!!

2𝑏𝑄! −

!!!
!

− 𝜃𝑏 ! .

< 0 and the function is strictly concave in 𝑄! . By

!!!

solving !!! = 0, one may find the best response function for the e-tail store 𝑄!! .
!

D.3

Proof of Proposition 6.3
!

Equation (6.4) can be rewritten as 𝜋!! 𝐹 = 𝑄! 𝐹 − 𝜃𝑐𝜇 − ! !!! 2𝑏𝑄! −
Thus,

! ! !!!
!! !

= −2

! !!!
!
!!! !!! !!!

!!!
!

− 𝜃𝑏 ! .

!

𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! − ! . Knowing the following: 𝑐 = ℎ! 1 + 𝑟!
!

and ℎ! > ℎ! , one may conclude that 𝑝!! − ! > 𝑝!! > 𝑤 > 𝑆! . Therefore,
function is strictly concave in 𝐹. By solving

!!!!
!"

! ! !!!
!! !

< 0 and the

= 0, one may find the optimal seasonal

fee 𝐹! .
D.4

Proof of Corollary 6.1

We assume the opposite is true, thus 𝐹! >

! !!! !!! !!!
!!!

− 𝑤 − 𝑠! . By substituting the

value of 𝐹! in the previous inequality and performing basic algebra we get
!!!!
!!! !!! !!! !!

. Since 𝑐 = ℎ! 1 + 𝑟!

!
!!!

<

and ℎ! > ℎ! , thus, 𝑝!! − 𝑐 > 𝑝!! > 𝑤 > 𝑆! . Thus,
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!
!!!

!!!!

≥ 1, and !! !!

! !!! !!

!

< 1. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction and Corollary 6.1 is

always true.
D.5 Proof of Proposition 6.4
The e-tail channel’s profit function, i.e. equation (6.5), can be rewritten as:
𝜋!" = 𝑝!! − 𝑠! 𝜃𝜇 + 𝑠! − 𝑤 𝑄! +
! ! !!!

Given 𝐹,

!!!!

∅ !!! !!! !!!

= −!

!!! !!! !!!

2𝑏𝑄! −

! !!!

!!!
!

− 𝑏! 𝜃 .

< 0 and the function is strictly concave in 𝑄! . By

!!!

!!!

solving !!! = 0, one may find the best response function for the e-tail store 𝑄!! .
!

Substitute the value of 𝑄!! in the function 𝜋!! . Since,
function is strictly concave in 𝐹. By solving

!!!!
!"

! ! !!!
!! !

! !!! ∅!!

= − ∅!

!!! !!! !!!

< 0, then

= 0, one may find the optimal seasonal

fee 𝐹! .
D.6

Proof of Corollary 6.2

We assume the opposite is true, thus 𝐹! > ∅

! !!! !!! !!!
!!!

− 𝑤 − 𝑠!

. By substituting

the value of 𝐹! in the previous inequality and performing basic algebra we get ∅ > ∅ + 1.
Therefore, there is a contradiction and Corollary 6.2 is always true.
D.7 Proof of Corollary 6.3
We proof this corollary by contradiction. Thus, assume that the opposite is true, i.e.
𝐹! ≥ 𝐹! . Since

!!!
!∅

is positive, then 𝐹! will have its highest value at ∅ = 1. By substituting

the values of 𝐹 ! and 𝐹 ! into the inequality 𝐹! ≥ 𝐹! when ∅ = 1, one may find the
following relationship:
𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!

!

𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! − ! ≥ 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!

!

+

!!!! !!! !
!!

. Since 𝑝!! ≥ 𝑝!! ,

then it is a necessity that 𝐿𝐻𝑆 ≤ 𝑅𝐻𝑆, and, therefor, the inequality 𝐹! ≤ 𝐹! always holds
true.
D.7 Proof of Corollary 6.4 (Part ii)
We can easily proof this corollary by contradiction. Assume that the opposite is true, i.e.
𝑄!! ≥ 𝑄!! . Since

!!!!
!∅

is negative, then 𝑄!! will have its lowest value at ∅ = 1. By

substituting the values of 𝑄!! and 𝑄!! into the inequality 𝑄!! ≥ 𝑄!! when ∅ = 1, one may

113

find the following relationship: 𝑏 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 < −𝑎 𝑤 − 𝑠! . It is trivial to see that
this is not true and, thus, the inequality 𝑄!! ≤ 𝑄!! always holds true.
D.8

Proof of Corollary 6.5 (Part i)

We assume that 𝜋!! ≥ 0 under all values of ∅ = 0,1 . That is to say the e-tail store’s
shortage value is not unrealistically high, i.e. 𝑔! < 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤
Thus,
D.9

!!!!
!∅

=

!

𝑔! −

!

!!! !!! !! !

!

4 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! .

< 0.

∅!! ! !!! !!! !!!

Proof of Corollary 6.5 (Part ii)

Under the above condition, we can easily use contradiction to prove that 𝜋!! < 𝜋!! . We
assume the opposite is true, i.e. 𝜋!! > 𝜋!! . Since

!!!!
!∅

< 0, then 𝜋!! will have its lowest

value at ∅ = 1. Substituting ∅ = 1 into the relationship 𝜋!! > 𝜋!! and performing simple
algebraic manipulation leads to 2 < 1. That is a contradiction and, thus, our statement is
correct.
D.10 Proof of Corollary 6.6
We know that 𝜋!! is concave on ∅. Also, we can easily prove that 𝜋!! ≥ 𝜋!! at ∅ = 1.
Assume the opposite is true and substitute ∅ = 1 into the relationship 𝜋!! ≤ 𝜋!! to get
1 + 𝑟! ℎ!

!

≤ 0. That is a contradiction and, thus, our statement is true. We now set

𝜋!! = 𝜋!! to find the formula ∅! 𝐴 + ∅! 𝐵 − ∅𝐶 + 𝐷 = 0. Since 𝜕𝜋!! 𝜕∅ < 0 and
𝜕𝜋!! 𝜕∅ = 0, the previous formula has at the most a single root that satisfies the
condition 0 ≤ ∅ ≤ 1 where;
𝐴 = 𝑔! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! 2𝑝!! + 2𝑔! − 2𝑠! − 𝑐

!

𝐵 = 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! 𝑔! 2𝑝!! + 2𝑔! − 2𝑠! − 𝑐
𝐶 = 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤
2𝑔! − 2𝑠! − 𝑐

!

𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!

!

!

+ 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤

+ 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!

!

!

𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!

+ 𝑔! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! 2𝑝!! +

!

𝐷 = 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!

𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤

!

𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! − 𝑔! 2𝑝!! + 2𝑔! − 2𝑠! − 𝑐

114

!

REFERENCES
Akcay, Y., Boyaci, T., and Zhang, D. (2013). Selling with Money-Back Guarantees: The
Impact on Prices, Quantities, and Retail Profitability. Production and Operations
Management, 22 (4), 777–791.
Alp, O., Erkip, N. K., Gullu, R. (2003). Outsourcing Logistics: Designing Transportation
Contracts Between a Manufacturer and a Transporter. Transportation Science, 37 (1),
23–39.
Balakrishnan, A., Sundaresan, S., and Zhang, B. (2014). Browse-and-Switch: RetailOnline Competition under Value Uncertainty. Production and Operations
Management, 23 (7), 1129–1145.
Berger, P., Lee, J., and Weinberg, B. (2006). Optimal Cooperative Advertising
Integration Strategy for Organizations Adding a Direct Online Channel. Journal of
the Operational Research Society, 57, 920–927.
Bin, L., Rong, Z., and Meidan, X. (2010). Joint Decision on Production and Pricing for
Online Dual Channel Supply Chain System. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 34
(12), 4208–4218.
Cai, G., Zhang, Z. G., and Zhang, M. (2009). Game theoretical perspectives on dualchannel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes.
International Journal of Production Economics, 117 (2009), 80–96.
Cai, X., Chen, J., Xiao, Y., Xu, X., and Yu, G. (2013). Fresh-Product Supply Chain
Management with Logistics Outsourcing. Omega, 41 (4), 752–765.
Cao, L., and Li, L. (2015). The Impact of Cross-Channel Integration on Retailers’ Sales
Growth. Journal of Retailing, 91 (2), 198–216.
Chang, S. Y., and Yeh, T. Y. (2013). A Two-Echelon Supply Chain of a Returnable
Product with Fuzzy Demand. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 37 (6), 4305–4315.
Chen, F. Y., Hum, S. H., and Sun, J. (2001). Analysis of Third-Party Warehousing
Contracts with Commitments. International Journal of Operational Research, 131 (3),
603–610.
Chen, J. (2011). The Impact of Sharing Customer Returns Information in a Supply Chain
With and Without a Buyback Policy. European Journal of Operational Research,
213 (3), 478–488.

115

Chen, J., and Bell, P. (2009). The Impact of Customer Returns on Pricing and Order
Decisions. European Journal of Operational Research, 195 (1), 280–295.
Chen, J., and Bell, P. (2011). The Impact of Customer Returns on Decisions in a
Newsvendor Problem With and Without Buyback Policies. International
Transactions in Operational Research, 18 (4), 473–491.
Chen, J., and Bell, P. (2012). Implementing Market Segmentation Using Full-Refund and
No-Refund Customer Returns Policies in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Structure.
International Journal of Production Economics, 136 (1), 56–66.
Chen, J., and Bell, P. (2013). The Impact of Customer Returns on Supply Chain
Decisions Under Various Channel Interactions. Annals of Operations Research, 206
(1), 59–74.
Chen, J., and Grewal, R. (2013). Competing in a Supply Chain Via Full-Refund and NoRefund Customer Returns Policies. International Journal of Production Economics,
146 (1), 246–258.
Chen, J., and Zhang, H. (2011). The Impact of Customer Returns on Competing Chains.
International Journal of Management Science and Engineering Management, 6 (1),
58–70.
Chen, J., Zhang, H., and Sun, Y. (2012). Implementing Coordination Contracts in a
Manufacturer Stackelberg Dual-Channel Supply Chain. Omega, 40 (5), 571–583.
Chiang, W. Y. (2010). Product Availability in Competitive and Cooperative DualChannel Distribution With Stock-Out Based Substitution. European Journal of
Operational Research, 200 (1), 111–126.
Chiang, W. Y., and Monahan, G. E. (2005). Managing Inventories in a Two-Echelon
Dual-Channel Supply Chain. European Journal of Operational Research, 162 (2),
325–341.
Choi, T. M., Liu, N., Ren, S., and Hui, C. L. (2013). No Refund or Full Refund: When
Should a Fashion Brand Offer Full Refund Consumer Return Service for Mass
Customization Products? Mathematical Problems in Engineering.
Dan, B., Xu, G., and Liu, C. (2012). Pricing Policies in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain
with Retail Services. International Journal of Production Economics, 139 (1), 312–
320.
116

David, A., and Adida, E. (2015). Competition and Coordination in a Two-Channel Supply
Chain. Production and Operations Management, 24 (8), 1358–1370.
Fabbe-Costes, N., Jahre, M., and Roussat, C. (2009). Supply Chain Integration: the Role
of Logistics Service Providers. International Journal of Productivity and Performance
Management, 58 (1), 71–91.
Falk, T., Schepers, J., Hammerschmidt, M., and Bauer, H. H. (2007). Identifying CrossChannel Dissynergies for Multi-Channel Service Providers. Journal of Service
Research, 10 (2), 143–160.
Giri, B. C., and Sarker, B. R. (2017). Improving Performance by Coordinating a Supply
Chain with Third Party Logistics Outsourcing Under Production Disruption.
Computers & Industrial Engineering, 103 (2017), 168–177.
Hartmann, E., and de Grahl, A. (2012). Logistics Outsourcing Interfaces: the Role of
Customer Partnering Behavior. International Journal of Physical Distribution &
Logistics Management, 42 (6), 526–543.
He, L., Liao, X., Zhang, Z. G., and Haug, P. (2016). Analysis of online dual-channel
supply chain based on service level of logistics and national advertising. Quality
Technology & Quantitative Management, 13 (4), 473–490.
Hsiao, L., and Chen, Y. J. (2012). Returns Policy and Quality Risk in E-Business.
Production and Operations Management, 21 (3), 489–503.
Hu, W., and Li, J. (2012). How to Implement Return Policies in a Two-Echelon Supply
Chain. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society.
Hu, W., Li, Y., and Govindan, K. (2014). The Impact of Consumer Returns Policies on
Consignment Contracts with Inventory Control. European Journal of Operational
Research, 233 (2), 398–407.
Hua, G., Wang, S., and Cheng, T. (2010). Price and Lead Time Decisions in DualChannel Supply Chains. European Journal of Operational Research, 205 (1), 113–
126.
Huang, S., Yang, C., and Zhang, X. (2012). Pricing and Production Decisions in DualChannel Supply Chains with Demand Disruptions. Computers and Industrial
Engineering, 62 (1), 70–83.
Jharkharia, S., and Shankar, R. (2010). Selection of Logistics Service Provider: an
Analytic Network Process (ANP) Approach. Omega, 35 (3), 274–289.

117

Jiang, L., Wang, Y., and Yan, X. (2014). Decision and Coordination in a Competing
Retail Channel Involving a Third-Party Logistics Provider. Computers & Industrial
Engineering, 76 (2014), 109–121.
Lei, L., Wang, Q., and Fan, C. (2006). Optimal Business Policies for a SupplierTransporter-Buyer Channel with a Price-Sensitive Demand. The Journal of the
Operational Research Society, 57 (3), 281–289.
Li, Y., Xu, L., and Li, D. (2013). Examining Relationships Between the Return Policy,
Product Quality, and Pricing Strategy in Online Direct Selling. International Journal
of Production Economics, 144 (2), 451–460.
Lim, W. S. (2000). A Lemons Market? An Incentive Scheme to Induce Truth-Telling in
Third Party Logistics Providers. European Journal of Operational Research, 125 (3),
519–525.
Liu, W., Xu, X., and Kouhpaenejad, A. (2013). Deterministic Approach to the Fairest
Revenue-Sharing Coefficient in Logistics Service Supply Chain Under the Stochastic
Demand Condition. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 66 (1), 41–52.
Lu, Q., and Liu, N. (2013). Pricing Games of Mixed Conventional and E-Commerce
Distribution Channels. Computers and Industrial Engineering, 64 (1), 122–132.
Min, H. (2013). Examining Logistics Outsourcing Practices in the United States: from the
Perspectives of Third-Party Logistics Service Users. Logestics Research, 6 (4), 133–
144.
Mollenkopf, D. A., Rabinovich, E., Laseter, T. M., and Boyer, K. K. (2007). Managing
Internet Product Returns: A Focus on Effective Service Operations. Decision
Sciences, 38 (2), 215–250.
Mostard, J., Koster, R., and Teunter, R. (2005). The Distribution-Free Newsboy Problem
with Resaleable Returns. International Journal of Production Economics, 97 (3),
329–342.
Mostard, J., and Teunter, R. (2006). The Newsboy Problem with Resaleable Returns: A
Single Period Model and Case Study. European Journal of Operational Research,
169 (1), 81–96.
Mukhopadhyay, S., and Setaputra, R. (2007). A Dynamic Model for Optimal Design
Quality and Return Policies. European Journal of Operational Research, 180 (3),
1144–1154.

118

Mukhopadhyay, S., and Setoputro, R. (2005). Optimal Return Policy and Modular Design
for Build-to-Order Products. Journal of Operations Management, 23 (5), 496–506.
Neslin, S. A., and Shankar, V. (2009). Key Issues in Multi-Channel Customer
Management: Current Knowledge and Future Directions. Journal of Interactive
Marketing, 23 (1), 70–81.
Neslin, S. A., Grewal, D., Leghorn, R., Shankar, V., Teerling, M. L., Thomas, J., and
Verhoef, P. C. (2006). Challenges and Opportunities in Multi-Channel Customer
Management. Journal of Service Research, 9 (2), 95–112.
Ofek, E., Katona, Z., and Sarvary, M. (2009). “Bricks and Clicks”: The Impact of Product
Returns on the Strategies of Multichannel Retailers. Marketing Science, 30 (2), 42–
60.
Ramanathan, R. (2011). An empirical analysis on the influence of risk on relationships
between handling of product returns and customer loyalty in E-commerce.
International Journal of Production Economics, 130 (2), 255–261.
Reimann, M. (2016). Accurate Response with Refurbished Consumer Returns. Decision
Sciences, 47 (1), 31–59.
Ryan, J., Sun, D., and Zhao, X. (2013). Coordinating a Supply Chain With a
Manufacturer-Owned Online Channel: A Dual Channel Model Under Price
Competition. IEEE Transactions of Engineering Management, 60 (2).
Schoenbachler, D. D., and Gordon, G. L. (2002). Multi-Channel Shopping:
Understanding What Drives Channel Choice. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 19
(1), 42–53.
Steinfield, C. (2004). Does Online and Offline Channel Integration Work in Practice?
Paper presented at the Workshop on E-Commerce Impacts Revisited, DIW- Berlin.
Su, X. (2009). Customer Returns Policies and Supply Chain Performance. Manufacturing
Service Operations Management, 11 (4), 595–612.
Takahashi, K., Aoi, T., Hirotani, D., and Morikawa, K. (2011). Inventory Control in a
Two-Echelon Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Setup of Production and Delivery.
International Journal of Production Economics, 133 (1), 403–415.
Vlachos, D., and Dekker, R. (2003). Return Handling Options and Order Quantities for
Single Period Products. European Journal of Operational Research, 151 (1), 38–52.
119

Wang, K. H., Tung, C. T., and Lee, Y. J. (2010). EOQ Model for Deteriorating Items with
Resaleable Returns. Journal of Information and Optimization Sciences, 31 (1), 189–
204.
Webb, K. L., and Hogan, J. E. (2002). Hybrid Channel Conflict: Causes and Effects on
Channel Performance. Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 17 (5), 338–
356.
Webb, K. L., and Lambe, C. J. (2007). Internal Multi-Channel Conflict: An Exploratory
Investigation and Conceptual Framework. Industrial Marketing Management, 36 (1),
29–43.
Widodo, E., Takahashi, K., Morikawa, K., Pujawan, N., and Santosa, B. (2009).
Managing Sales Return in Dual Sales Channel: An Analysis if its Product
Substitution. International Journal of Industrial and Systems Engineering, 9 (2).
Widodo, E., Takahashi, K., Morikawa, K., Pujawan, N., and Santosa, B. (2010).
Managing Sales Return in Dual Sales Channel: Common Return Versus CrossChannel Return Analysis. International MultiConference of Engineers and Computer
Scientists, 3. Hong Kong.
Yalabik, B., Petruzzi, N., and Chhajed, D. (2005). An Integrated Product Returns Model
With Logistics and Marketing Coordination. European Journal of Operational
Research, 161 (1), 162–182.
Yan, R. (2008). Pricing Strategy for Companies with Mixed Online and Traditional
Retailing Distribution Markets. Journal of Product and Brand Management, 17 (1),
48–56.
Yan, R. (2010). Product Brand Differentiation and Dual-Channel Store Performances of a
Multi-Channel Retailer. European Journal of Marketing, 44 (5), 672–692.
Yan, R., Wang, J., and Zhou, B. (2010). Channel Integration and Profit Sharing in the
Dynamics of Multi-Channel Firms. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 17
(5), 430–440.
Yao, D. Q., Yue, X., Mukhopadhyay, S. K., and Wang, Z. (2009). Strategic Inventory
Deployment for Retail and E-tail Stores. Omega, 37 (2009), 646–658.

120

You, P. S., Ikuta, S., and Hsieh, Y. C. (2010). Optimal Ordering and Pricing Policy for an
Inventory System with Trial Periods. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 34 (10),
3179–3188.
Yu, M. C., and Goh, M. (2012). Time-Bound Product Returns and Optimal Order
Quantities for Mass Merchandisers. International Journal of Systems Science, 43 (1),
163–179.
Zhang, J., Farris, P., Irvin, J., Kushwaha, T., Steenburgh, T., and Weitz, B. (2010).
Crafting Integrated Multi-channel Retailing Strategies. Journal of Interactive
Marketing, 24 (2), 168–180.

121

VITA AUCTORIS
NAME: Mohannad Hassan Radhi
PLACE OF BIRTH: Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
YEAR OF BIRTH: 1979
EDUCATION:
2012 – 2018: Ph.D. Industrial and Manufacturing Systems Engineering, University of
Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
2009 – 2012: M.Sc. Industrial and Manufacturing Systems Engineering, University of
Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
1996 – 2002: B.Sc. Mechanical Engineering, King Fahad University of Petroleum and
Minerals, AL-Khobar, Saudi Arabia.
PEER REVIEWED JOURNAL PUBLICATION:
Radhi, M., Zhang G. (2016). Optimal Configuration of Remanufacturing Supply Network
with Return Quality Decision. International Journal of Production Research, 54 (5), 1487–
1502.
RECENT CONFERENCES:
Radhi, M., Zhang, G. (2016). Pricing Policies in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Offering a
Full Refund for Resalable Returns, CORS 2016 Annual Conference, Banff, Alberta,
Canada.

122

